Hawn against Norris and Brown

[Sunbury, Thursday, June 13, 1811.] Hawn against Norris and Brown. In Error. It is a sufficient description of the premises within the act of 21st March 1806, which devises the writ of ejectment, to mention the county and township, the number of acres, and the name or names of the persons who own the adjoining lands. Where articles of agreement have been entered into for the sale of lands, the vendee upon tender of the purchase money, may enforce them by ejectment. This was an ejectment brought in the Common Pleas of Mifflin county, in the form devised by the act of 21st March 1806. The writ described the premises as “ a tract of land situate in Armagh township in the said county, containing fourteen acres and sixty-three perches or thereabouts, bounded by land of the said John Hawn,” the defendant, which was precisely the kind of description set out in the formule given by the act of assembly. The plaintiffs claimed under articles of agreement dated the 26th March 1810 between John Hawn and William Norris, by which the former sold to the latter fourteen acres of land out of a certain tract, to include a mill seat. The land was afterwards surveyed, and the quantity ascertained by metes and bounds, to the satisfaction of both parties. Norris subsequently tendered the money, and a deed to be executed by Hawn, which he refused. Brown the other plaintiff was a purchaser of one half from Norris. Two objections appeared to have been taken below, although one only was pressed in this court. 1. To the plaintiffs’ right of recovery upon the articles. 2. To the description of the premises in the writ and statement. Walker, President, charged the jury, that although ejectment was not a mode of enforcing articles of agreement, according to the law of England, because there the party might go into Chancery, and the chancellor if it was a *proper case would decree a deed; yet in Pennsylvania, from the want of a Court of Chancery, a practice had arisen at a very early day, to enforce articles by ejectment wherever the chancellor in England would enforce them. This authority had been long exercised by our courts, and it had become settled law, that a purchaser tendering his money, and performing on his part, all that he was bound to perform, might recover. In exercising the right, the common form of ejectment was in common use, and the articles were not spread upon the record, but the party made out his cause as in other cases. The power of the courts thus to enforce agreements, was one of those secured and sanctioned by the constitution, as having been usually exercised by them before its date. It was said that no title was shown in Iiawn. If Hawn the owner of land sold it to Norris, he could not afterwards keep him out of possession. The only question was whether the plaintiffs had made out a fair case. As to the act of assembly of 1806, it was intended to cure certain defects, and particularly formal objections to the pleadings. The sixth section provides that there shall be no nonsuits for defect of form. The legislature thought there was too much fiction in the old action of ejectment, and abolished it. The question now arises on the 12th section of the act and the supplement. The 12th section prescribes the form of ejectment, and the 13th enforces it by removing entirely the common law form. The description in the form is general, without courses and distances. A statement, a description of the land is to be filed, and defence taken for all or a part. The difficulty is as to a description of the land. What is the meaning of this? The legislature never intended to introduce the strictness of the writ of right. At common law the description was general, the verdict made it certain, and the judgment followed. Descriptions were very vague, but the service of the ejectment gave notice to the party, and the plaintiff was bound to prove that the defendant was in possession. All ejectments were brought in the same form, and there was no spreading of articles of agreement upon the record. What is a description under the act ? If the legislature had meant a draft they would have said so. The word is vague, but it wrnuld seem to mean not a draft, but some convenient notice of the claim, which might inform the defendant what was to be tried. If brought upon the *articles before survey, and the party had refused to have one made, a draft would have been impossible. The Court think the substance has been complied with. This opinion is confirmed by the supplement to the act of 1806, (Act of 13th April, 1807.) There is no distinction between ejectments; the same form is to be used in all cases, and is to give remedy as fully as in ejectments in the form heretofore used. The supplement cuts up some of the old forms in the case of joint owners. It seems intended to do justice, and to destroy forms. We may be mistaken; but when the legislature intended to disentangle legal proceedings from formal objections, we cannot proceed to create them. We do not think this objection has substance. A bill of exceptions to this opinion was tendered and allowed, and the record removed by writ of error. The objection to the description was alone urged by Watts for the plaintiff in error, who contended that it was essential that the objection in controversy should be described in such a manner, that the defendant might know what he was called upon to prove. Here were articles of agreement. Had they been described, or had the description they contain, been inserted in the writ, it might have been notice. But it was impossible for the defendant to say what part of his property he was called to defend, since the description applied equally -well to any fourteen acres of his possession. The legislature give a form as a general guide; but where there are articles of agreement not executed, the writ is not notice unless it contains what they contain as to matter of description, or refers to them. Huston and Duncan answered that there was no difference between a title under articles of agreement, and any other writing or deed; and that they had pursued precisely the course pointed out by the act, which could not be erroneous, while the act continued in force. The act said there should be no other. [MAJORITY — Tilghman, C. J.,] Tilghman, C. J., delivered the court’s opinion. If this court had the power to form the writ of ejectment, the remarks of Mr. Watts might have weight; but it is not so. The legislature have fixed the form, and said that no other shall be pursued. Has that form been pursued? I think it *has. In the form prescribed by the act of assembly, which has been exactly followed here, there are blanks left for the township, for the quantity of acres, and for the names of the person or persons who own the adjoining lands. All these blanks have been filled up. It is not for us to say that the form prescribed by the act is insufficient. Indeed the description contains as much certainty as the ancient form of ejectment, and in some respects more ; for the old form did not require that the owners of the adjoining lauds should be named. But it is enough for the plaintiffs below, that they have complied with the law. Our opinion is that the judgment should be affirmed. Judgment affirmed. [Citfed in 2 W. 150 ; 6 id. 271 ; 9 id. 498 ; 4 Phila. 93; 10 Wr. 11.]