Fuller against Bettes

Fuller against Bettes. In April, 1823, A and B entered into an agreement in writing, whereby A agreed to suffer B to improve .A’s farm, together with the stock and farming tools thereon ; for such improvement, B undertook to support A and his wife, during their natural lives, in sickness and in health ; and A further agreed, that after the decease of himself and wife, B should have all A9s estate ; it being stated in the agreement, that A had, by will, given to B his whole estate, after the decease of A and his wife. Such a will A in fact made, and put into the hands of a depositary ; and B went into possession of the property mentioned in the agreement, and occupied and enjoyed it. He also supported A and his wife until her death, in September, 1830, and A afterwards. In May, 1831, C, availing himself of the weakness and infirmity of mind, he being then eighty-five years old, and of impaired understanding, procured from A, without any consideration, a deed of said farm; after which, C, having knowledge of all these facts, brought ejectment against B. On a bill in chancery, brought by B against A and C, for relief against such deed, and for an injunction, it was held, 1. that B, by Buch agreement, was to have the use of the estate during the life of A, and the estate absolutely, after A's death; 2, that the conduct of C was grossly fraudulent ; and consequently, that B was entitled to a decree declaring such deed void, and enjoining C against further prosecuting his action of ejectment, and A against making any conveyance inconsistent with the agreement between him and B. This was a bill in chancery, founded on a contract between the plaintiff and Azariah Bill, which was thus set forth in the bill: That on the 16th of April, 1823, it was agreed between them, that the plain tiff should support Bill and wife, in a comfortable and handsome manner, both in sickness and in health, during their natural lives ; and that the plaintiff should have the use and improvement of the farm, stock, and farming tools of said Bill, during his life ; and that at the decease of said Bill and wife, he should have all Bill’s estate, excepting five dollars. The bill then proceeded to state, that said Bill, to effectuate his intention, executed his last will and testament, sufficient to convey lands, and lodged the same, with the contract, with Nathan Brooks, Esq. of Lisbon, therein giving, at his death, all his estate to the plaintiff. The plaintiff went into possession of all the property; continued to occupy and enjoy it; and supported Bill and his wife until her death, which took place on the 5th of September, 1830, and Bill ever since. The bill then alleged, that Bill, being now more than eighty-five years old, had become greatly impaired in his mind ; and on the 10th of May, 1831, haying been induced by William ■Bettes, one of the defendants, of Sandisfield, in the commonwealth of Massachusetts, to remove with him thither, gave a deed of all his farm to said Bettes; that the deed was procured by Bettes, by availing himself of the weakness and infirmity of the grantor’s mind, and without any consideration therefor, and was afterwards duly recorded ;• and that Bettes had brought his action of ejectment, to turn the plaintiff out of possession ; he, Bettes, being, and having been from the execution of the contract, acquainted with all the facts aforesaid. New-London, July, 1833. The bill sought relief against the deed, and that Bettes might be enjoined against prosecuting his action of ejectment. On the hearing, before the superior court, at Norwich, March term, 1833, the plaintiff, in support of the allegations in his bill, adduced the following contract in evidence : “ An agreement, made this day, between Azariah Bill, of Lisbon, in New-London county, on the one part, and John Fuller, of said Lisbon, on the other, witnesseth, that the said Bill agrees, on his part, to suffer the said Fuller to improve said Bill's farm, which lies in said Lisbon, in Hanover society, together with the stock and farming tools on the same ; and whereas the said Bill has, by will, given his whole estate, except five dollars, after the decease of said Bill and his wife, to said Fuller ; said Fuller agrees, on his part, to support said Bill and his wife, through their natural life, in sickness and in health, in a handsome, comfortable manner. It is understood between the above parties, that the said Fuller has undertaken to support the said Bill and his wife, for the improvement of all said Bill's estate ; and after the decease of said Bill and wife, said Fuller is to have all said Bill's estate, except five dollars before mentioned. Dated, Lisbon, April 16th, 1823. Azariah Bill, John Fuller." This agreement was objected to, as variant from that set forth in the bill ; but it was admitted ; and the facts stated in the bill were found to be true. The case was thereupon reserved for the consideration and advice of this court, on the question of variance, and also on the question what decree ought to be passed. Goddard and Strong, for the plaintiff, contended, 1. That the plaintiff, by virtue of his contract with Bill, was entitled to the use of the farm and tools, during the life of Bill, and to the absolute ownership of the property afterwards. 2. That the conduct of the defendants was a palpable infringement of the plaintiff’s rights. On the part of Bill, it was a direct violation of his agreement, the benefits of which he had enjoyed for eight years; and on the part of Bettes, it was a gross fraud. He was a mere volunteer, fully apprized of all the facts in the case. 3. That the relief sought was the proper mode and measure of redress. The plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the farm itself; and is not bound to seek remuneration in damages. He is entitled, also, to have the deed, thus wrongfully given and fraudulently obtained, and which purports to transfer the legal title, set aside. Reeve’s Bom. Rel. 411. Hall v. Warren, 9 Ves. 608. Legará v. Hodges, 3 Bro. Ch. Ca. 531. 4. That the agreement given in evidence was in no respect variant from that set forth in the bill. J. W. Huntington and Child, for the defendants, after premising, that this plaintiff, like every other plaintiff, must recover, if at all, by virtue of the strength of his own title; and that Bill being the owner of the property, the right of the plaintiff must rest upon the contract alone ; contended, I. That by virtue of the contract, the plaintiff had merely the interest of a tenant at will. Bill agrees “ to suffer said Fuller to improve said Bill’s farm” in Lisbon, “ together with the stock and farming tools on the same but as to the duration of this improvement, the contract is silent. 2. That if the import of the contract is to grant an estate for life, the plaintiff is not entitled to a decree vesting him with such an estate; first, because the grant is not absolute, but conditional, depending upon the continuance of the support to be furnished by the plaintiff. Non constat that the condition will be performed. On the failure of the plaintiff, his right, eo instanti, ceases. Secondly, this objection cannot be obviated, by making it a part of the decree, that the plaintiff shall give bond for the support of Bill. This would be substituting a contract made by the court for the contract of the parties. Bill never meant to put his property beyond his own controul. He relied for his security upon his right to possess it. The court is called upon to compel him to accept of a different security, not contained in the contract; and that too when the plaintiff is claiming under the contract. Thirdly, this contract, if a grant of an estate for life, is void as against Bettes, not being sealed, acknowledged, or recorded. 3. That the court cannot vest the, fee of this land in the plaintiff. If the contract gives him any right to it after the death of Bill, it is a right to it by will. 4. That no fraud is imputable to Bettes. He took the deed, it is true, with the knowledge of the plaintiff’s claim. He knew that the plaintiff had a contract with Bill; but he knew also, that it conveyed to him no title whatever. Ten years ago, A. made a parol contract with B. to sell him a farm. Would it be a fraud in C. to take a deed of it now ? 5. That if there be no fraud or mistake, and the instrument is drawn as the parties intended it should be, chancery will not relieve, in any way, against the legal consequences resulting from it, though they may not have been apprehended, by the parties, and are different from what they expected. Lyon & al. v. Richmond &. al. 2 Johns. Ch. Rep. 51. 60. [The objection of a variance was not pursued.] [MAJORITY — Daggett, Ch. J.] Daggett, Ch. J. On looking into the agreement, which is annexed and made part of the case, it seems impossible to raise a doubt whether it does not support the agreement set forth. The expressions, in many instances, and the substance in all, are identical. As to the merits of the plaintiff’s claims, it is exceedingly difficult to support them by argument. They are so palpable as to carry conviction to every mind. The agreement was reasonable, upon sufficient consideration, mutual and without fraud. The conduct of the defendant Bettes, according to all the principles with which I am acquainted, was grossly fraudulent. He, knowing all the facts, took a deed, after the plaintiff had become justly entitled to a full compensation for the support of Bill and wife, to deprive him of all the benefits of the contract. It would be disgraceful to our jurisprudence, if no relief could be had. But it is said, that by this contract, the plaintiff was only entitled to an estate for life. I do not so read the contract. Bill agrees, that the plaintiff should have the use and improvement of the farm and farming tools and stock, during life; and after, he is to have all his estate. Construing this agreement. according to the rules which govern in such cases, it is perfectly clear, that the plaintiff was, by this contract, to have the estate absolutely, at the decease of Bill. His will to this effect is conclusive proof of the intention, as well as the contract. The superior court, then, is to be advised, that the prayer of the bill be granted, and that a decree be passed, declaring the deed to Bettes void, and enjoining Bettes against further prosecuting the action of ejectment, and also enjoining Bill against making any conveyance inconsistent with the contract set forth in the bifi, under suitable penalties. The other Judges were of the same opinion, except CHUItCn, J. who was absent. Decree for plaintiff.