HADLEY against AYRES

HADLEY against AYRES. New York Common Pleas; General Term, April, 1870. Attorney’s Compensation.—Interest on Charges for Services. On a mutual, running, unliquidated account between attorney and . client, the attorney is not entitled to interest on charges for services, not liquidated by the fee bill, nor by agreement, and the amount of which was only ascertained on conflicting evidence at the trial, and for which no time of payment was fixed.* He may be allowed interest on disbursements. * In Mygatt v. Wilcox (45 N. Y., 306; affirming 1 Lam., 55), where interest was allowed on the charges for services from the time the bill was rendered, after termination of the services, the reasonableness of the charges was not questioned. Appeal from a judgment entered on the report of a referee. This action was brought by Amos K. Hadley, plaintiff, against Eleazer Ayres, defendant, to recover the sum of two thousand nine hundred dollars, which the former alleged that the latter owed him over and above all payments and counter-claims, for professional services rendered as an attorney and counselor at law, in prosecuting and defending divers suits in the courts of this State, and drawing sundry contracts and agreements, between January 1, 1857, and June 27, 1867. The defendant admitted that he employed the plaintiff, but claimed that the latter was only entitled to the taxable costs and his disbursements, for his services. He also set up a counter-claim, amounting, in the aggregate, to one thousand five hundred and sixty-seven dollars, for rent of office, moneys collected by plaintiff from other persons on his behalf, goods sold and delivered, and work, labor and services rendered. The referee found in favor of the plaintiff, for the sum of two thousand seven hundred and seventeen dollars and seventy-one cents, besides interest thereon from June 27, 1867, to the date of- this report, which interest amounted to the sum of three hundred and eighty-eight dollars and thirty-nine cents. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant, for three thousand seven hundred and sixty-two dollars and twenty-eight cents, damages and costs. The defendant appealed to the general term. L. S. Chatfield, for defendant and appellant. A. K. Hadley, plaintiff and respondent, in person. [MAJORITY — By the Court.—Loew, J.] By the Court.—Loew, J. As the plaintiff in this action denies that he ever made the agreement, testified to by defendant,—that he would charge only the taxable costs for his services,—and as the referee found in his favor on that point, it became immaterial whether all the charges on the bill of particulars were strictly taxable or not. Under the Code, an attorney, in the absence of an express agreement as to his compensation, is entitled to what his services are reasonably worth (Garr v. Mairet, 1 Hilt., 498; Stow v. Hamlin, 11 How. Pr., 452. The plaintiff testified that he never made any agreement with defendant other than that he should charge him as lightly as he could. On the trial, the charges in the bill of particulars appears to have been referred to and used, simply as a basis or criterion, for the of assisting in ascertaining what would be a fair and reasonable compensation (in addition to the counsel fee charged) for the services rendered by the plaintiff in the several causes and matters specified in the bill of particulars. No error appears to have been committed by the referee in his ruling, in respect to that question, except, perhaps, as to the suit of Waring v. Ayres. With regard to the latter suit, I think the referee erred in allowing the plaintiff more than taxable costs, as he himself admitted when he was recalled, that that was an exceptional case, in which he advised a settlement, and told the defendant that he would take the taxable costs for his services therein. I am also of the opinion, that the referee erred in the allowance of interest. The general rule is well settled, that on an unliquidated account for goods sold, or work, labor and services rendered, no interest can be recovered, unless there is an agreement, express or implied, to that effect, or a time of payment has been fixed (Holmes v. Rankin, 17 Barb., 454; Adams v. Fort Plain Bank, 23 How. Pr., 45; Reid v. Rensselaer Glass Factory, 3 Cow., 393; 5 Id., 587; Wood v. Hickok, 2 Wend., 501). I am aware that the court of last resort reversed the judgment in Adams v. Fort Plain Bank {supra), for the reason that interest should have been allowed (36 N. Y., 255). But the decision was put on the ground that the referee had found as a fact that the indebtedness existed in a fixed amount, and accrued on certain specified days, long before the action was brought; and the court held that the finding of the referee wrs conclusive, and that they would not inquire how the indebtedness arose. Now, in the case under consideration, there was no such finding by the referee. Here the account was mutual, running and unliquidated, and open to inquiry before the referee. The evidence was conflicting as to what plaintiff’s compensation was to be, and it could not, therefore, be known what amount he was entitled to, till found and reported by the referee ; nor does it appear that any specified time for payment had been agreed on by the parties. As interest can only be computed on the amount when ascertained, it should not have been allowed on any thing, except the disbursements paid by the plaintiff ; and as to those advances, I am inclined to think he was entitled to interest from the time when they were respectively made (Reid v. Rensselaer Glass Factory, supra). The judgment should, therefore, be reversed, and a new trial granted, unless the plaintiff should elect to reduce the amount of the judgment in accordance with the preceding views, in which case, the judgment should be affirmed, without costs of appeal. Chas. P. Daly, Ch. J., and Yah Brunt, J., concurred. After the delivery of the above opinion, the plaintiff stipulated to reduce the judgment, in accordance with the decision of the court, by deducting therefrom the sum of three hundred and eighty-eight dollars and thirty-nine cents, interest, which had been included therein ; and the further sum of two hundred and eighty dollars, counsel fees in the case of Waring v. Ayres,—in all, six hundred and sixty-eight dollars and thirty-nine cents. Subsequently, the defendant appealed to the court of appeals, where, in November, 1871 the judgment was in all things affirmed.