ROBERT K. ELLIOT v. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, JOHN F. COOK, COLLECTOR OF TAXES, AND WILLIAM J. MURTAGH

ROBERT K. ELLIOT v. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, JOHN F. COOK, COLLECTOR OF TAXES, AND WILLIAM J. MURTAGH. Equity. I. The collector of taxes in the District of Columbia was applied to for a statement of unpaid taxes upon certain real estate by one who did not disclose the object of the inquiry, or that lie was about to become a purchaser; and it was held that the District was not estopped from making sale of said property for unpaid taxes thereon, which had been omitted by mistake from the statement furnished on such request, although the applicant relied upon the collector's statement in afterwards purchasing’ the property. II. The duties of the collector are prescribed by statute, and lie is not required to make search and furnish statements of unpaid taxes. His statements and his mistakes in regard to unpaid taxes can never, therefore, operate as an estoppel upon the District of Columbia. STATEMENT OE THE CASE. This bill is filed to restrain the District of Columbia from enforcing the collection of certain taxes which constitute, as is alleged by the District authorities, a lien upon lots 23 and 24 in square 491, in the city of Washington. The matei’ial statements in the bill are, that in June, 1872, one Alfred Ely was in the occupation aud possession of said lots as the owner of an estate therein during the life of Cornelius Boyle. At the date just mentioned, the said Ely having neglected for several years to pay the taxes assessed on said property, a suit in equity was commenced for the purpose of requiring him to pay the taxes then due and in arrear. Mr. Elliot, who was the solicitor of the complainant in that equity suit, called upon the collector of taxes for the District to furnish him with the bills for all unpaid taxes upon said property, and the collector gave him the bills for the years 1868, 1869; 1870, and 1871. These taxes were taken into the account by the auditor, and the property, was finally sold under a decree of the court, and Mr. Elliot became the assignee of the purchaser at the sale under said decree, and paid the taxes so reported by the collector and the auditor, together with all taxes which subsequently accrued down to the time of such sale, and the amount thereof was deducted from the purch ase-mon ey. The District of Columbia now claims taxes for the years 1866 and 1867, and the collector has advertised the property for sale for the non-payment thereof. The complainant alleges that he purchased the property, relying upon the information which he received from the collector, and he claims that the District of Columbia cannot legally or equitably enforce tbe payment of the taxes for 1866 and 1867 upon said property, and that said District ought not to be permitted to sell the lots in question and thus cast a cloud upon his title, and that the District is estopped by the act of its collector. The District of Columbia and John F. Cook, the collector, filed a general demurrer to the bill of complainant in this cause; and on June 8, 1877, the demurrer was overruled, and the said defendants perpetually enjoined from offering said lots for sale for the alleged taxes of the years 1866 an d 1867. From this decree an appeal has been taken to the general term. R. K. Elliot, for complainant. The “ District of Columbia is a municipal corporation,” and the collector of taxes is the officer or agent. The statements made by that officer or agent, as alleged in the bill of complaint, estop the corporation from denying the truth thereof. The doctrine of estoppel applies as well to corporations as to individuals, and has even been held to apply to the United States. (U. S. v. Collier, 3 Bl. C. C., 325; Mayor v. Sheffield, 4 Wall., 189; Lee v. Munroe, 7 Cr., 366; C. R. I. and P. R. R. Co. v. The City of Joliet, 79 Ill., 39; Dillon on Mun. Corp., sec. 176n.) It is a matter of no consequence in the present ease whether the taxes referred to in the bill of complaint had been paid or not, since the fact is admitted that the defendant, by its proper officer or agent, acting within the scope of his authority in respect of a subject exclusively, by virtue of his office, within his knowledge and control, represented that they had been paid, or, rather, that there were no taxes upon the property referred to, excepting those that were then and there paid by the complainants. Whether this representation was true or not, according to the well-settled doctrine, of estoppel, it is binding upon the District, and it must look to the bond of the collector for relief. The decree of the special term is, therefore, correct, and should be affirmed. Birney cf.Birney, for defendants. The single question at issue in these cases is, whether the District of Columbia is estopped from making sale of certain real estate for unpaid taxes due thereon, because the collector of taxes has, by mistake and inadvertence, failed to report said taxes, among others, to an inquirer for a statement of all unpaid taxes, who did not disclose the cause of his inquiry, but afterwards, by purchasing the property, in reliance upon the collector’s statement, was specially injured ? The District of Columbia is not so estopped. The collector of taxes, in rendering tax bills to the plaintiff, did so for plaintiff’s accommodation, and not under authority of law. There is no statute making it the duty of the collector to furnish statements of taxes due to all inquirers. His duties are statutory. The case of Lee v. Monroe and Thornton is conclusive upon this question, and is, in its general outline, closely analogous to the case at bar. There Morris and Nicholson, owing Lee $3,000, offered payment in city lots, the title to which was in Monroe and Thornton, as commissioners of Washington city. Morris and Nicholson, having paid money in advance to the ' commissioners, thought themselves entitled to demand a conveyance of the lots in question. Lee applied to the commissioners to know of them if they would convey the lots to him upon the order of Morris and Nicholson. This they promised to do. Lee, upon receiving from Morris and Nicholson their order to the commissioners to convey to him, gave up to them their notes. On presenting the order to the commissioners, they refused to convey the lots unless he would pay the purchase-money due thereon. Morris and Nicholson shortly after became insolvent. In rendering its opinion in favor of the defendants, the court said: “If the commissioners acted fraudulently, they may be personally liable to the plaintiff; but if it were a mistake, * * * the interests of the United States cannot and ought not to be affected by it. Were it otherwise, an officer intrusted with the sales of public lands, or empowered to make contracts for such sales, might, by inadvertence or incautiously giving information to others, destroy the lien of his principals on very valuable and large tracts of real estate, and even produce alienations of them without any consideration whatever being received. It is better that an individual should now and then suffer by such mistakes than to introduce a rule against an abuse of which, by improper collusions, it -would be very difficult for the public to protect itself.” (7 Cranch S. C. R., 366 ; 2 Condensed R., 531.) It will be noticed that the bill of complaint does not aver that the misrepresentation complained of was fraudulent; neither does it aver that the collector was informed or had notice of the object of the inquiries made to him, or of the persons in whose behalf the inquiries were made. Under such conditions no estoppel can possibly arise against a corporation or individual, for estoppels in pais are not allowed to operate, except where, in good conscience and honest dealing, the party ought to be permitted to gainsay his admission. There must be actual fraud by wilful concealment or misrepresentation by the party sought to be estopped, or such gross negligence and indifference to the rights of others as are equivalent to actual and premeditated fraud. (Hannay v. Stewart, 6 Watts, 489; Walker v. Vaughn, 33 Conn., 577; The Governor v. White, 20 Wis., 425; Piper v. Gilmore, 49 Me., 149; Taylor v. Ely, 25 Conn., 250; McAfferty v. Connor, 7 Ohio St., 99; Ridgway v. Morrison, 28 Ind., 201; Rigney v. Smith, 29 Barb., 383.) [MAJORITY — Mr. Justice MaoArthur Cartter, Ch. J. — Olin, J.] Mr. Justice MaoArthur delivered the opinion of the court: This bill is filed to restrain the collection of taxes, upon the ground that the District is estopped by the action of the collector. It appears that Mr. Elliot did not inform that officer of the purpose for which he requested the bills for unpaid taxes; nor did he disclose to him that he was about to become a purchaser of the property. It is not alleged that the col-’ lector had any knowledge whatever of the object for which the tax bills were furnished. He was not informed that Mr. Elliot represented a purchaser, or that he contemplated becoming one himself. It is not pretended that he concealed or .misrepresented the amount of the taxes due wilfully or intentionally. A majority of the court are clearly of opinion that the District is not excluded from claiming the taxes still due and unpaid. To hold otherwise would be to establish an estoppel where the party sought to be estopped was ignorant of the facts material to such a conclusion, and where there was not the slightest intention to mislead or deceive. The collector could have been examined as a witness before the auditor, and recourse had to the books of his office, and thus the extent of the taxes due' and in arrear could have been ascertained as testimony in the usual method of judicial proceedings. This the complainant had a right to do, and having failed to exercise, this right, he cannot now be permitted to claim the benefit of an estoppel for the discharge of taxes that have never been paid. The duties of the collector are prescribed by statute. (B. S. D. C., secs. 133, 161, 175, act of Aug. 23, 1871, Leg. Assembly, D. C.) To make a search of the records in his office for unpaid taxes at the request of any one, whether connected with the title or not, or whether liable for the tax or not, is not one of his statutory duties. There is no fee or reward provided for making searches. No duty of this Mud is imposed by law, and he is not the officer of the District for that purpose. If any person applies to him to search for unpaid taxes, or to make a certificate of the same, it is an employment outside of his official duty, and there is no privity between the person requesting the search or certificate and the District of Columbia. The law is the only standard of the extent of his powers, and all inquirers in regard to taxes are bound to take notice of the extent of his authority. His statements or his mistakes as to unpaid taxes can never, therefore, operate, so far as the District is concerned, as an estoppel. If any other doctrine should prevail, it would be in the power of a tax-payer, or of even the collector himself, to divest the District of its liens upon property in all cases of delinquent taxes. The decree ought to be reversed. Cartter, Ch. J. — The complainant asks that the District of Columbia be restrained in the collection of taxes properly assessed upon the property in question. When he applied to the collector he was a stranger to the property, and not in privity of taxation with it. He failed to disclose his relations to the property, or his purpose to buy it, and he now demands that these taxes» may be the same as satisfied without paying them, because he had formerly inquired of the collector for the unpaid tax bills. I do not believe that a citizen at large can, by passing through the collector’s office, making an inquiry of this Mnd about taxes, thereby pay them and estop the District. I do not believe that the revenues of a municipality can be crippled in that way. Here the applicant for information about the taxes did not disclose that he was about to become a purchaser, or that he -wanted to know- in contemplation of such purchase the actual burdens upon the property. He inquired for the taxes, and the collector, as is frequently the case, made a mistake in the amount; he did not go back far enough in his search, and the doctrine in the decree below is that the taxes are in effect paid. I cannot concur in that view, and think the bill ought to be dismissed. Olin, J. I put my opinion expressly upon the ground that the law imposes no obligation upon the collector to furnish his certificate at all. And not being within the limit of his prescribed duties, if he chooses to furnish statements he acts voluntarily, and the District is not responsible for his acts of that kind. I think the decree should be reversed and the bill dismissed. Wylie, J., dissented..