Karol Holomany, as President of the Verni Slovaci Lodge, 110, of the National Slavonic Society of the United States of America, Respondent, v. The National Slavonic Society of the United States of America, Appellant

Karol Holomany, as President of the Verni Slovaci Lodge, 110, of the National Slavonic Society of the United States of America, Respondent, v. The National Slavonic Society of the United States of America, Appellant. What right of review of the action of a society, by its own tribunal, will not, until it be had, bar an appeal to the courts. The rule that, if the constitution and by-laws of a society afford a member, claiming to be aggrieved by a ruling of a tribunal of the society, a remedy by appeal to another tribunal of the society, the court Will not entertain a suit by such member to obtain relief from the ruling until he has exhausted his remedy by appeal, will only be applied where the appeal given is such that the aggrieved party, of his own motion, is entitled, as a matter of right, to obtain a review of the ruling. A provision in the by-laws of a society that any one dissatisfied with the verdict of the grand jury of the society may call the latter to account at the following convention, through any delegate present, and that the convention may affirm or annul the verdict of the grand jury, does not give to a local assembly of the society, which has been expelled by the grand jury, an absolute right to secure a review by appeal, as its expulsion deprives it of a delegate at the convention, thus rendering it dependent for the presentation of the appeal upon the favor of a delegate of some other assembly. Appeal by the defendant, The National Slavonic Society of the United States of America, from a judgment of the Supreme Court in favor of the plaintiff, entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 12th day of July, 1898, upon the decision of the court rendered after a trial at the New York Special Term. The supreme assembly of the defendant’s society notified the lodge of which the plaintiff is the president that one of the members of that lodge had been expelled from the society and called upon the lodge to expunge his name from the rolls. Upon the refusal of the lodge to comply with this request the supreme assembly suspended the lodge and the individual members thereof, and also preferred a charge against the lodge before the grand jury of the society, which body finally expelled the lodge and the members thereof from the society. The plaintiff thereupon brought this action to obtain an adjudication that the attempted expulsion of the plaintiff’s lodge was void and to secure a reinstatement of such lodge and the individual members thereof. George F. Roesch, for the appellant. Edward A. Alexander, for the respondent. [MAJORITY — Rumsey, J.:] Rumsey, J.: The reasons given in his decision by the learned justice before whom this case was tried are amply sufficient to show the propriety of the judgment which he directed to be entered. We would not, therefore, deem it necessary to add anything to that decision were it not for the point made before us, which does not seem to have been adverted to by him, that the plaintiff had a remedy by appeal from the action of the'grand jury of the society in expelling it, and that it should have been compelled to exhaust that remedy in the society before resorting to the court for relief. The claim of the defendant is that, by the constitution and by-laws of the society, an appeal lay from the action of the grand jury to the next convention of the society, and that whoever was dissatisfied with the verdict of the jury might have its action in rendering the verdict revised by the convention, which had authority to confirm it or set it aside. It is, undoubtedly, the rule in such cases that where the by-laws of the society afford a remedy by appeal from the tribunal to which is intrusted in the first instance the trial of members for offenses against the society, that remedy must be exhausted before the party claiming to be aggrieved will be heard upon an application to the courts to annul the action of the constituted tribunal of the society. (Poultney v. Bachman, 31 Hun, 51; Lafond v. Deems, 81 N. Y. 507.) But that rule will only be applied where the appeal given is such that, as a matter of ■right, the aggrieved party may review the decision of the subordinate tribunal. It is not sufficient to create a tribunal which has the power to annul or affirm the decision against him, but it is necessary as well that he should have the absolute right to appeal to that tribunal, and that such right should not depend upon the discretion or favor of any person for its exercise. Unless the procedure before the tribunal is such that the appellant of his own motion may come into that tribunal and bring the respondent there and have a hearing, he does not have such a right of appeal as will oust the courts of jurisdiction. In this case we do not see that such a right of appeal is given. There is a provision for a trial before the grand jury, to which the power is given to make certain judgments after a trial before it. The only provision for an appeal is found in sections 33 and 34 of the by-laws of the supreme assembly. They provide that the verdict of the grand jury shall be unrepealahle until the next coming convention. Whoever is dissatisfied with the verdict of the grand jury may call the latter to account through any delegate present at the convention. The convention shall have the right either to affirm or annul the verdict of the grand jury. No other provisions are made for an appeal. The convention consists of a delegate from each one of the local assemblies and the chief officers of the supreme assembly. There is no provision anywhere in the by-laws that the appeal of any local assembly must be taken up by the convention, nor is it made the duty of any particular delegate to present such an appeal. If the local assembly had a delegate in the convention, it would, undoubtedly, be in a situation to present its case and have its appeal heard. But in the absence of such a delegate, no means are provided for an appeal, and whether it could obtain one or not would depend solely upon the favor of some person who happened to be a delegate. In this particular case, as the result of the punishment of expulsion, the plaintiff would have no delegate in the convention, and whether or not it could appeal depends upon whether some delegate of some other assembly should see fit to present its case and take charge of its interests upon the appeal. This clearly does not constitute such an appeal as would take away the right of the aggrieved party to resort to the courts for its protection. The other objections taken to the judgment are sufficiently answered in the decision of the learned justice at the Special Term. The judgment must be affirmed, with costs. Barrett, Patterson and McLaughlin, JJ., concurred. Judgment affirmed, with costs.