John F. Trumbull vs. William C. Moss

John F. Trumbull vs. William C. Moss. The 16lh section of the statute with regard to paupers, provides that it shall be the duty of the selectmen of a town to furnish necessary support to any person not an inhabitant of the town, residing therein, who shall become poor and unable to support himself. The object Of this enactment was to provide for the immediate relief of suffering paupers without reference to the liability otother towns or parties for their support, and a pauper who is temporarily within a town at the time when he needs relief, is residing therein within the intent of the statute. Action on the statute with regard to paupers,- (Rev. Stat., tit. 42, \ 16), brought against the defendant, as a selectman of the town of Stonington, to recover a penalty for refusing to furnish support to one Miller,- a pauper. The action was brought originally before a justice of the peace, and was appealed by the defendant-to the superior'court. ■- The 16th section of- the statute provides that “ it shall be the duty of the selectmen of every town, whenever a . person, not an inhabitant of such town, residing [ *254 ] therein, shall become poor and unable to support, himself, to furnish such pauper such support as may be necessary, as soon as the condition of such pauper shall come to their knowledge; and [that] each selectman, neglecting such duty, shall forfeit the sum of seven dollars to him who shall prosecute for the same to effect.” It appeared that Miller, the pauper, was an American seaman, engaged in the whale fishery, and had been left in a sick and destitute condition at one of the Cape de Verde islands, whence.he was sent to this country by the American consul there, in a vessel belonging to Stonington, and owned by persons residing there, the owners receiving the compensation provided by the laws of the United States therefor. On the arrival of the vessel at Stonington, being still sick, he was carried by direction of the owners from the vessel to a boarding house, where he was kept several weeks at their expense, and was then sent to Boston by railroad, on his way to his home at Salem, one of the owners paying his fare. He never had any settlement in any town in this state, and was never a citizen of the state. About a ■week after the vessel arrived, one of the owners applied to the defendant, as one of the selectmen of the town, to take care of him and furnish him support, but the defendant refused to do so. Previous application had been made to the collector of the port to furnish him relief, but he had refused on the ground that he had no authority to do it. On these facts the case.was reserved by the superior court for the advice of this court. E. Perkins and Trumbull, for the plaintiff. 1. Every pauper within the limits of this state, whether an •inhabitant of any town in this state or not, is entitled to necessary care and support under the provisions of the act with regard to paupers. 2. In the case in question, the duty of providing care and support for Miller devolved upon one of three parties—the owners of the brig, the government of the United [ *255 ] States, or *the town in which the pauper happened to be while needing aid, and through that town upon the state. 1st. In no event is it made the duty of the owners of the vessel, for our statute does not impose upon individuals, other than certain relatives of the pauper, any liability for his support. 2d. No provision is made by the general government for the relief of sick and disabled seamen who are not required to pay hospital money. The pauper in question, being engaged in the whale fishery, was not required by law to pay any part of his wages for the support of hospitals, and was not therefore entitled to support under any of the acts “ for the relief and maintenance of sick and disabled seatnen.” Act of 1798, ch. 94. Act 1799, ch. 142. Act 1802, ch. 51. Act 1811, ch. 93. Reed v. Canfield, 1 Sumner, 201. 3d. Miller was a state pauper, and as such it was the duty of the selectmen of the town in which he was residing, or happened to be, when he needed relief, to furnish him such support as was necessary. 3. Even if the law made it the ultimate duty of some other party than the selectmen to furnish his support, yet it was their duty to provide for his immediate necessities, and they are liable for any refusal or neglect to do so; the intent of the statute being, to impose upon the selectmen of every' town the duty to provide for a suffering pauper who happens to be within their limits ; and being in the town and in necessitous circum,stances is “ residing therein ” within the intent of the act. Kent v. Chaplin, 6 Conn., 72. New Milford v. Sherman, 21 id., 101. Paris v. Hiram, 12 Mass., 262. Taunton v. Westport, id., 355, 7. N. F. Dixon, for the defendant. It is essential to the right of the plaintiff to recover, that the pauper, at the time the relief was requested of the defendant and refused, should have resided in the town of Stonington. This is the very language of the statute, and it is to receive a strict construction in a penal action founded upon it. The adjective “resident” is defined by Webster, “dwelling, or having an abode in a place for a continuance of time,” and the verb “ to reside ” is defined as *meaning “ to dwell [ *256 ] permanently, or for a length of time—to have a settled abode for a time.” See also Jacob’s Law Diet. Residence. The term has also received a settled meaning, and in conformity with the above definitions, in election cases. The mere temporary casual presence of the pauper in the town, in the case now before the court, can not be such a residence as was intended by the statute. His presence was not even voluntary, but he was sent there by the United States Consul. The United States government has no power to make a pauper a charge upon a town by thus sending him into any port that it pleases. Besides, provision is made for the support of paupers of this character in other sections of the statute. See sections 24, 25, 26 and 27. [MAJORITY — McCurdy, J.] McCurdy, J. It is the humane purpose of our law in relation to the support of paupers, to prevent as far as possible any person, under any circumstances, from suffering for the neces ” saries of life. For the supplies which are required to be furnished, the ultimate liability rests upon different parties—town, state, or relatives—according to the facts in each particular case. But to avoid delays which might be fatal, the duty of making immediate provision is devolved upon thé selectmen of towns. To ensure the performance of this duty, the statute enacts, that “ it shall be the duty of the selectmen of every town whenever a person not an inhabitant of such town, residing therein, shall become poor and unable to support himself, to furnish such pauper such support as may be necessary,” &c., under a penalty of seven dollars. The decision of the case turns on the meaning of the word “ residing.” It is claimed that the term imports, not a mere stopping and being in a place, but “abiding in it for some continuance of time.” ■ Such undoubtedly is a common understanding of the expression. But the meaning in this instance is to be gathered from the manifest intention of the law. As before stated, the object is to afford immediate relief, without waiting to settle the point of final responsibility. If the word means in this [ *257 ] *case “ some continuance of time,” the question arises, how long is that—who is to decide the statutory length —and, in the interval, is the sufferer to be left to die in the street ? The 17th section provides that, “ whenever a pauper, not an inhabitant of the town where he resides, shall die, it shall be the duty of the selectmen of the town to give said pauper a decent burial,” &c. Now if the selectmen are required to bury a deceased pauper only in case he may have been abiding in the town some continuance of time, what is to become of the body of one who may have died soon after his arrival? There can, we think, be no doubt that, in the language of Judge Ellsworth in the case of New Milford v. Sherman, (21 Conn., 116,) “ being in the town, and in necessitous circumstances, is a residing therein, within the meaning of the law. The subsequent sections of the statute referred to by the defendant’s counsel do not seem to affect the question. We advise judgment for the plaintiff. In this opinion the othei judges concurred. Judgment for plaintiff advised.