Study aid, not legal advice. caselaw is not a law firm and does not provide legal advice or engage in the unauthorized practice of law (UPL). All briefs, outlines, and citation tools on these pages are educational summaries for law students; they are not a substitute for advice from a licensed attorney admitted in your jurisdiction. Bar-admission rules vary by state. For court filings or client matters, verify every authority against the official reporter and your court's local rules. Use of caselaw does not create an attorney-client relationship.
John Fisher Reese et al., Respondents, v. John A. Rutherfurd, Appellant, 1882 — 90 N.Y. 644 · caselaw · US
Criminal Law · MBE-tested
John Fisher Reese et al., Respondents, v. John A. Rutherfurd, Appellant
90 N.Y. 644·New York Court of Appeals·1882·NY
Brief incoming
Hand-reviewed Bluebook brief (procedural posture, facts, issue, holding, reasoning, dissent) ships once the AI generation pipeline runs through this case. Join the waitlist to get notified when 1L briefs go live.
Opinion
John Fisher Reese et al., Respondents, v. John A. Rutherfurd, Appellant.
Interest was allowed upon a balance for moneys loaned, due prior to January 1, 1880, when the act changing the rate of interest went into effect (Chap. 588, Laws of 1879), at seven per cent, up to that date, and at six per cent thereafter. Held no error ; that on that date plaintiff had a vested right to so much of the interest as had accrued at the rate fixed by law prior thereto, of which right the act did not attempt to deprive him, and could not, had it so attempted.
(Argued October 11, 1882;
decided October 24, 1882.)
In 1870 and 1871 the plaintiffs were stock brokers in the city of New York, under the firm name of Reese & Hall, and the defendant during those years, prior to July 1, 1871, purchased and sold stocks through them as his brokers, and this action was commenced to recover of the defendant a balance claimed by the plaintiffs to be due them on account of their transactions with him'. The transactions were entered in the books of the plaintiffs, and accounts were from time to time rendered to the defendant, the last being rendered shortly after the close of the account.
The referee, in computing interest on the balance of the account due the plaintiffs, allowed interest at the rate of seven per cent down to the first day of January, 1880, and thereafter at the rate of six per cent. The claim was made on the part of appellant that by this mode of computation the referee committed an error. Held untenable.
The court say, “ We are of opinion that the mode of computation was fight. By the law as it existed prior to 1880, the rate of interest to be allowed as damages in such a case was seven per cent, and on the first day of January the plaintiffs had a vested right to so much of the interest as had accrued prior to that date, and of that vested right the law reducing the rate of interest did not attempt to deprive ‘them, and it could not have deprived them of it even if the legislature had attempted so to do, and hence ho error was committed.”
George H. Forster for appellant.
Hugh Z. Cole for respondent.
[MAJORITY — Earl, J.,]
Earl, J.,
reads for affirmance, with costs.
All concur, except Rapablo, J., absent.
Judgment affirmed.