The New Haven Web Company, Respondent,, against Francis J. C. Ferris, Appellant. The Armstrong Manufacturing Company, Respondent, against Francis J. C. Ferris, Appellant.
(Decided April 1st, 1889.)
Defendant was arrested on an order of arrest granted on the ground that he had disposed of his property with intent to defraud his creditors. Twenty-one days after his arrest, plaintiff entered judgment on a complaint, not previously filed or served, and which did not contain allegations that defendant had disposed of his property with intent to defraud his creditors, but only averments of a sale and delivery of goods to defendant. Held, that a motion by defendant to vacate the order of arrest might be granted, although not made within twenty days of the granting of the order of arrest, as required by section 567 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The complaint not containing the essential allegations, the motion to vacate could be made at any time under section 558.
Appeals from orders of this court denying motions to vacate orders of arrest.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Andrew Gilhooly, for appellant.
Franklin Bien, for respondents.
[MAJORITY — Van Hoesen, J.]
Van Hoesen, J.
The plaintiffs charged the defendant with having disposed of his property with intent to defraud his creditors, and on the 29th day of May, 1888, the defendant was on their application arrested. The complaints were not served. On the 19th of June, twenty-one days afterwards, the plaintiffs entered their judgments upon complaints that did not contain any allegation that the defendant had fraudulently disposed of his property, but contained only an ordinary averment of a sale and delivery of goods to the defendant. As the defendant was arrested more than twenty days before the entry of final judgment, and as, before making the motion to vacate the order of arrest, the defendant had been under arrest more than twenty clays, the plaintiff insists that the defendant is precluded by section 567 from moving to vacate the order of arrest. It is plain that section 567 does not apply to this case. The ground of the defendant’s motion was not exposed to view till after judgment had been entered, and then he had been in custody for more than twenty days. It was not until after final judgment had been entered, which was at least twenty-one days after his arrest, that the defendant discovered that the complaints, which had never been served at all, and which had not previously been filed, failed to contain what section 549, subdivision 4, imperatively requires that they shall contain, namely: the allegation that defendant had disposed of his property with intent to defraud his creditors. It would be a mockery to provide that the defendant may not take advantage of an objection the existence of which he could not possibly detect until the time to make the objection has passed beyond recall.
The defendant was not too late in his motion. Section 549 provides that there cannot be a recovery in an action in which a defendant is arrested for disposing of his property with intent to defraud his creditors, unless the plaintiff alleges in his complaint, and proves at the trial, that the defendant has committed the fraud. If the complaint fails to contain the necessary and requisite allegation, the defendant may, under section 558, move, at any time, to vacate the order of arrest. The plaintiff, for want of such an allegation in his complaint, cannot recover in the action; and as he cannot recover', it would be idle to hold the defendant to answer any judgment that might be recovered. As the action must needs fail, the order of arrest must fall.
The plaintiffs had no right to enter judgment, as they did in these cases, and they did not better their condition by their unwarranted proceedings. As they had arrested the defendant for disposing of his property with intent to defraud his creditors, .they were bound, before they entered any judgment, to serve an amended complaint in which the charge of fraudulently disposing of property should have been plainly made (§ 558).
The motions to vacate the orders of arrest should be granted, with costs.
J. F. Daly and Allen, JJ., concurred.
Orders reversed and motions granted, with costs.