Study aid, not legal advice. caselaw is not a law firm and does not provide legal advice or engage in the unauthorized practice of law (UPL). All briefs, outlines, and citation tools on these pages are educational summaries for law students; they are not a substitute for advice from a licensed attorney admitted in your jurisdiction. Bar-admission rules vary by state. For court filings or client matters, verify every authority against the official reporter and your court's local rules. Use of caselaw does not create an attorney-client relationship.
Administrative
SACRAMENTO SUBURBAN FRUIT LANDS CO. v. STERN et al.
36 F.2d 928·United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit·1929
Brief incoming
Hand-reviewed Bluebook brief (procedural posture, facts, issue, holding, reasoning, dissent) ships once the AI generation pipeline runs through this case. Join the waitlist to get notified when 1L briefs go live.
Opinion
SACRAMENTO SUBURBAN FRUIT LANDS CO. v. STERN et al.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
December 17, 1929.
Rehearing Denied February 10, 1930.
No. 5682.
Butler, Van Dyke & Desmond, of Sacramento, Cal., and Arthur C. Huston, of Woodland, Cal., for appellant.
Ralph H. Lewis and George E. McCutchen, both of Sacramento, Cal., for appellees.
Before RUDKIN, DIETRICH, and WILBUR, Circuit Judges.
[MAJORITY — WILBUR, Circuit Judge.]
WILBUR, Circuit Judge.
This is a companion ease to Sacramento Suburban Fruit Lands Co. v. Melin (No. 5671) 36 F.(2d) 907, to which reference is made for a more particular statement of the facts.
The alleged fraud consisted of misrepresenting the value of the land, relied upon by the appellee, and the representation that the land was “rich and fertile, capable of producing all sorts of farm crops and products, and that said land was entirely free from all conditions and things injurious or harmful to the growth of fruit trees, and that the said land was perfectly adapted to the raising of fruits of all kinds.”
The appellant requested an instruction, No. 14, to the effect that the plaintiff could only recover upon the proof of the false representations alleged in the complaint and not for other false representations. This was a proper instruction, and the court, after stating the allleged fraud in the terms of the complaint, instructed the jury in effect that, if it was shown that the land was not capable of raising fruit in commercial quantities as represented in the appellant’s book, plaintiff could recover. For illustration, the court instructed the jury as follows:
“So, Gentlemen of the Jury, taking the plaintiffs’ evidence, and the defendant’s evidence, in respect to the adaptability of the land for commercial orcharding,' if you find by the greater weight of the evidence that this land is not adapted to commercial orcharding, and is not worth $350 an acre, then you proceed to the next step.”
Judgment reversed.