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General
Murray v. Porter, Price Administrator; Raley et al., trading as Raley's Food Store, v. Porter, Price Administrator; Porter, Price Administrator, v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co. et al.
329 U.S. 705·Supreme Court of the United States·1946
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Opinion
No. 483.
No. 512.
No. 583.
Murray v. Porter, Price Administrator. Raley et al., trading as Raley's Food Store, v. Porter, Price Administrator. Porter, Price Administrator, v. Mohawk Wrecking & Lumber Co. et al.
November 12, 1946.
Robert W. Upton for petitioner in No. 483. C. L. Dawson for petitioners in No. 512. Solicitor General McGrath and David London for the Price Administrator. John W. Babcock for respondents in No. 583.
[MAJORITY]
On petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit;
On petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia; and
On petition for writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
The petitions for writs of certiorari in these cases are granted limited to the question whether the Emergency Price Control Act authorizes the Administrator to delegate to district directors authority to sign and issue subpoenas.
Reported below: No. 483,156 F. 2d 781; No. 512, 81 U. S. App. D. C. 156, 156 F. 2d 561; No. 583, 156 F. 2d 891.