Study aid, not legal advice. caselaw is not a law firm and does not provide legal advice or engage in the unauthorized practice of law (UPL). All briefs, outlines, and citation tools on these pages are educational summaries for law students; they are not a substitute for advice from a licensed attorney admitted in your jurisdiction. Bar-admission rules vary by state. For court filings or client matters, verify every authority against the official reporter and your court's local rules. Use of caselaw does not create an attorney-client relationship.
WHITNEY et al. v. PURO FILTER CORPORATION OF AMERICA, 1933 — 63 F.2d 811 · caselaw · US
Corporations
WHITNEY et al. v. PURO FILTER CORPORATION OF AMERICA
63 F.2d 811·United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit·1933
Brief incoming
Hand-reviewed Bluebook brief (procedural posture, facts, issue, holding, reasoning, dissent) ships once the AI generation pipeline runs through this case. Join the waitlist to get notified when 1L briefs go live.
Opinion
WHITNEY et al. v. PURO FILTER CORPORATION OF AMERICA.
No. 237.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.
March 6, 1933.
Frank R. Pentlarge and David C. Johnson, both of New York City, for appellants.
. Zalkin & Cohen, of New Yoijj City (Nathan Coplan and Barney Fensterstoek, both of New York City, of counsel), for appellee.
' Before L. HAND, SWAN, and CHASE,Circuit Judges.
[MAJORITY — PER CURIAM.]
PER CURIAM.
The bill alleges that the defendant declared a dividend on July 5th payable on July 20th. It was filed on July 8th, and therefore before the payment which it seeks to enjoin. The order to show cause was issued on July 12th, also before the date of payment. The .-relief sought was therefore more than a de-elaratory judgment, and the court has juris- • diction.
j[2] On the merits it is plain that both decree :and order were correct. The purpose of the Charter was to give a limited priority to-, class A stock, which should end when any share or shares had received an .aggregate of $1.60 in dividends. Although the provision is peculiar, it was not unlawful, and it is so plain that discussion cannot clarify it. The preferred shareholders appear to have been content to give up their birthright for this mess of pottage. Any who bought A shares thereafter were fully advised that their advantage ended when the original A shareholders had got what they bargained for. The charter was before them and they were charged with notice of its plain meaning.
Decree and order affirmed.