Study aid, not legal advice. caselaw is not a law firm and does not provide legal advice or engage in the unauthorized practice of law (UPL). All briefs, outlines, and citation tools on these pages are educational summaries for law students; they are not a substitute for advice from a licensed attorney admitted in your jurisdiction. Bar-admission rules vary by state. For court filings or client matters, verify every authority against the official reporter and your court's local rules. Use of caselaw does not create an attorney-client relationship.
General
CASELLA v. NAGLE, Commissioner of Immigration
29 F.2d 111·United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit·1928
Brief incoming
Hand-reviewed Bluebook brief (procedural posture, facts, issue, holding, reasoning, dissent) ships once the AI generation pipeline runs through this case. Join the waitlist to get notified when 1L briefs go live.
Opinion
CASELLA v. NAGLE, Commissioner of Immigration.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.
November 12, 1928.
No. 5495.
Julian D. Brewer, of San Francisco, Cal., for appellant.
George J. Hatfield, U. S. Atty., and George M. Naus, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.
Before GILBERT, RUDKIN, and DIETRICH, Circuit Judges.
[MAJORITY — RUDKIN, Circuit Judge.]
RUDKIN, Circuit Judge.
This is an appeal from an order denying a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a deportation proceeding arising under the Immigration Law. Deportation was ordered on the ground that the appellant was found managing a house of prostitution, or music or dance hall, or other place of amusement or resort habitually frequented by prostitutes. The testimony before the department was exceedingly brief and without substantial conflict. Two immigrant inspectors testified that they visited a rooming house in Sacramento and there met the appellant, by whom they were taken into one of the rooms. The appellant asked if they wanted a girl, stating that she had only one. The girl was then brought in, and the appellant asked whieh one would take her first, whereupon one of the inspectors took the girl into another room. The appellant was called as a witness in her own behalf, and while she denied that she herself had committed acts of prostitution at the rooming house, or that the rooming house was a house of prostitution, or that she had received any of the earnings of prostitutes, she made no denial of the facts testified to by the inspectors. On this record, the finding of the department was so far supported by the testimony as to preclude judicial interference.
The order of the court below is therefore affirmed.