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Contracts · MBE-tested
YOUNG v. GRISWOLD MFG. CO.
25 F.2d 722·United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit·1928
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Opinion
YOUNG v. GRISWOLD MFG. CO.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.
April 17, 1928.
No. 3710.
Patents <§=>288(5) — Defendant In patent Infringement suit cannot be heard to question jurisdiction in which it participated and of which it invited exercise.
Defendant in patent infringement suit, knowing in advance of hearing by court that infringing dampers were bought by plaintiff, and submitting case on merits of patent and infringement thereof by sale of dampers bought by plaintiff, will not be beard to question jurisdiction in which it participated and of which it invited exercise.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania; W. H. Seward Thomson, Judge.
On motion to vacate judgment. Petition dismissed.
For former opinion, see 23 F.(2d) 1007.
Ballard Moore, of Chicago, Ill., Fraley & Paul, of Philadelphia, Pa., and Cheever & Cox, of Chicago, Ill., for appellant.
Hugh C. Lord, of Erie, Pa., for appellee.
Before BUFFINGTON, WOOLLEY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
[MAJORITY — BUFFINGTON, Circuit Judge.]
BUFFINGTON, Circuit Judge.
After argument and due consideration had, we find no sufficient ground to warrant our disturbing what we have already decided. As appears by the letter of counsel dated April 30, 1927, the defendants, in advance of the hearing by this court, knew that the infringing dampers were bought by the plaintiff. With that knowledge the case was proceeded in and submitted to our determination on the merits of the patent and infringement thereof by the sale of the dampers bought by the plaintiff. Having thus chanced the decision of the ease, the defendant will not now he heard to question a jurisdiction which it has participated in and invited exercise thereof.
Accordingly the petition is dismissed.