WILLIAM WILLIAMS and others, Appellants, v. GEORGE ARMROYD and others, Appellees

WILLIAM WILLIAMS and others, Appellants, v. GEORGE ARMROYD and others, Appellees. Absent, Todd, J. a sentence ¿t L„°[dgn ‘T*’ aeranini? netttral property uo^Tt iniSeit «oñtrary to í vioía-"3’ ,«on of neutral rights! au<t ed,by ttié leexecutive d¿ partm-entsK of thb govern-United States; changes the tiihiPNcoh-Ehe denmed A Affirmed by aueh sentence, and iff good Rb initio. sale by the-authority of. the. captors before 'seiir- THIS was an appeal from the sentence of the Circuit Court for the district ef Pennsylvania, which dismissed the libel with costs. A French^ufdaioupehatP" jurisdictíon ed°on ufe high seas for breach "Lvee ^and rriect : _. e Dnt Stand ° of Martins, and order ^the Dutch governor of St. fore condemnation, withiVen'ih tribudeoiee, the dutch na! at Guada* lpup<».( The American owner Cannot reclaim, in the fcourts oi thté country, his be!'h seized and cbmiem*¿oun u^de^ the Milan de cree" Tile libel stated* tfaat'the. schooner Fortitude, Owned by Williams and others# citizens of the United States, having taken in á cargó of molasses at Martinico, sad-ed oh l^e 20th of: August, 1809, fair New London* That ort the next day she was piratically seized on the high by an artned schooners;, shewing no.coloufcs, but asserted to be from Guadaloupe, and carried into St. Mar--Where'the captain’s papers were taken from .him, the vess.bl andoargo detained, Nas it was asserted, to the event of it trial* That on the 9th' of Septem* hdr,. the. prize-master left St, • Martin’s for Guadaloupe, with a copy of the schooner’s papers, under preof causing proceedings to ,be instituted in the FrenckCotijrt of Admiralty ip that'island: Tliat on the -September, the master of the Fortitude "went to St. BarthMomexvs, arid on his return was informed, that durifig his absence the Governor had ordered the Vessel and-cargo to.be sold at public sale; which was dbne arid bought for the Governor and one of his council,’ as the Libellants believed. Tiiat immediately after the sale*' the; Governor took possession of the vessel, arid on the' 2d of October the! cargo was landed, and 97.hogsheads of tiie- riiola,Sites were shipped on hoard another vessel to Philadelphia, where they arrived, consigned to Arm- and others, of whom'the Libellants demanded it# but they refused to deliver it, or to account for the valueof jt. • \ claim was interposed by George Armroyri oc Co. i*1* behalf of Richardson, <§*Carty* arid others, which statofedr-tháton the.21st of August, 1809, and long before, war existed between Great Britain and France ; that the Fortitude, being an American vessd at peace with ^1C French .empire, on her voyage from Martinico,, a lation of .the decrees and Regulations of tiiat empire, .was seized by a French privateer, and carried to Sí. Mar-as lawful, prize to the captors; ^and her papers sent to a French tribunal, having competent juris.lietion, at Guadaloupe, under the sole and exclusive dominion and jurisdiction of the‘French empire; but the papers arere captured on the passage to Guadaloupe. thif vessel-arid cargo, being so carried into St. Martinis, were there bona fide sold by order of the Dutch coloriy, where she had been trading with the enemies of the French empire, during the war, in viogovernor at the island, to whom such right belonged, by the laws arid constitutions of the said island $ and the goods in question, part of t>>e cargo, were bona fide purchased by a certain I. L. Lapierre, arid by him bono Jld'e sold to a certain Jlbraham Gonclieyter, from whom they were afterwards bond fide purchased by Richards <§• Carty, for account of themselves and others; By qonsent of parties^ a senterice w.is passed profórMa in the District Court, for the Libellants. In the Circuit Court, upon tlie appeal, the Claimants exhibited a further answer, stating, .that .by a decree of the Registry of the Commission for prize causes Of the island of Guadeloupe, and its dependencies, duly conStituted a Court of Prirae. by the Emperor of France, on the 12th of October, 1S09, the schooner Fortitude, and her cargo, were condemned, by a sentence which is set forth at large in the answer; the substance of which sentence is included in the following extract, viz. “ it results From the examination arid from the analysis »f the papers just mentioned, that the- schooner *• Fortitude, captured by the French privateer, Le. Fripon, is the property of a citizen of tlie United States of America; tii^t she sailed from New London, bound. u to Martinico, at which place she sold her cargo, and L< tooTf in another of molasses for the said port of New-London, and consequently she has incurred the.penal- « ty, pronounced by the Sd article of the Imperial de- “ cree,.which directs new measures against the maritime' *< system of England, and was given at the Royal. Pa-f( lace of Milan, on the 17th of September, 1807, in* ** serted in tlie bulletin of the laws, No. 169, which ar«tide is as follows: « Evei;y vessel-whatever, and whatever be her cargo, which shall have cleared from any English port, co* ** lony, or country occupied,by English troops, or which te shall be. bound to any English port, colony or country «« occupied by English troons, shall be good prize, as “ having infringed the present decree. Such vessels « shall be captured by our riien of war, and awarded « to the captors.” “ And after .having heard the opinion of the inspector « of marine, we have declared, and. do declare, the “ American schooner Fortitude to have been well, and « duly captufed by tlie French privateer, Le Fnpon, and to he forfeited to the owners and crew of Hie said private'ei*; consequently the said schooner Fortitude, “ together with her cargo, is awarded to the captors to « be sold in the customary form, if -jthé.sale has not al- (• ready taken place j- and the proceeds shall be distri- « bated conformably to the ordinance concerning capee tures,” &c. On the 19th of April, 1811, the Circuit Court reversed the sentence of the District Court, with costs; from which sentence of reversal, the Libellants appealed to lliis Court. Lyman Law, for the Appellants. This condemnation was founded upon .the Milan urce, which is admitted, on its face, to be in violation of the law of nations. It does not proceed on the ground of its being the property of an enemy, nor contraband of Avar, nor for violating, a blockade^ If it appear from tifo sentence itself, that the-condemnation Avas not upon any ground recognized by the law of nations, nor upon the violation of any municipal right acknoAvledged by that law, this Court will not carry it into effect. France may, by . her own municipal laAvs, regulate her own trade, but she lias no right to control .ours, beyond her territorial jurisdiction, further than to protect her own belligerent rights, acknowledged by the law of nations. If we violate no such right, and if we do not carry our property within her territorial jurisdiction, she has no right to regulate our trade., Her condemnation, grounded upon regulations which she has no right, according to the law of nations, to make, is void. But even if she had a right to condemn, her. condemnation •ean transfer ho'title, unless the thing' itself be in her possession, at the time of condemnation, so that the' possession may pass. with the title. Here the property never was within the jurisdiction of the Court at Guadalope. It had been sold and delivered by the Dutch governor, before the condemnation. It does not appear that he had any authority either from the capfors, or from the Court, to make the sale. The purchaser canticit derive from the' governor a better title, than the governor had at the time of sale. I. R. Ingersorii, contra. It is acknowledged that a tribunal, professing to be a Court of Admiralty, has condemned the property in question, and that the Appellees possess it by virtue of a capture on the high seas. This is prima facie evidence of the correctness of the title, and throws the onus probandi upon the Appellants. A Court of Admiralty is a Court whose jurisdiction is .co-Ordinate with that of every other throughout the world. The Admiralty Jaw is “ of all times and of all nations,” and its decrees, so far as they uffect the thing itself, and so long as they remain unreversed, cannever be question-, ed. The end being gained,' it is an immaterial question, what, were the means, as they are sanctified by1 tlie end. Whether the proceedings are erroneous, or not, according to our notions of right and wrong, whether they are predicated upon a mistake of the law, or of the fact, or are founded upon regulations consistent with, or rc* pugnant to, the law of, nations, .are questions wholly immaterial. The sentence has sealed the proceedings, and those questions can never judicially come before this Court. In confirmation of these positions,, it might be suificient to refer to the decisions of this Court, where the principles are settled. ■In the case of Rose v. Himely, 4 Cr. 292, this Court refused, to' confirm the property of the alleged purchaser, because the Court, passing sentence, had neither the actual nor constructive jurisdiction, nor power, over the subject in controversy. The point upon which it was decided was, that the vessel and cargo were seized, out of the territorial jurisdiction claimed by the French government of St. Domingo, for a breach of municipal regulations, and were never carried within that jurist diction, but were sold by the captor at a foreign port. Two Judges, (the Chief Justice and Judge Washing-top) thought that, in order to give jurisdiction, the property should have beep taken as prize of war,, brought infra presidia; Íj’íií*ee (Jiu!ges Cushing, CIia^fe and Liyjngston) were of opinion;'that it wotííd be coni' c]usiye even under a municipal Regulation, provided it were carried to the country of the captors. Judge Johhson considered, it conclusive at all events. But even in that case, the Chief Justice says, in p. 276, « If the F Court of St. Domipgo had jurisdiction, the sentence is conclusive.55 ■ In the cage of Hudson and others v. Guestier, and La Font v. Bigelow, 4 Cr. 293, it is decide;] flipt, in case of prize of war, a condemnation, while, lying in a neutral port, will bind the property^ an. that the game principle applies to a seizure, made lyitbin the territory of a state, for a violation of jtsjnwnicipjdlaws, p. 296. judges Chase and Livingston dissented,. because the vessel was not carried into a French-port for trial. Judge johnson adhered to 1ns former opinion, that it was immaterial whether the capture was ¿nade in the exercise of m,unicipal or belligerent rights, or, Wither within the jurisdictional limits of France, where She is supreme, or upon the high gras, where her authority is concurrent with that of other nations. P. 29$, In the case of Craudson and others, v. Leonard, 4 Cr. 434, it was decided;, that a sentence pf condemnation for breach of blockade, was conclusive evidence of a violation of the warranty of neutrality in a policy of insurance. In the casé of Rose & Himoly, above mentioned, the incidental questions were decided,in favor pf our positions j for here it was prize of war., seized and condemned within the jurisdiction of the Court;, yet it maybe said the issue of that pase was adverse. If sp, it was expressly over-ruled in Hudson & Smith, v. Guestier, 6 Cr. 281. The Court there unanimously decided; that the judge of tlie.Fr< nch Court must have had a rightto píspese of every question made in behalf of the owner pf the property, whether it related to the jurisdiction of the Court,' pr arose out of the law of nations, or out of the French decrees, or in any other way: and even if tlye reasons of his judgment, should not be satisfactory,, it would be no ground for a foreign Court to rescind his proceedings, and to r: fuse to consider his sentence as conclusive pn the proper y ; and that, as the title was changed by the condemnation at Guadalope, the original pwner had po right to pursue ,it in the hands of a yendee, ' But this is no new principle of law originating with the present state of the worid, which would seem, rather to forbid it; since the rapacity of Courts of on the one side, apd their acknowledged subserviency to the governing power' on the other/ di minish the respect which would otherwise be due to their sentences. The conclusive eifect of a foreign sentence in changingjfthe property seems to have been first judicially decided in the case of’ Hughes v. Cornelius, 2 Shower, 242. Sir T. Raymond, 473. Skin. 59. Lord Raym. 893. 935. Vern. 21. The authority of 'this case has never been questioned. The only question has been as to the collateral eifect -between underwriters and the assured in cases of warranty in a policy of insurance. And even there, whenever the condemnation has been upon,.the ground of its being the property ’ of an enemy, the sen- , tepee has always beep holder to be conclusive, without regard to the circumstances by which the Court came to, that result; The sentence is conclusive as to whatever; it purports to decide. Park. 355; 360, 361-2, Rob. 173, The Christopher. 4 Rob, 35, The Henrick and Maria. 5.Rob,, 255,, The Comet. 4 Rob. 3. The Helena. 3 Bos. & Pul. 505, Lothian v. Henderson, 7 T. R. 526, Calvert v. Boville, 7 T. R. 681, Geyer v. Aguilar. East, 473, Oddy v. Boville. 3 Bos. & Pul. 201, Baring v. Clagett. 5 East, 99, Baring v. Royal Exch. Ins. Co, 5 East, 15, Balton v. Gladstone. Such also, has been the course of decisions in the different American States, 1 Binney, 295, Calhoun v. Penn. In. Co. 3 Binney, 220, Cheviot v. Faussat. Johnson’s N. Y. cases, 451, Vanderheuvel v. The United In. Co. S. C. 127. Such being the acknowledged eifect of a foreign condemnation, the only remedy for the injured party isa yesprt to the Court of the epptors for redress, If that government will not afford it, he must apply to his own/ jvhich will make it a national concern to be settled either by negotiation or.war, if it be deemed a matter of Sufficient importance. Doug. 614, Le Caux v. Eden. The fact that the Milan decree was a violation of the pw of nations, and of our neutral rights, can make no ,ifference„ Foe if an unjust, condensation, professing to be founded upon a just law, be conclusive, there is no reason why a condemnation, founded upon an unjust law, should' not be equally conclusive. The question is not, whether this Court will lend its to.carry into effect the Milan decree, but whether it will reverse the sentence of a foreign Court, and destroy vested rights- acquired under such a sentence by a bona fide purchaser. Rut it is said the purchase was made before the sentence of condemnation was passed, and was therefore void. This/ however, can make no difference. The effect of the condemnation is not to vest the property, but to sanctify ’a title which was vested by the capture ; to confirm all intermediate acts, and to give a judicial ,sanction to that which was already sufficiently firm in point of fact. 1 Wils. 211, 2 Azuni, 262. 12 Mod. 134, Rex v. Broome. Carth. 398. S. C. The condemnation does not give property, it only establishes the fact that the captor bad a lawful title by the capture/ -These maritime sales in market overt give an indefeasible title.. 4 Johnson, 38, 39, Grant v. M'Lachlan. In cases of foreign attachment, if the attached goods are perishable, or from their situation are exposed to peculiar danger, the-constant practice is to order a sale, and such sales are valid, although the attaching creditor may fail to support his claim. It is an established principle, says the. Court of errors, (2.Johnson’s cases, 458,) that any person purchasing will be secure, • Law,- in reply,’ cited the, cases of Geyer v. Aguilar, Pollard v. Bell, Price v. Bell, Bird v. Appleton, Mayne v. Walter. 1 Rob. 144, and Havelock v. Rockwood, 8 T. R. 268, to show that there must be a good cause fob condemnation by the law of nations. He cited also, •i’Cr. 221. Doug. 67.4, and 1 Bób. ISO1, to the same point, and to show the limitation of the general principle'of .conclusivencss of a foreign sentence. As to .the extent of the power of France over neutral commerce, he cited. Marten’s Law of Nations, 332 / and to show that the Berlin and Milan decrees were in violation of our neutral rights, and were so declared by our government, fce referred to the President’s message to; Congress of the 15th of December, 1810, and cited 4 Cr. 292, Ross v. Himely. 3 Rob. 99, 333, 2 Rob. 239. To show that the Court must haye jurisdiction, fore its decree can'be conclusive, he cited 4 Cr. 471. 3 Rob. 96. To support the position that a sale before demnation is hot valid, he cited Marten’s 33%. 4 Cr. 250. 1 Browne’s‘Civil law, 254. 1 Rob. 139, Dana, on the same side. This is an appeal by a citizen of the United States . his government for redress for a violation of his neutral 'rights by a foreign sovereign. This Court exercises that branch of, the government, which, in some coun tries of Europe,-is exercised by the sovereign himself The only question is, whether this Court has .power to declare void a condemnation founded upon a decree, which the legislature atul the executive of the United -States have declared to be a violation of our. neutral rights, and contrary to the law of nations. This,is a question never before agitated in the Courts of the United States. This vessel has not violated the law of nations, nor the municipal law of any state or nation. The sovereign' power ot a nation cannot be exercised' on the high seas, unless over its own subjects or pirates, or jure belli. It can affect hostile property only. A municipal regulation can' not rightfully affect neqtral property, beyond the territorial jurisdiction. On the high seas all nations are equal. This property, having never been within the French jurisdiction, can never have of-' fended against French municipal law. The Court had no jurisdiction under the municipal law of France in such a. case. Suppose, in case of capture and recapture, the first captors proceed to libel and condemn the property in a French Court, while it is safe in a port of the United States, having never been within the jurisdiction of France. It can never be pretended that such a condemnation would be valid. ' The title and possession must be delivered together at the same time, or the sentence will not be conclusive in rein. In the cases of Rose Himely, and Hudson fhtcstier,, the property was sold by an agent of the Court; but the Dutch governor of St. Martin’s, had no; authority from the tribunal at Guadaloupe. It has been decided in the Courts of the United States, that Holland not a dependency of France. Captors cannot sell or dispose of the property captured, before the capture has been adjudged lawful by a competent Court. It is the interest of ,ali nations to enforce this rule. The onnosite practice would lead to incalculable evils. March 8th... [MAJORITY — Marshall, Chief Justice] Marshall, Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the Court as follows : A vessel, with a cargo belonging in part to' the Ap-, pellants, was captured On the'high seas, on the 30th of August, 180.9, by á French privateer, and carried to St. Afartins, where the vessel arid cargo were sold, bw order , of the governor, at public auction, and part or the cargo purchased and sent to the Appellees in Philáde phia. After the sale, the.vessel and cargo were condemned by the Court of' prize, sitting at Guadaloupe; professedly for a violation of the Milan decree in trading to a dependence of England. On the arrival of this goods, they were claimed by the original owner, who filed a. libel for them. In the District Court, they were adjudged to 1dm; The Circuit Court reversed that sentence, and from the' judgment of the Circuit. Court there is an appeal to this Court.’ It appears to be. settled in this country,- that the Sentence of a competent Court, proceeding in rem, is conclusive with respect to the thing itself, and operates as an absolute change of the property. By such sentence; the right of the former owner is lost, and a complete title given to the person who claims under, the decree: No Court of co-ordinate' jurisdiction can examine the Sentence. The question, therefore, respecting its conformity to general or municipal law, cam never arise, for no co-ordinate tribunal is capable of making the inquiry. The decision, ..in the. case of Hudson Smith, v-Guestier, reported in 6t’> Cranch, is considered as fully establislungthis principle. It is contended that the sentence, in tnis case, has not- . changed the property, because 1st; The sale was made under the direction 0/the governor of St. Martins, before the sentence of condemnation was pronounced. 2d. The sentence proves its own illegality, because it purports to be made under a decree which the govern'ment of the United States has declared to be subversive of neutral rights and national law. 1st.* In support of the first objection, it has been urged, that the jurisdiction of the Court depends on the possession of' the thing; that a sentence is a formal decision, by. which a forcible possession is converted into a civil right; and that the possession being gone, there remains nothing on which the sentence can operate. However just this reasoning may be when applied to a. case, in which the possession of the captor has been divested by an adversary force; as in the cases of recapture, rescue, or escape ,• its correctness is not admitted when' applied to this case. The possession is not an adversary possession, but the possession of a person claiming under the captor. The sale was made on the application of the captor, and the possession of the vendee is a continuance of his possession. The capturé is made by and for the government j and the condemnation, relates back to the capture, and affirms its legality. 2d. That the sentence is avowedly made under a decree subversive of the law of nations, will not help the Appellant’s case, in a Court which cannot revise, correct, or even examine that sentence. If an erroneous judgment binds the property on which it acts, it will not bind that property the less because its error is apparent. Of that'error, advantage can be taken only in a Court which is capable of correcting it. It is true that in this case there is the less difficulty in saying, that the edict under which this sentence was pronounced, is a direct and flagrant violation of national law, because the declai’ation has already been made by the legislature of the Union. But what consequénces attend this declaration ? the legislature which was competent to make it, was also competent to limit its operation, or to give it effect by the employment of such means as:.its own wisdom should suggest. "Had one of these been, that all sentences pronoiineed under it should .be considered as void, and incapable of changing the property they professed to condemn, this Court could not have hesitated to recognize tilt title of the original owner iri this case. But the legislature has not chosen to declare sentences of condemnation, pronounced under this unjustifiable decree, absolutely void. It has not interfere,d'with them. They retain therefore the. obligation common to all sentences whether erroneous or otherwise, and bind the property Which is their object; whatever opinion other co-ordinate tribunals may entertain of their own propriety, or of the laws ‘under which they were rendered, 'the sentence is affirmed with costs,