In the MATTER OF: Terrence J. MATTHEWS, Debtor. Terrence J. Matthews, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dennis Sallaz; et al., Defendants-Appellees

In the MATTER OF: Terrence J. MATTHEWS, Debtor. Terrence J. Matthews, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dennis Sallaz; et al., Defendants-Appellees. No. 17-35565 United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Submitted February 13, 2018 Filed February 22, 2018 Terrence J. Matthews, Pro Se D. Blair Clark, Attorney, Law Office of D. Blair Clark, PLLC, Boise, ID, for Defendants-Appellees Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges. The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). [MAJORITY] MEMORANDUM Terrence J. Matthews appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment affirming the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing Matthews’ adversary proceeding. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo a district court’s decision on appeal from a bankruptcy court, and apply the same standard of review the district court applied to the bankruptcy court’s decision. Christensen v. Tucson Estates, Inc. (In re Tucson Estates, Inc.), 912 F.2d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 1990). We affirm. The bankruptcy court properly dismissed counts 1 and 2 of Matthews’ complaint because Matthews failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 681, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). The bankruptcy court properly dismissed counts 3, 4, and 5 of Matthews’ complaint because the bankruptcy court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163-65 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing proper application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); see also Hen richs v. Valley View Dev., 474 F.3d 609, 616 (9th Cir. 2007) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred plaintiffs claim because the relief sought “would require the district court to determine that the state court’s decision was wrong and thus void”). Contrary to Matthews’ contention, the extrinsic fraud exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to his claims. A dismissal under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004), and thus should be without prejudice, Kelly v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 377 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm the bankruptcy court’s dismissal, but remand to the bankruptcy court with instructions to amend the judgment to reflect that the dismissal of claims 3, 4, and 5 is without prejudice. AFFIRMED; REMANDED with instructions to amend the judgment. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.