William C. Gardner vs. John A. Collins et al.

William C. Gardner vs. John A. Collins et al. Where the question upon the construction of the statute o'f a State relative to real property, has been settled by any judicial decisio.n in the state' where the lane lies; this Court, upon the uniform principles adopted by it, would recognise that decision as a part of (he local law. [85] The statute of descents of Rhode Island, of 1822, enacts, “ that when any person having title'to any real estate of inheritance shall die intestate as to such estate, it shall descend, and pass in equal portions to his or her kindred in the following course.” It then provides, “ if there be no father, then to the mother, brother, and sister of such intéstate, and their descendants, or such of them' as there beand then declares,'in the nature of a proviso, that, “ when the title to any estate of inheritance, as to which the person having such title shall die intestate, came by descent, gift, or devise from the parent or other kindred of the intestate, and such intestate die without children; such estate shall go- to the kin next to the intestate, of the blood of the'person from whom such estate came or descended, if any there be.”. An estate situated in Rhode Island, was devised by John Collins, to his daughter, Mary Collins, in fee; Mary Collins intermarried with Caleb Gardner, and upon her death, in 1S06, the estate descended to'her three children, John, George, and Mary C. Gardner. John and George Gardner died intestate and without issue, and Mary C. Gardner, as heir to her brothers, became seised of the whole estate, and died in 1822. Held, that under the provisions of the’law of descents of Rhode Island, two-thirds of the estate of Mary C. Gardner descended to Samuel F. Gardner, Eliza Phillips, formerly Eliza Gardner, and Mary Clarke, formerly Mary .Gardner, children of Caleb Gardner by a former marriage; they being brothers and sisters of the half blood of Mary C. Gardner; it being admitted that the remaining one-third, which Mary C. Gardner took by immediate descent from her mother, belongs to the heirs of the whole blood-of John Collins. [86] . The phrase “of the blood,’ in the statute, includes the half blood. This is the natural meaning of the word “blood,” standing alone, and - unexplained by any cpntext. A half brother or sister-is of the blood of the intestate; for each of them has some of the blood of a common parent in his or her veins. A person is with the most strict propriety of language affirmed to be of the blood of another, who has any, however small a portion, of the samé blood derived from a common ancestor. In the common law, the word “ blood” is used in the same sense. Whenever it is. intended to express any qualification, the word whole or h?lf blood is generally used to designate it, or .the qualification is implied from the context, or known principles of law. [87] . A descent from a parent to a child cannot be construed to mean a descent through, and not from a parent. So a gift or devise from a parent, must be construed to mean a gift or devise by the act bf that parent, and not by that of some other ancestor more remote passing through the parent. [90] It is true, that in a sense an estáte may be said to come by descent, from a remote ancestor to a person upon whom it has devolved, through many intermediate'descents. .But this, if not loose language, is not that sense which is ordinarily annexed to the terms.- When an estate is said to have descended from A. to B., the natural and obvious meaning of the words is, that it is an imniediate descent from A. to B. [91] At the common law, a man might sometimes inherit who was of the whole blood of the intestate, who could'not have inherited from the first purchaser. As in the case of a purchase by a son who dies, without issúe, and his uncle inherits the same, and dies without issue; the father may inherit the same from the.uncle, although he could not inherit from his own son. [93] IN the circuit court of the United States for the district of Rhode Island, the plaintiff, William C. Collins, instituted an action of ejectment for the recovery of two-thirds of certain real estate in the state of Rhode Island, of which .Mary C. Gardner died seised ánd intestate. The facts of the case agreed upon were as follows: “ The estate in question, two-thirds of which is demanded by" the plaintiff, in his said writ, was the estate in fee simple of the late John Collins, esq. deceased, the father of the defendant, and the purchaser of said estate. That the said late John-Collins died in 1817, leaving lawful issue, viz. John A. Collins, Abigail Warren, and Mary \Collins; and leaving a last, will and testament, wherein and whereby, he devised' the estate in question to his daughter, the said Mary Collins, in fee simple; who became seised and possessed thereof accordingly, and continued so seised and possessed thereof to the time of her death, viz. the 2d of October 1806, and died intestate. That the said Mary Collins intermarried with' Caleb Gardner, on or about the day of and at her death left lawful issue, viz. John Collins Gardner, George Gardner, and Mary C. Gardner. The said John Collins Gardner died the 17th of November 1806, aged about , of course intestate, and without issue. The said George Gardner died the 18th of September 1811, aged about years, of course intestate, and without issué. The said Mary C. Gardner died the 31st of December 1822, aged about , intestate and without issue. That, at the death of their mother, the said John-Collins Gardner, George Gardner, and Mary C. Gardner, took from their said mother the said estate, as her heirs, at law, in equal parts, and became seised and. possessed of the same accordingly, in fee simple, and continued so seised and possessed till the death of the said John Collins Gardner, viz. till the 17th of November 1806. That, thereupon, his part of the said estate descended to and vested in his surviving brother and sister, viz'. George Gardner and Mary C. Gardner, in fee simple, in equal moieties; and thereupon the said George Gardner and Mary C. Gardner became seised and possessed of the estate in question, in equal and undivided moieties, and fee simple, and so continued seised' and possessed till the death of the said George Gardner, the 18th of September 1811. That, thereupon, Ms part of said estate descended to and vested in his sister the said Mary C. Gardner, in fee simple, and she became seised and possessed of the same accordingly, and thereby became seised and possessed of the whole estate in question, in fee simple; and so continued seised and possessed to t re time of her death, viz. to the 31st of December 1822. That, at the death of the said Mary C. Gardner, the defendants, viz. the said John A. Collins and Abigail Warren went into possession of the estate ip.question, claiming to be the heirs of the said Mary C. Gardner; and the defendants have continued possessed thereof, claiming it as their inheritance without interruption or adverse claim, till the'plaintifPs suit as aforesaid. That the plaintiff, by deeds duly executed, became seised and possessed of all the right and title of the said Samuel F. Gardner, Eliza Phillips, and Mary Clarke, in and to the demanded premises. The plaintiff and Samuel F. Gardner and Eliza Phillips are children of the said Caleb Gardner by a former marriage. That the said Mary Clarke is also a child of said Caleb Gardner, by a former marriage, and are brother and sister of the half blood to the said Mary C. Gardner. That the said plaintiff and Samuel F. Gardner, Eliza Phillips and Mary Clarke, are not. of kirt to the said late John Collins, esq. deceased, and have not any of his blood in their veins. . And if, upon'the foregoing..)facts, the court shall be of opinion that the plaintiff, and those under whom he claims, are heirs at law of the said Mary C. Gardner, and-, entitled to said estate, then judgment to be given for the plaintiff; but, if not, then judgment to be rendered for the said defendant.” The statute of Rhode Island upon which the plaintiffs in the ejectment claimed to recover, was passed in January 1822,. and is entitled, “An act directing the descent of intestate estates^ and the settlement thereof, and for other purposes therein mentioned. “ Section 1. Beit enacted by the general assembly, and by the. authority thereof it is spaded, That henceforth when any person having title to any ireal estate of inheritance shall die intestate* as to such estate, it shall descend and pass, in equal portions, to his of her kindred in the following course: ■ To his or her children, or their descendants, if any there bé: If there be no children, nor- their descendants, then to the father of such’intestate If there be no father; then to the mother, brothers and sisters of such intestate, and their descendants, or such of them as there be: If there be no mother, nor brother, nor sister nor theii descendants, the inheritance shall go in equal moieties to the paternal and maternáí kindred, each in the' following course: First to the grandfather: If there be na grandfather, then to the grandmother, uncles and aunts, on the same side, and their descendants, ór such of them as there be: If there be no grandmother, uncle nor aunt, rior their descendants, then to the great-grandfathers, or great-grandfather if there be but one: If there be no great-grandfather, then to the great-grandmothers, or great-grandmother if there be but one, and. the brothers and sisters of the grandfathers and grandmothers, and their descendants, or such of them as. there be, and so on in other cases without end; passing to the nearest.lineal male ancestors, and for want Of them, to the lineal female ancestors, in the same degree, and the descendants of such male and female lineal ancestors, or sueh of them as there be.- But no right in the inheritance shall accrue to any persons whatsoever, other than to the children of the intestate, unless such persons be in being, and capable in law to take, as heirs, at the time of the intestate’s death. And when herein the inheritance is directed to go by moje-. ties to the paternal and maternal kindred, if there be no such kindred on the one part, the whole shall go to the other part; and if there be no kindred, either on the one part or the other, the whole shall go to the husband or wife of the intestate; and if the wife or husband be dead, it shall go to his or her kindred in the like course as if such husband or wife had survived the intestate, and then died entitled to the estate •The descendants of any person deceased, shall inherit the estate which such person would have inherited, had such person survived the intestate. When the title to any real estate of inheritance as to which the person having such title shall die intestate, came by descent, gift or devise, from the parent or other kindred of the intestate, and such intestate die without children, such estate shall go to the kin next to the intestate, of the blood of the person from whom such estate came or descended, if any there be." For some time prior to the passage of this act, the law of descents of Rhode Island was regulated by an act of 1798, the first section of which nearly resembles the clause in the statute of 1822. It was as follows: “ When the title of- any real estate of inheritance, as to which the person having such title, shall die intestate, c.amb by.descent, gift, or devise, from the parent or other kindred of the intestate, and such intestate die without children, such estate shall go to the next of kin of the intestate of the blood of the person from whom such estate came or descended.” The judges of the circuit court of Rhode Island, having divided in opinion upon the case, the decision was certified to this Court for its decision Mr Whipple, for the plaintiff, made the following points. 1. That.at common law- the phrase “ of the blood,” includes “ the half blood.” 2. That if this is not the case at common law, the phrase “ of the blood,” as it is used in the statute of Rhode Island, necessarily includes the half blood. 3. That the person whose blood is referred tó in the statute, as constituting “ the stock of descent,” is that kindred . from whom the intestate derived the estate, by immediate descent; to wit, the brothers, and not the mother of the intestate, Mary C. Gardner. He argued, that the act of the legislature of Rhode Island gives the estate “ to the next of kin of the intestate,- of the blood of the person from whom such estate came or descended;” and by the Uct of 1822, there is added, “ if any there be.” The defendants contend, that “ the blood,” ex vi termini, means the whole-blood; because they assert this to be the .meaning at common law. For the plaintiff, it is claimed that neither at the common law, nor by tlie proper construction of the statute of Rhode Island, the whole blood is intended; and that as the plaintiff daims as half blood, and as representing those who were of the half blood of Mary C. Gardner, the person last seised; the whole question in the cause, and which alone is to .be decided by this Court, depends upon a proper construction of the law of Rhode Island of 1822. - In order to arrive at a sound conclusion upon the case, it may be proper to examine what is the meaning of the word-blood at common law. Upder the sixth canon of d.cscents, in reference to the intestate, the word “ whole” is added, which would not have been necessary if that was the natural import of the term. In reference to purchasers the word. “ blood ” simply is used; which means, when used alone, half as well as whole blood. In a note to Chitty’s Blackstone’s Commentaries, Vol. II. p. 5, is the following. language. “ It should here be noticred. that though it is necessary that a person wih.0 Would succeed, must show himself to bé of the blood of the first purchaser;, yet, where the persons who inherit succeed or derive title to the inheritance by virtue of remote and intermediate descents from the purchaser, it will be sufficient if they be related by half blood only to the purchaser, or to such other remote and intermediate ancestors, who were formerly and intermediately seised of the inheritance, in the regular course of descent from the purchaser; provided, according to the rule which follows, they are the worthiest legal relatives of the whole blood, to the person last seised.” Robinson on Inheritance, 45, is cited. . He mighl have cited better authority.. In I Go. Litt. sec. 8, p. 14, b. it is said, “ But if there be two brothers by divers ventres, and the eldest is seised of [and in fee and die without issue, and his uncle enter as next of kin to him, who also dies without issue; now the younger son may have the land as heir to the uncle, for he is of the whole blood to him, albeit he .be but of the half blood of his elder brother.” What is the meaning of the terms “of the blood,” as used in the statute9 The object of the provision was to continue the estate in the blood of the person from whom it descended; to find a stock of inheritance, not to establish a new rule of descent. The provision has no, application, except to a case where the purchaser.or preceding holder has already transmitted it to his heirs. Under the enacting clause, the half blood take from the purchaser on the first descent. An heir of the purchaser dies, will not the same blood take from the heir that took from the ancestor*1 It is to go to the kin, that is the whole or half blood of the intestate, of the whole blood of the purchaser. According to the argument for the defendant, this, reverses the common law; which gives to the whole blood of the intestate, of the whole or half blood of the purchaser. After giving it to the half blood on the first descent, you can never narrow the capacity of inheritance. You may enlarge it as the common law does, but not give in the first descent and fake away in the second. The family, the blood of the purchaser, is his whole and. half blood. The object is to continue the estate in the blood. The second question is, who is “ the person" who is to constitute the stock of descent, “ the first purchaser, or the last ancestor.” We agree that the' object of the statute was to preserve ¿states in families. We disagree as to the extent of the object. What but the language of the act can determine that question. It is not the identity but the extent of the object, about which we differ. The former might be determinedly other considerations, the latter by nothing-but the words of the act. 2. The acts of 179S'and 1S22, admit of two readings- “ To such of the next of kin of the intestate as are of the blood of the person from whom such right, title or interest came or descendedor “ to the nearest of such of the kin of the intestate as are of the blood,”&c. The second reading will, in most cases, giv&it to a more remote relation of the intestate than the first; and "as the next of kin is the primary object of the statute, the former reading should be preferred. 3. Suppose we adopt the latter, however. If first purchaser had been intended, why not expressed1? if the principle, why not the language of the common law? Its meaning is well settled and comprehensive. Technical wordy.are adopted, as in other, statutes. It was drawn by lawyers, who generally usetechnical words, — not in haste. Why use eight new words to express the meaning of three old ones 9 A studious rejection of the words, proves that the principie was not intended to be adopted. Other legislatures have made the same mistake. They intended the first purcháser if ioe did, for . their language is similar. Not a statute in the union except that of the state of New York- admits the first purchaser. A reference to the statutes of Connecticut, Neto York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, will maintain this position. . 4. Why.connect “descent, gift, and devise” together, if there is,-.in fact, no connecting medium between them 9 In - the case of gift and devise, the last ancestor is agreed to be the stock: If he is not also in the other case of descent, vvhat' is there in common between them? Why use them in connection* when they express two .separate principles, . establish two distinct rules, and transfer the estate to. two different sets of heirs. In those threé cases, the same person shall be the stock of descent. .This-is common to them all3 connects them in principle, mid therefore they are connected in language We never speak of a multitude, unless to say something applicable to a multitude. When something is intended applicable to a part, and something else applicable to another part, we separate them in our discourse. Something then was intended, equally applicable to all the three modes of transmission; and this shows that it can be nothing else but the same stock of descent. Something was to be done, equally applicable to all; for the statute directs wbat shall be done in those three cases. What is it? The answer is, the same stock of descent. There is a difference between the description and the disposition of the estate.' The word or, belongs to the former. It has nothing ■to do either distributively, or collectively, with the latter. ¡Such estate shall go, &c. What estate? The estate which came by descent, gift or devise. There is but one estate, and one channel for it to pass. 5. To show the true meaning, and necessary construction of the words that are used’. The words,. “ parent or other kindred,” embrace the brother. Parent includes father and mother. Ml the other kindred are included under the other terms. General words comprehending particulars, are the same as an enumeration of particulars. The order in which they stand is of no importance. “ From the brother or other kindred,” would be the same as those now used. If a descent from all is provided for," the same as if enumerated; áh immediate descent is intended. They agree that an Immediate descent in the case of gift and devise is intended; and in some cases of descent, as an immediate descent from the purchaser; can both be intended? Does not an immediate, exclude an intermediate descent?. Such a descent must come through those kindred who are entitled to be stocks of descent. No other qualification is required than to be of the kindred. The words are not to such of the kindred as are first purchasers. Tn the preface of .Judge Swift’s Treatise on Descents,'p. 1 .1", it is said’ in relation to our statutes; “ But in the law of descents there" is an almost total change of the common law. It is radically new in each state, bearing no resemblance to the common-law in most of the states, and having great and essential differences in all.” The laws of descent in every state in the union, except New York and New Jersey, are altogether different from the common law. . The case of Hall vs. Jacobs, in 4 Harris & John. Rep. 249, was thig. The father devises to his'three children,. A. B. and C. and dies. A. and B. die intestate, and their shares descend to C. The court say, that the statute provides for three cases; 1. Estates descended oh the part of the father. 2. Estates descended on the part of the mother. 8. Estates by purchase. This case is neither: “ but it vested in the intestate by immediate descent from his brother and sister, a course of descent expressly directed by the act of assembly in the case of a purchaser, and is known also to the common law.” In Stewart’s'Lessee vs. Evans, 3 Harris & John. 287, an estate descended to John Stewart’s two children, Jane- and Alexander. Jane died, and her portion descended to Alexander, who also died intestate. The question was, whether this estate came to the intestate, on. the part of the father, ✓or on the part of the sister. The defendant’s counsel agreed, - “ that it did not come from or through the father, yet that it was on the part of the father.and so the court decided without giving.their reasons. In the case of -Shippen vs. Izard, 1 Serg. & Rawle, 225, Tilghman, chief justice, says, “ The words on the part, of the father, and from the father, are so different, that I cannot concéive how the former can bé restricted to the father alone without violence to their plain meaning. Not only is there a difference in common phrase, but in legal acceptation •, for the phrase, on the part of the father, is familiar to the common law, and must have been borrowed from that source by the persons who drew this act of assembly. That it comprehends not only the.father but all the ancestors of the father, both paternal and maternal, appears by the citation of the plaintiff’s counsel from Co. Litt 12. a.” Yate;, justice, .was of the same opinion. The act of Virginia of 1793, provides, that when an infant died seised of property, which descended “ from the father,” the maternal kindred, should be excluded. In 1 Munford’s Rep. ÍS3, the case of Tomlinson .m Dil-liard, decided in'3 Call’s Rep. 120, was reviewed. The case of Wyatt vs. Muse and wife, also came before the court. The case was a descent from the father to his children, and from a deceased child to the intestate. - The court decided that the mother, or her issue, were not excluded, where the properly was derived, not immediately, but by intervening succession from the father. (Cited also, the opinkrtLj of Justice Tucker, 215.) In p. 197, Mr Justice Tucker cites a former decision, and says; “ In that case it was determined, that Mrs Gee, the mother of Sarah Jones, was entitled to inherit lands from the daughter, who diéd an infant, which she had derived from .her brother John Norfleet; to whom the same were devised by his father, who was also the father of Sarah Jones. In that case, however, John Norfleet had attained his age of twenty-one years; but I. was of opinion, and understood the rest of the judges who sat in the cause to concur with me.in that.opinion, that the mother might have inherited these lands, although John Norfleet had not attained his age.of twenty-one years; for that the descent from the father to the daughter was not immediate but broken, and therefore not within the exceptions contained in the fifth and sixth sections.” The words of the '¿ct under Which the above decisions were made, are as follows: “ That where an infant shall die without issue, having title to any real estate of inheritance, derived by gift, devise or descent, from the father, and, there be living at the death of such infant, his father, or any brother and sister on the part of the father, or the paternal grandfather or grandmother of such infant, or any brother or sister of the father, or any descendant of any. of them; such estate-shall descend and pass to the paternal kindred without regard to .the mother or maternal kindred of such infant; in the same manner as if there had been no mother or maternal kindred.” In section sixth there is a similar provision as to estates-from the mother* The^e are the words ot the act of 1819 ; bat they do not in this respect differ from the act of 1792. Many other decisions may be found, but not exactly to ’the point. The remarks of Mr Justice Roane, in 3 Call’s Rep. 96, are worthy of attention. The case of Hilliard vs. Moore, in 2 Carolina Law Depository, 590, is exactly like the case of Collins and Gardner, as to its facts. The decision .was in favor of the mate/-, nal line, and would have been decisively against us, had the .words of their act rendered such a decision unavoidable. The words of the act are, “ descended on the part of .the. mother.” This decision supports the distinction taken by Chief Justice Tilghman and Mr Justice Yates, in Serg. & Rawle, already referred to. As to the spirit of the act, he contended: 1. The defendants, take for granted that the object was to preserve the estate in the family of Mary Collins. How do they arrive , at this knowledge I- The legislature ' have' not declared their^pbject. They have only piro ided certain means, and the extent of the object ought to be ■measured by those means. ‘ They make the means bend to the supposed object. Because the Object was to preserve estates in families to a cértain extent, they conclude that an estate going out of a family defeats the intention. Have the Court a right to resort to other means than those of the statute1? Ho they^do so at common law, in order to prevent an estate’s going out of a family “? . 2. A strong objection to the doctrine of a first purchaser, is the difficulty of ascertaining him., and the consequent uncertainty of the rule. ■ The proofs of descents frequently rest in parol. The defendants take for granted, that the common law means will prevent the evil of an estate going out of 'the family. So uncertain and impossible is the proof, that t'hé common law'has abandoned it, and substituted a rule of law in the lieu of actual proof; this is the sixth canon of descents. In cases of actual descents from a real first purchaser, the difficulties are the same. In 2 Bl. Com. it is said: “ Yet when an estate has really descended in a course of inheritance to the person last seised, the strict rule of the feudal law is still observed; and none are admitted but the heirs of those through whom the inheritance has passed; .as if lands come to John Stiles by descent from his mother Lucy Baker, no relation of his ' father, (as such) shall ever be his heir to these lands. Here, we -may observe, that so far as the feud is really _ antiquum, the law traces it back; and will not sutler any to inherit but the blood of those ancestors from whom the feud was conveyed to the.late proprietor. “But when through length of time it can trace it no farther, as if it be not known whether his grandfather George Stiles inherited it from his father Walter Stiles, or his mother Christiana Smith ; or if it appear that his grandfather was the first purchaser; in either of those cases, the law admits the descendants of any ancestor of George Stiles, either paternal or’ maternal, to be in their order the heirs to John Stiles o.f this estate.” Again, to show how uncertain a rule that of the first purchaser was; “ the doctrine of the whole blood (p. 230) was calculated to supply .the frequent impossibility of proving a descent from the first purchaser. And this purpose it answers for the most part effectually- enough. I speak with these restrictions, because it does not, neither can any other method answer this purpose entirely.” ' Suppose three or four descents with th,e aid of whole blood, and sole succession. What could we do towards finding the purchaser, under half blood and partible inheritances. Let Blackstone answer: 2 Bl. 201. “ Here then the supply of proof is deficient, and by no means amounts to a certainty; and the higher the ■ common stock is removed, the more will even the probability decrease. .But it must be observed, that upon the same principles of calculations, the half blood have a much less chance of being descended from an unknown, indefinite, ancestor of the deceased, than the whole blood in the same degree; as in the first degree the whole brother of John Stiles is sure to, be descended from the unknown ancestor; his half brother has only an even chance, for half John’s ancestors are not his. “ So in the second degree, John’s uncle of the whole blood' has an even chance.; but the chances are three to one against his uncle of the half blood, for three-fourths of John’s ancestors are not his. In like manner, in the third degree, the chances are only three to one against John’s great uncle of the.whole blood; but they are seven to one against his uncle of the half blood. This much less probability of the half blood’s descent from the first purchaser, has occasioned their general exclusion.” These remarks apply to the' case of a real descent. Suppose it is not known from whom the grandfather George Stiles inherited, his father Walter or his mother Christiana. The whole blood would give an even chance. The half blood might give only one in four. Partible inheritances increase the difficulty by the number of descents. In a country increasing in population, and freed from the influence of those principles in the law of inheritance of England, which had their origin in feudal times; rules of such difficult application are impolitic and oppressive. Another objection to the doctrine of first purchaser is, that it is inconsistent with an allodial tenure. It acknowledges a claim in some other person than the intestate. This is an objection to going back at all. But going to the first purchaser is worse, because he has no claim, either at common law or the' statute; at common law, it was in the lord’. Tf we give it to any one, give it to,him .who has some share of claim. It sacrifices the main objects of regard, the kindred of the intestate, in.favour of a subordinate object; the blood of the purchaser. Among the reasons lor the construction of the act of the legislature, claimed by the plaintiff, Mr Whipple urged, that “Descent, gift, and devise,” are connected on account of blood. It hose blood? That of the devisor and devisee, not that of the purchaser. The consideration being their blood, the rcioard ought to be to their blood. The three modes of transmission are the acts of the party The person who bestowed the bounty is the only person having any claim. His claim extends only to the person upon whom -he bestowed the bounty, his heir. He has no claim on any future descendant, because to him he has not been liberal. The.claim then is by the devisor or ancestor, because he is. the only source of the bounty. The estate descends upon his heir or devisee, and him alone; because he alone is indebted to the ancestor or devisor, to the extent of the bounty conferred, and to no greater extent. The intestate, Mary C. Gardner, was her mother’s heir for one-third; that was the extent of her bounty. To her brothers for two-thirds. For the same reason that Mary Collins has a claim for one-third, the brothers have for two-thirds. She transmitted her portion of her father's estate to her children. This gives her a claim upon each. If her children transmit their portion of her estate,, they have the same claim upon those to whom they transmit it. The plaintiff’s counsel denied that the .construction claimed by the counsel for the defendant was th.e received law of Rhode Island., No case was cited on the argument in the circuit court to establish such a construction; añd when the experience of the bar was appealed to upon the subject, it was not followed by any evidence that the principles of construction the defendants asserted, had ever gone into use in the state, with the sanction of a judicial decision, While he admitted that the statement of the counsel of the defendant, that the law was with him by the common understanding of those, who did not from their education or their situation know what the law was; he denied that this, which might be denominated “street law,’’ could or should'have any' influence in this Court. The construction which this Court would give, would be adopted' from other views, and from higher authorities; the principles of the common law, and the fair and legal import of the words of the statute. Mr Roomns, for the defendants. The common law of descent of England has two leading objects in view; one is to preserve the -inheritance in the blood of that family by whom it was originally acquired: this is the dictate of nature: for it is an object that approves itself to reason, and recommends itself to the best affections of the human heart: it operates as a .stimulus to ■exertion, by furnishing the means and the hope of building up, and perpetuating a family, and providing for its happiness : it cherishes, by gratifying the love of kindred, a natural and a noble sentiment, and one in which the sentiment of patriotism itselfhas its root.; for the love of country is but the love of kindred expanded. The. other leading purpose is, to keep the inheritance entire, by keeping it, for the time being, in a single representative of that family by whom it was acquired: this object was the offspring of state policy; and by it the sentiments of nature are moré or less controlled. The people' of Rhode Island brought with them from their mother country, a fond attachment to both views; and of this the proof is> that for more than one hundred years, the •law of descent of England was their law. But at length in 1770, they were wéaned from one of these objects; namely, •that of keeping the inheritance entire, by keeping it in a single representativo of the family: but the other object, that of keeping the descent of the. inheritance in the blood of the family by whom it had been acquired, they fondly retained, and still fondly cherish. This case comes up upon the division of the court below, ' as to the interpretation of the statute of descent, passed in 1822, which is the same in substance as the. statute passed in 1798. One interpretation gives the estate in question to the plaintiff, the othér interpretation gives the estate to the defendants; between the two interpretations lies the conflict of the cause. The defendants claim the inheritance of this estate under a provision of the statute, which is in these words, viz. . “ When the title to any real estate of inheritance, as to whieh the person having such title shall die intestate, come by descent, gift, or devise, from the parent or other kindred of the intestate, and such intestate die without children, such estate shall go to the kin next to the intestate, of the blood of the-person from whom such estate came or descended, if any there be.” The question is as. to the person referred to, whose blood is to inherit. Is it the person from whom the estate originally came or descended to the intestate 1 If so, then the estate goes to the defendants; for they are the next of kin to the intestate who are of the blood of that person; it goes to the defendants and it keeps the descent of the family inheritance in the blood of the family, by whom it was acquired, and from whom it has descended : and this is one interpretation. Or, is it the person from whom the estate last came or descended 9 If so, then the estate goes to the plaintiff ; for though the defendants are of the blood of that person, and of kin to'that person as well as the plaintiff, yet the plaintiff is nearer of kin to that person; it goes, to the plaintiff, and the family inheritance goes out of the blood of that family by whom it was acquired, and from whom it has descended, into the blood of another and a foreign.family; hereafter to descend in the blood of that foreign-family: and this is the other.intérpretation. Now, “ blood of the person from whom such estate came or descended”, may mean either the person from whom it originally came or* descended, or the person from whom it last came or descended: neither the word originally, nor the word last is used, but either may be understood as implied, as the case may require; anddhat ivdrcf must, be understood as implied which is necessary to express that meaning That -meaning must be ádoptéd \Jvhich was the meaning of the legislature. - But one way of settling what-was. the meaning of the legislature in this ease, is known, and that is, by determining what was the object of the legislature in making, this provision. Doubtless, the legislature intended those words to be understood in that sense which is necessary to the accomplishment of their object.. Say that the object was to preserve the family'inheritance in the blood of that family by whom it had been acquired, arid fron^whom it had descended; and: our construction must be adopted, in order to effectuate that object; for. if it is not, and-the other construction is adopted, that object must be defeated. It would be .defeated in the present instance at once; it must be in all .'cases sooner or later. Even, if there were any verbal or literal difficulties-in the way of our construction, and none ar.e perceived, they must give way when opposed to the intention of the legislature; for it is a- settled rule of law, that what is within the letter of .'a statute is not within the statute, if it bé not within the intention of the legislature.” . The construction claimed by the defendants appears the most natural of the two; and must so appear to every mind accustomed to that law of inheritance, which our construction supposes,. In expressing this idea we would not think of using the word originally; wé would understand that word as .implied, and would suppose that every body would understand it as implied. But it is enough that these words are susceptible of either, interpretation; and that the object of the legislature in making that provision, is to determine which of them is the .true interpretation. That the object of the legislature wás „to preserve and perpetuate the family inheritance in the .blood of the family, by whom it was originally acquired, appears- as evident as if they had so said in so many words. It is obvious in the first place from the. distinction vvhich the statdte makes between estates acquired by the intestate, and estates derived to the intestate from parent or other kindred. As to all estates acquired by the intestate, or derived to him from any person, other than parent or othér kindred; the statute makes the intestate the stock of lnhe-. ritance, and hiis next of kin his heir .at law. But as to all estates derived to the intestate from parent or other kindred,, by descent, gift, or devise; the statute makes the person, from whom the estate came or descended, the stock of inheritance; and it makes the next of kin to" • the intestate, who is of the blood of that person, the heir at law. . Now, it is inquired, what possible object could there have, been for this distinction, but that of keeping the family inheritance in. the blood of the family *? But further, the same distinction is made between estates derived, and derived in the same, manlier too, to the intestate. If the estate is derived, to the intestate, by descent, gift or devise; but not derived from a parent, or other kindred; he is made the stock of inheritance, and his next of kin is made his heir at law. But if the estate is derived to him, from a parent or other kindred by descent or devise, then the person from whom it came or descended is made the stock of inheritance; and the next of kin, who is of the blood of that person, is made the heir at law. Providing then a different stock of descent, and a different rule of descent, for estates derived from a parent or other kindred, and for those estates only, must have been done to keep the descent of such estates in the blood of such parent or other kindred; and could have been dore with no other view. Then it is asked, if this, which had always been an object of their descent law,, was not to remain a provision of their descent law, why was this provision introduced . at all1? if this object was to be abandoned, this provision wás not necessary. If this was not the object, and théir construction be the true one, the legislature made a general mle of descent; and then made an exception, to it* by which exception no rational end whatever was to be answered. It has been said, that it always had been the wish of the descent law of that people, to perpetuate the family inheritance in the blood of the family. A short review of the history of that law, will prove this a correct statement. The common law of .descent of England, was the law of descent of that people'to 1718, without any alteration or intermission. This law was secured by their descent law up tp that time; for it was one ofits great purposes. In 1718 they made a statute of descents, which made the intestate, in all cases, the stock of inheritance, and his next of kin his heir at law. But, in the short period of ten years, this statute was repealed, hnd for the very reason that this- object was thereby abandoned. The preamble states, “ For as much as the aforesaid act is found by experience to be very prejudicial by destroying inheritances,” “ be it therefore enacted,” &c. By destroying inheritances — that is, inheritances as they theretofore had existed, and by which family estates had been kept in the blood of the family. This repeal left the common law of descent to revive as the ■ law of descent of that people; by which the first law was again secured to them, and remained their law of descent to 1770. In 1770 they made another statute of descent, but in making which, they were careful to preserve the object which had been abandoned by the statute of 1718. In this statute of 1770, they made the intestate, in all cases, the stock of inheritance; but in all collateral inheritances, they made the next of kin of the full blood of the intestate, the heir at law. As this statute of 1770-made the intestate in all cases the stock of inheritance, the making the next of kin of the full blood to the intestate, in all collateral inheritances, the heir at law, was necessary to the plan of .keeping the descent of the estate in the blood of the family. This restriction of the descent in collateral inheritances, was adopted for this purpose. This rule,.liké the common law rule of descent, would be attended with some occasional cases of apparent hardship. This statute continued unaltered, as this provision to 1798, 'when all the statutes were revised, and this among the rest; The statute of 1798 proposed to accomplish the same purpose, which was accomplished by the statute of 1770, but by different means; and by a modification that would avoid those occasional cases pf apparent hardship, which resulted from .the application of the rules established by the statute of 1770. The statute of 1798 made the intestate the stock of inheritance, and his next .of kin the heir, but not in all cases as did the statute of 1770; it excepted cases derived to the intestate by descent, gift or devise, from the parent or other kindred; and as to those excepted cases, it made the person fiom whom the estate came or descended, the stock of inheritance, and made the next of kin to the intestate of the blood of that person the heir at law. By this modification', by making the blood, hot the full blood only, of that person the heir at law; it obviated the hardships occasionally inci-. dent to the rule established in the statute of 1770. This statute continued to 1822, when all the statutes'Were again revised, and this among the rest. The statute of 1.798 is re-enactéd in the statute of 1822, in'substance, differing only in form; As to all the cases in which the intestate is to be the stock of inheritance, or his next of kin to be the heir; and as to all the excepted cases in which the person from whom the estate came or descended, is to be the stock of inheritance, and the blood of that person to be the heir; both statutes are th,e same. From this-deduction of the history of the law descent of Rhode Island, which can not be impugned in any one particular, but which will be found verified and confirmed throughout.,by an examination of that law-, it must be admitted-that it has always been the object of that law, to keep the inheritance in the blood of that family, by whom it.had been acquired, and from whom it had descended. • A reference to the statutes of 1718, and of 1770, will verify this exposition'of those statutes.. A’gain; that such was the design of the. legislature, may be; and must be inferred from the understanding and the practice, which has prevailed in the state on this point. The question is practically settled, though not. judicially, and settled for such a length of 'time, as gives to the practical settlement all the force of a final judicial .determination. For it is the result of an impression, so universal and so decided, as to have precluded all doubt and all litigation up to the origin of this action. Nor is the statute of 1798 to be considered as a -new statute of descent, introducing and prescribing a course of descent for the first time: this however it is not; for it is to continue only to regulate the ancient-course, not to originate a new one. It is now thirty years since that statute was made; and the rule, of descent thereby established, is still the rule of descent in thq state*' Now all the collateral descents, in all the state during all that time, have been cas.t according to the defendant’s .construction of the statute, without a question being made, as to their being rightfully cast; and have been, and'now are enjoyed accordingly. Not an instance of a descent in that state, contrary to this statement, has been, or can be cited. How numerous those descents have been, is not known; but in that length of time they must have been numerous. This fact is at once a proof of this practical'construction by the whole state; extending back' a full quarter of a century, prior to the origin of this action; and of the mischiefs, which a judicial reversal of this practical construction would now produce : for it must unsettle every one of those descents, which possession has not matured into a perfect title. We need not go out of this case, to see in the descents which have occurred in the case, how settled the impression has been, that the family inheritance must descend in, and-be . confined to the blood of the family according to our construction of the statute, t There was, in the first place, on the death of John Gardner, in 1806, the descent of his-third part of the estate to his surviving brother and sister. 'No stress is laid upon this;for upon both interpretations, the .descent was rightly .cast. But then carne the death of George Gardner in 1811, and the descent of his third-part, and-of his half of John’s third part.. On whom was the descent now cast 1 Oh Mary the surviving sister; the descent of the whole, as well that part which George inherited from his brother John, as that part which George inherited from his mother. The plaintiff agrees to all this — agrees that she succeeded -legally, rightfully and exclusively, to the part which George had inherited from John. If John, the person from whom it last-descended was the stock of inheritance, as to this part, the plaintiff was-entitled to,succeed equally with Mary. The plaintiff himself agrees that John was not the stock of inheritance as to this part; for he agrees that he himself was not entitled to succeed to any share of that part. The plaintiff himself agrees that the mother, from whom the estate had originally .descended, was the stock of inheritance; for he agrees that Mary, her child, alone, had the right to succeed. Then how can the plaintiff claim to inherit from -Mary, on a principle on which he agrees, he could not claim to inherit from her brother George, as to the part which George inherited from his brother John *? If the plaintiff could not make John the stock of inheritance, as to the estate which George inherited from his brother John, how can he make Mary the stock of inheritance, as to the estate which she inherited from her brother George 1 He has, in truth, surrendered the very principle in controversy, and left himself no ground to stand on; for he has made it a matter of record, and the Court are now called upon to give to the plaintiff an estate, to which he has agreed, and agreed on the record that he has no title. In proof of this position, the Court are referred to the statement of facts; and especially to that part distinguished by italics. It reads thus : “ That thereupon (that is, upon the death of George), his part of said estate, (that is. one moiety of the whole estate, including his original third part who had previously déceased,) that thereupon his (George’s) part, descended to and vested in, his sister the said Mary C. Gardner in fee simple; and she became seise'd and possessed of the same accordingly. And thereby became seised and possessed of the whole estate in question in fee simple.'” The legal effect of this statement, in this case, and upon this case, is a striking illustration of that familiar, that settled, that riveted notion, prevalent in Rhode Island in favour of the principle of descent, which wé contend for. The plaintiff’s counsel at the time, probably, were not aware of its palpable inconsistency, with the new principle of descent, which they had to contend for;- and unreflectingly made the statement, according to their. habitual notions on the subject. And the descent itself is another striking illustration of the same fact. It took place in 1811, eighteen years ago; was acquiesced in then, has been acquiesced in ever since, and is ratified even now, so far as a recorded agreement can ratify it, Then came the death of Mary C. Gardner, and the descent of the whole estate; of which she had one.third directly from her mother, and the other two thirds, from her mother, but-through her two brothers. On the death of Mary, how was the descent cast or supposed to be cast 1 That such has been the practical construction of the statute, must be admitted, as no instance to the contrary hasbeen cited, or can be. The state of Connecticut have a parallel provision in their statute <5f descents. Its construction there is considered as settled, though it never has been judicially settled; it is considered as settled, because long and uniform practice has settled it. The attention o.f the Court is invited' to the descent law of Connecticut; as it has been said, that the provision in the Rhode Island law was framed by the provision in that; and there is to be found in the statute of 1798, some internal evidence of the fact. It was long in that state a vexata queslio, whether the words, next of kin, in their then subsisting statute of descents, did not mean, when applied to real estate in the collateral descent, “next of kin to the intestate of the full blood f which was much agitated, and variously decided by their courts; but it was finally decided, that next of kin meant, next of kin in the civil law sense of the expression; which had no reference to distinction of blood. It was with a view to preclude this very controversy, that the Rhode Island statute of 1798, in providing for the desteñí of all.that part of the intestate’s estate which" is made to descend to tbe next of kin to the intestate, adds, to the words next of kin, these seemingly unnecessary words, “ computing according to the degrees of the civil law.” The struggle in that state, about the meaning of the words next of kin, it is.believed, was' occasioned by the strong prevalent sentiment of that people in favour of keeping the family inheritance in the blood of the family. For they were so dissatisfied with the final judicial decision, which frustrated that object, that their legislature afterwards, in the first revision of their laws,. introduced this special provision — viv,. “ Provided that all the' real estate of the intestate, which came to him by descent, gift or devise, from his or' her parent, ancestor, or other kindred, shall belong - equally to the brothers and sisters of the intestate,- and those who ler gaily represent them, of the blood of the person or ancestor from whom s.uch. estate came or descended;” going oñ-and following out the same principle; if there be not any brother or sister. This statute was made in 1784; therefore soon after the termination of this controversy. The practical construction of th,eir statute ever since, has been precisely the practical construction given to that of Rhode Island; arid there all the estates coming within their proviso, have, uniformly descended to the blood of the person or ancestor, from whom the- estate originally came, whether by descent, gift or devise. And such is considered as the settled law of that state; but how settled1? not by any judicial adjudication, for there has been none; but by an uniform practical execution of the statute, according to that construction. Wherein such a practical construction is inferior, in point of authority, to a judicial decision, it is difficult to comprehend. The authority for this statement will be found in tile case of William Hillhouse vs. Levi Chester, Day’s Reports, Vol. Ill, page 166 ; and also in the statute láws of Connecticut, Digest of 1821, page 208. In the statute regulating descents in New York, there is also a parallel provision. It is said that there has never been any controversy as to its construction; of course there can be found no .judicial decision settling its construction. The provision is in these words, viz. — And in such case, every brother and sister of the half blood of the person so seised, shall inherit equally with those of the full Rood; unless when such inheritance came to the person so seised, by descent, devise or gift of some one of his or her ancestors ; in which case, all those who are not of the blood of such ancestor, shall be excluded from such inheritance.” See the act to regulate descents of the state of New York, haws of New York, Vol. I. p. 46, sec. 4. It is remarkable how exactly alike in all essential particu-larsj are all these provisions in both the laws.' In one, it is the estate coming by descent, gift or devise; in the other, it is the estate coming by descent, gift or devise; in the Rhode Island law, it is the estate coming from parent or other kindred; in the'Connecticut provision, it is the estate coming from parent, ancestor or other kindred; in the New York provision, it is the .estate coming from the ancestor. But what is most remarkable is, that they all agree in designating the person whose blood is to inherit, in' the same general way. In all, it is the person from whom the estate came or descended; leaving-the word originally, to be understood as implied; and as what would of course be'understood as implied. As to the meaning of the word “ blood,” as used in the proviso; whether it mean blood or full blood, it is not deemed necessary to discuss in this case: for, whether it mean the one or the other, the plaintiff is not entitled to inherit upon x>ur rule. Our rule is, that the blood of the person from whom the estate originally came, is to inherit; and the plaintiff is not of that blood. It is said, that the rule (if ours be the rule,) could have been more technically expressed'; and it is inferred that it could not be the rule, because this was not done. But does it not appear that this difficulty operates both ways '? The difficulty is4 that the words do not mark our rule with absolute precision; but if they did, there could be ho controversy between the parties. The argument is just as good for one as for the other; and therefore is good for nothing for either. It is said that the eommon law considers a gift or devise as a purchase; and the purchase as the stock of inheritance: and. that we must consider descent as standing on a common foot with gift and devise. - It is true that .the common law considers the donee or the devisee as the stock of inheritance. But the question is not. who is made so by the common law, but whom the statute makes that stock. It is very clear that the person whom the common law makes'that stock, is not the same the statute does. The common law makes it from the donee or devisee; that is, the ■ intestate himself, if he be donee or devisee : but the statute certainly does not; it goes back of the donee or devisee to some other person; now to say that the donor or devisor is that person, is begging the question. It may go through the donor, or devisor, back to .the person from whom the estate originally came; and must, if that was the intention. The family inheritance may as well come down through gifts and devises, as through a course of descent; and the. words gift and devise were coupled with the word descent, purposely to cover the whole inheritance. As to the authorities cited by the counsel for the plaintiff, Mr Robbins observed, that none of them seemed to conflict with any of the grounds which had been taken for the defendant. In all the numerous references to Reeves’s Law of .Descent, not one militates with these .grounds; nor is it .supposed that the practical construction of the.parallel provision of the Connecticut statute is different from ours. As to the two cases from Sergeant & Rawls’s Reports, and from Harris & Johnson, they are cases under the statutes of Pennsylvania and Maryland, which are different from that of Rhode Island. Theirs extends only to the estate which comes by descent; not like the one under which the defendant holds to the estate, which comes by gift or devise, as well as by descent. And one of those cases only goes to say that the estate by devise was not embraced by the proviso in the Maryland statute, relating to estates by descent; and that the estate by devise descended upon dther principles. [MAJORITY — Mr Justice Story] Mr Justice Story delivered the opinion of the Court. This case comes before us from the circuit court of Rhode Island, upon a certified division of opinion of the judges of that court, upon the question whether the plaintiff1 was entitled to recover upon a statement of facts incorporated into the record. The action was an ejectment for two-third parts of certain land described in the writ; and the title of the parties being by descent, depends altogether upon the true construction of the statute of descents of Rhode Island, of 1822. Accordingly as that statute shall be construed, the land now in controversy bélongs to the plaintiff or the defendants. The material facts are, that the estate (two-thirds of which are demanded in the writ) was devised by John Collins to his daughter Mary Collins in fee. Upon her death in 1806, the same descended to her three children, viz. John C. Gardner, George Gardner, and Mary C. Gardner. The twobro-thers died intestate and without issue; and Mary C. Gardner, ' as heir to her brothers, became seised of the whole estate, and died intestate and without issue, in December 1822. The defendants are the uncle and aunt of Mary C. Gardner, the intestate, of the whole blood; being children of John Collins, the devisor, and brother and sister of her. mother, Mary Collins. The plaintiff is the brother of Mary C. Gardner, the intestate of the half blood; and he holds a conveyance of their shares from her other brothers and sisters of the half blood, they being children of her father by a iormer marriage. The plaintiff and his brothers and sisters of the half blood claim the two-thirds of the estate now in question, as her heirs of the- half blood; and the defendants claim the same as her heirs of the whole blood. It is admitted on all sides, that the one-third which ..Mary C. Collins took by immediate descent fronrher ihother, belongs to the heirs of the whole blood. But the other two-thirds, being taken by immediate descent from her brothers, it is contended, that by the statute of 1822, it passes to her heirs of the half blood. If this question had been settled by any judicial decision. ■ in the states where the la. . lies, we should, upon the unU form principles adopted by this Court, recognise that decision as a part of the local law. But it is admitted that no such decks •> has ever been made. If this had been an ancient statute, and a uniform course of professional opinion and practice had long prevailed in the interpretation of it, that would be-respected as almost of equal authority. But no such opinion or practice has been known to prevail; and indeed, the statute itself is but of very recent origin. Even the statute of 1798,; of which, in respect to this point, that of 1822 is almost a transcript, is not of a date so remote, as to enable us. to presume that many cases could have arisen in that state, on which to found a practical construction, without some unequivocal evidence. The most that has been urged is, that there has been some general understanding among the people, that such was the meaning of the statute; but even this, though very respectably attested, is encountered, by equally respectable statements on the other side. We are driven therefore to consider the question as entirely new and-unsettled; and to be decided not upon the mistakes of parties relative to their rights in one or two unndjudicated cases, even if they existed, but by the true construction of the statute itself. The statute of 1822 enacts, that “ when any person having title to any real estate of inheritance shall die intestate as to such estate, it shall descend and pass in equal portions to his or her kindred in the following course* &c.” Among other clauses is the following, “ if there be no father, then to the mother, brothers and sisters .of such intestate, and their descendants, or such of them as there be.” In the. present case there was no father or mother of Mary C. Gardner, the intestate, living at-the time of her decease; and as her brothers and sisters, of the half blood are her brothers and sisters within the meaning of the statute, they would be entitled to thé estate in question beyond all controversy; if there were no other disqualifying clause. But in a subsequent clause of the statute in the nature of a proviso, it is declared, that “ when the title to any estate of inheritance, as to which the person having such title shall die intestate, came by descent, gift, or devise from the parent or other kindred of the intestate, and such intestate die without children, such estate shall go to the kin next to the intestate of the blood of the person from whom such estate came or descended, if any there be.” The most material differences between the statute of 1798 and that of 1822, so far as regards this question is, that the words “ if any there be” are omitted in the former, which also uses the words u next of kin toj” instead of “kin next to.” Both of these circumstances have been'relied on at the bar as indicating a probable change of intention. It is said that both acts admit of two readings, viz. “ to such of the next of kin of the intestate as are of the blood, &c.” or “ to the nearest of .such of the kin of the intestate as are of the blood,” &c. The latter reading will give the estate to a remote relation of the intestate of the blood, although he be not of the next of kin of the intestate. The former reading requires that the party should be of the next of kin, (that being the primary intention), as well as of the blood; and therefore, if a person be not of th¿ next pf kin of the intestate, although he be of the blood, he cannot take; and the words of the act of 1822, “ if any there be,” are relied on to fortify the construction. We think the. legislative intention in both acts was the same; and that the transposition of the words “ next of kin” to “ kin next,” was accidental, and not introductory of any new object. The true construction of the statute of 1822 is, that it gives the estate to the next of kin of the intestate who are of the blood, excluding all others though of a nearer degree who are not of the blood, &c. In this view of the clause, two questions'have been argued at the bar. 1. Whether the words “ of the blood” include the half blood ; or exclusively apply to the whole blood. 2. Whether the words “ came by descent, gift, or devise from the parent and other kindred of the intestate,” are limited to a proximate and immediate descent, gift, or devise from such parent, &c. to the intestate; or include a descent, gift, or devise which can be deduced mediately from or through any ancestor, however remote, who was the first purchaser to the intestate. The first question has not been seriously pressed in this Court by the counsel for the defendants, though it constituted in the court below a main ground of argument. We think that the phrase “ of the blood” in the statute includes the half blood. This is the natural meaning of the word “ blood” standing alone, and» unexplained by any context. A half brother or sister is of the blood of the intestate, for each of them has some of the blood of a common parent in his or' her veins. - A person is with the most strict propriety of language affirmed to be of the blood of another who has any, however small a portion, of the same blood derived from a common ancestor. In the common law, the word “ blood” is used in the- same sense. Whenever it is intended to express any qualification, the word whole or half blood, is generally used to designate it, or the qualification is implied from the context on known principles of law. Thus, Littleton in his sixth section says, that none shall inherit “ as heir to any man, unless he be his heir of the whole blood; for if a man hath issue two sons by divers ventres, and.the eldest purchase lands, &c. &c. the younger brother shall not have, the land, &c. because the younger brother is but of the half blood to the elder.” The same distinction is found in section eighth of the same author; and Lord Coke in his commentary , on the text constantly takes it. So < Robinson, in his Treatise on Inheritances; 45, after laying down the rule,, that the person who is to inherit must be. of the. whole blood to the person from whom he proximately and immediately inherits; adds, that he must • also, be of the blood of the first purchaser.; but that it is sufficient to satisfy, this that he is of the half blood of such purchaser. The legislation of. Rhode Island leads to the Same result as to the meaning of the word “ blood.” That colony..was governed by the English law of descents from its.first ..settlement until the, year 1718, a period of more than , half a century. By an act passed in 1718 the real estate of the intestate was divided among all his children, giving the eldest son a double share, &c.; and in default of issue, the same was distributable among the next of kin of the intestate, within, equal degree, &c. This act was repealed in 1728, and the 'common law course of descents was revived and remained, in force until 17.70, when an act was passed, providing substantially for the,same distribution as the act of 1718. It contained,, however, this remarkable proviso, “mat no distribútion of ahy real estate inconse-quence of this act, shall extend or be made in the collateral tine beyond, the brothers and sisters of such, intestate and their children, and to those only of the whole blood” :In 1772 the act of 1770 was repealed in regard to the double share to the eldest son, but. in other respects, it remained in force until the revision in 1798, when the proviso that none should inherit., in the collateral line except the whole blood was dropped ; 'and there is not either in the act of 1798 or 6f 1822 any clause; referring to the blood ofany person as a stock of descent,'except the very clause-upon which the present questions, arise:. When, therefore, ihe distinction between the whole and half blood, was well known in the colony, not only as a part of the.common law, bq$. ás a part of its own legislation, and the proviso is dropped in which th'e words “ whole blood” were studiously used ;' and the words “ of the blood” only, are found in any correspondent provision; it affords a strong presumption, that the whole blood were no longer deemed to be exclusively entitled to inherit, but that the half blood should be let in. If the half blood weré hot permitted to inherit in cases of this sort, this anomaly might occur; that a son might inherit from his parent the moiety of ah estate directly, which he could not inherit from his brother of the half blood,- to whom it had passed by descent from the same parent, if such brother should die without issue. We see no reason, then,’ to doubt, that the words “ of the blopd,” include the half as well as the whole blood. The plaintiff, then, and those from whom he claims being the next of kin of the iiitestate, and of the blood of her two brothers, from whom she immediately derived that part of the estate which is-now in controversy;. is entitled to recover,. unless the statute in thé other part, of the clause defeats the descent. ' This leads us to the second question. The estate originally came from John Collins by devise to his daughter Mary Gollins,- and by descent from her to her three children, and '"mediately as to the two thirds to the intestate, through her brothers. The counsel for the plaintiff contends, that the clause looks Only to. th'e proximate and immediate descent; the counsel for the defendants, that it looks to the origin of the title in the first purchaser, ana requires that the party claiming as heir, should be of the blood of the first purchaser, through whatever intermediate devolutions by descent, gift br devise if may'have. passed, and however remote may be the first ancestor. If the latter be the true construction of the clause it .goes far. beyond the common law, for that stopped at -the last purchaser in the ancestral line, (and persons taking by devise or gift are deemed purchasers,) and ascended no higher than it could trace an uninterrupted course of descents. The common law, therefore, would have considered Mary Collins as the- first purchaser for all its own purposes of descent. The words are, “ when the title to.any real.'estate, &c. as to which the person having such title .shall die intestate came by 'descent, gift or devise from the parent, or other Kindred of the intestate,” &c. Now what reason is there to suppose that the legislature, in this, cl ¿use, meant in favour “of the blood of the person, from whom such estate came or descended,” to extend its reach beyond that of the common law1? No such intention is disclosed on the face of the provision; and every progressive enactment, for the last fifty years in Rhode Island, is a relaxation* of the'strict canons of descent of the common -la'w. The words themselves ^certainly do not necessarily require such an interpretation. As to descents, as well' as . gifts and devises from a parent, it is plain that'the act looks only,-to the immediate descent or title. A descent from a .párent to a child cannot be construed to mean a descent' through and not from á parent.' So a gift or devise from a-parent must be construed to mean a gift'.or devise by the act of . that parent ;‘and not by that of some other ancestor ipore remote, passing-' through, the .parent. .It has been Urged, in anotherquarter entitled to great,respect, that the .words maybe construed distr-ibutively.;. that a distinction maybe taken.‘between a descent, • gift or devise, dram a parent, and a descent, &c. from other kindred; and so, also, that the- wordsdescent, gift and. devise .maybe construed distributively ; so. that in cases of descents, the-party , who shall inherit is to be of the blood of the first purchaser,, from whom*by intermediate descents it was passed to the intestate ; and that,' in cases of gifts or devises, the donor or devisor shall alone be the person whose blood is to be inquired for. It may be admitted; that the clause is susceptible of such a construction'without any great violation of its terms. But .we.do not think, that such is the natural construction of the terms, nor is any-legislative intention disclosed, which vyould justify us in adopting it. There does not seem any sound reason, why the clause should be-construed in the case.of a parent, differently from what it-would be in the case of any “other kindred of the intestate.”’ The latter words must be construed in the same manner as if each class of kindred had been enumerated in detail; such as uncles, brothers, grand-parents, cousins, Asc. &,c>t; and if they had been, the' same rule from the specific enumeration must have been applied ■ to them, as is now sought tó -be applied to the case of parents. The general expression must be deemed to include all the particulars. Then, as fo' the distinction between descents, and gifts and.devises- It is true, that in a sense an estate may be said to come by descent, from a' remote .ancestor to a person, upon whom it has devolved through' many intermediate descents. Rut this, if not loose language, is .not that sense" which’is. ordinarily annexed, to the term: When an estate is said to have descended from A; to B>, the natural and obvious meaning .of the words is, that it is an immediate descent from" A. to B. If other words of a statute shoüld seem to require another and more enlarged meaning, there would be no absolute impropriety in adopting it; but if the true sense is to be sought from the very terms per se, that which is the usual sense would seem most proper to be followed. It is not for courts of justice to indulge, in any latitude of construction, where the words do. not materially justify it; and there is no.express legislative intention to guide them. But .we think, that the connexion in which the words stand, justify us in adhering' to the ordinary interpretation. . If in cases of gifts and devises, the blood of the proximate donor or der visor is alone to be regarded, there being, no distinction pointed out in the words of the act, between, those cases and that .of descents; the very juxta position of the words affords a strong presumption, that the legislature intended to apply the same rule as to all. If the object was to re-, gard the blood of the party, from whom the estate was derived ; what reasoh is .there to suppose that, the legislature, intended less, regard to the blood of a devisor or donor, than to that of an. ancestor.1?' The mischief might'be as great in suffering the estate to. pass int.o the hands of strangers; when there were next of kin of the blood in the one case, as in. the other. On the other hand, there might be solid reasons for confining the preference of blood to cases of immediate descents, which coüld be easily known and easily traced. One of the known inconveniences of tracing back titles and relationship, is the obscurity which at a small distance of timé gathers over themi It would often be difficult to ascertain, whether there were not relations of a very distant' stock, of the blood of a remote ancestor; who might be entitled to the inheritance, to the exclusion of the immediate next of kin of the intestate. . And even the course of descents of his own title in a country, where estates' are universally partible, for two or three generations; might involve the estate of the intestate in inextricable difficulties; and disable the next of -kin from ascertaining, into what fragments it was to be subdivided with any Reasonable certainty. It would be no want of wisdom, therefore, in a legislature to limit its provisions in favour of the blood, to cases where the immediate^title could be traced with almost absolute certainty. Certainty of title, in a country where titles so rapidly, change hands, might furnish a. far safer principle of legislation, than any preference for the blood of persons remotely related to the intestate through some distant, and, perhaps, unknown ancestor. We think, then, that in the case of a gift or devise, the statute stops at the immediate donor or d.evisor, and ascends no higher for an,y blood. What reason is there to suppose, that in the case of a descent there was a different legislative intention1? In the case of a parent, the parent is, 'by the very terms of the statute, made the sole stock of descent, whether he derived it by descent, or by gift, or devise, from an ancestor or a stranger. . In the case at bar, .the mother of the intestate took the estate by devise from' her father. She was in by-purchase; and in the sense of the common law, as first purchaser, and, of course, the true stock of descent, holding the estate ut feudum antiquum. It has been said that the .object was. to preserve inheritances in the same family. To a limited extent this is true ; that is, as far as the legislature-has provided for suclilcases. No general declaration is made by the legislature'onrtbe subject; and no preamble, .which discloses any leading intention, exists.. What the legislative intention was, nan be derived only from the words they have used; and we cannot speculate beyond the reasonable- import of these words. The spirit of the act must be extracted from the words of the act, and not from, conjectures aliunde. The common law carries back in certain cases, the descent to the heirs of the first purchaser. But the common law canons of descents, are overturned by the statute of descents of Rhode Island. How then can we resort to the common law, to make up the supposed defects in the■ language of the statute1? . Here, there is not a casus omissus; but a complete scheme of descents; and the only question is, how much the proviso carves out and saves from the operation of the general rule. No such words as “ the first 'purcháset,” are to be fouhd in the statute, though it is sufficiently technical in other, respects; and what right'can this Court.possess, to exchange the words in this statute for the words, “first purchaser,” when they are not equipollent in meaning or extent1? If the legislature intended to set up anew the rule of the common law, as. to descents, &c. from the first purchaser, it seems scarcely credible that it should have omitted the Very phrase, considering that for a century at least it was a material ingredient in the law of descents of the colony. Then, again; if the argument now urged at this bar for the defendants; is well founded, it goes (as has been already stated) far beyond, and indeed to the overthrow of the common law on the very point pf first purchasers. Indeed, at the common law, a man-might sometimes inherit, who was of the whole blood of the intestate, who could not have inherited from the first purchaser. As in the case of a purchase by a son, who dies without issue, and his uncle inherits the same, and dies without issue, the father may inherit the same from the uncle, although he could not inherit from his own son . The statute of Rhode Island'imparts to parents a right to inherit the real estates of their childreh; in cases where the latter die without issue. The statutes of descents of the different states in the union, are so different in their provisions, that it is not easy tp apply any general rule of construction to them. The cases cited at the bar, do however demonstrate, that in thosé states where a similar language is Used in their statutes of descents, the expression has been uniformly construed to mean immediate descents, gifts and devises, unless that construction has been overruled by the context. The statute of Connecticut, of 1784, which has been supposed to be'the model of that of Rhode Island, as to this proviso, is understood to have received this, co'nstruction. Under words nearly similar, in the Virginia statute of 1792, (the words being, “ that where an infant shall die without issue, having title to any real estate as inheritance derived by gift, devise or descent from, the father, &c.”) it has been held that an immediate descent, from, the father, and not an intermediate descent was intended. Upon the vyhole, our opinion is, that both points are in favour of the plaintiff We all think that the words “ of the blood” comprehend all persons of the blood, whether of the whole or half blood; and that the words, “ come by descent, gift or devise, from the parent or other kindred, &c.”' mean immediate descent, gift or devise, and make the immediate ancestor, donor or devisor, the sole stock of descent. A certificate will accordingly be sent to the circuit.court of Rhode Island, in favour of the plaintiff. This' cause came on to be heard on the transcript of .the record from the' circuit court of the United States, for the district, of. Rhode Island; and on the points on which the judges of the said circuit court were divided in opinion, and which were certified to this Court for its opinion; and was argued by counsel; on consideration whereof, it is ordered and adjudged by this Court, that it be certified to the said circuit court of the. United States for the district of' Rhode Island, that the plaintiff and those under whom he claims the estate in controversy, are heirs at law of Mary C. Gardner the intestate, and, as such heirs, are by the statute of descents of Rhode Island of (A. I). 1822), eighteen hundred and twenty-two, entitled to the same estate upon the facts agreed in the case, and that judgment ought to be^iven for the plaintiff in this cause; all which is ordered to b.e certified to the said circuit court. • See Smith vs. Tracey, 2 Mod. 204 ; Crook vs. Watts, 2 Vern. Rep. 124; S. C. Shower. Parl. Cases, 108. See Cowper vs. Cowper, 2 Pecre Will. 720 735; Collingwood vs. Pace, 1 Vent. 424; Watkins on Descents. 227, 228. [153.] note; Reeves on Descents, 170. See Littleton, s. 3. and. Co. Litt. 10. b. Litt. s. 8. Co. Litt. 14. b. а) See Reeves on-Reseents, 160, &c. 1 Munf.Rep,.183. 3 Call. Rep. 120.