Wiscart, et al. Plaintiffs in Error, versus Dauchy, Defendant in Error

Wiscart, et al. Plaintiffs in Error, versus Dauchy, Defendant in Error. ERROR to the Circuit for the Virginia Diftrift. ' The original proceeding was on the Equity fide of the Court below, where the Defendant in Error had filed a bill, charging Adrian Wfcart and Augujline De Neufuille, Co-partners,-wirh having fraudulently conveyed all their eftate, real and;perfonal, by three (aparate deeds, to Peter Robert De iteufuille (who was alfo made a.Defendant to the bill) with a view to prevent the;Complainant’s recova ing the amount of a decree, which lie had formerly obtained in another fuit againft them. The an-; fwers averred the conveyances to be made bona fide, ar.u for a .valuable confideration ; but after a full hearing of the cafe, the Cjrcuit Court (confiding of Judges Iredell and Griffin) delivered, the following opinion: That the deeds filed as exhibits in this raufe, one dated on the 20th oflvlav, 1793,convey-ing the goods and chattels in the fcnedule thereunto annexed, to the Defendant P. R, De Neufiuille ;—another dated on the 17th of the fame month, conveying the ilavgs therein mentioned, to.the faid P. fi. De Neufviile ;---and another, dated on the 20th day of the fame month, conveying to him the land therein mentioned,- are fraudulent, and were intended to defraud the complainant, and to prevent his obtaining fatisfadfion for a juft demand ; that the faid P. R. De Neufviile was. a party and privy to the fraud aforefaid ; and that the faid Deeds were void as to the Complainant: Whereupon it is decreed and ordered, ~ the cireumftances of each particular QaL~ and every fuitor is entitled by the Conf'citutibn to have it. re-examined in this Court. i Burr. ~96. 484. - ~very equivocal fa~ may be ex-. p~1ainedby circumft~nces; and thofe circuinftances fhould ap-. pear wherever the fa& is to be made the ground.ofa judicial decifion. But here the Decree not only f~at~s the general re- luJ.t that the .L)eeds were traudulent, but that they were made with a view to defeat and defraud a juff creditor, without fpe- cifying by what evidence the fraudulent intention was afcer- tamed. if it was o~Iy giving a preference to another banafide `creditor. the A~ could not be deemed fraudulent; and. this Court ought not to b~ bound by the conftru&ion of an inferior `~o~rt~ asto that point, but thould exercite their own ju~g_ ment upon a knowledge ofnll the fa6Is. Ttce Decree, thérefore~ ought not in any cafe to be deemed conclufive; and in this cafes at all events, it is not luch ajtatement as the law contemplates, but the fcaternent, on which the ca~fe is now to be ~ake~i up~ muit be that WhiCh, reciting the eviuence an~ exbibits is ex- prefsly called a ftatement, and as fu ch is fubfcribe4. by the that the said Deeds be by him, the said P. R. De Neusville, delivered to the Clerk of this Court, to be cancelled ; that when thereunto required, he deliver up to the Marshall of this Court, so much of the personal property in the said Deeds mentioned, or either of them, as is now in his hands or possession, to the end that the Complainant may have an execution thereon; that he do account before one of the Commissioners of this Court for the value of all the personal property mentioned in the said Deeds, or either of them, which he shall not be able to deliver from having disposed thereof, or from any other cause. And it is further ordered, that the Defendants pay to the Complainant his costs by him expended in the prosecution of this suit." The record being returned containing the above Decree, at large, and all the pleadings, and depositions, and examinations, produced and taken in the cause the discussion by Ingersoll, for the Defendant in errors and by Lee and Du Ponceau for the Plaintiff, involved these considerations,-Whether a statement of acts by the Circuit Court was in any case conclusive? And whether the Decree, in the present case was such a statement of facts as the law contemplated ? For the Defendant in error. The Court may state the case, in conformity to the Act of Congress (Jud, Act f. 19 1 vol. p.60.) by merely sending-forward the evidence. In Talbot v. Fanson, ant. p. 138. in not: and Hills et al. v. Ross ant.p. 184. there was no statement be the Circuit Court, and the question now agitated was started ;but the Counsel, in deference to what seemed to be the opinion of the Bench, waved the objection, and proceeded upon the evidence at large, as transmitted with the record. The present case turns upon the point, whether the execution of certain Deeds was, or was not, fraudulent ? but, surely, the Decree of the Circuit Court, declaring the execution to be fraudulent is not a statement of the facts, but an inference of law arising from the facts. It must have been the design of the Legislature to separate the fact from the inference; otherwise this court would be precluded from examining on appeal, the justice of the inference, compared with the facts, from which it had been drawn by an inferior tribunal. The statement called for by The Act, may, indeed be likened to a special verdict, where the Jury-ascertain the fans, and the Judges decide the law arising from them; and it cannot be denied, that a question of fraud, or not, is a question of law, the result of Judge. I~'or the Plaintiff in error. `1~here is no precedeht to bind the decifion of the Court;. and, therefore, the gei~uine expo- iition of the a~ic of Congrels is to be lought as the onJy guide on this occafion~ Two things are in~c1uded in the record-~ lit. The Pleadings and U,ecree; and 2d. The Statement of the evidence. Now~the A& of.Col3grefs (f x8.) exprefs.. ly fpecifies the firfc of thefe as one of the ibree thodes,~by ~hich the Circuit Cour.t thafi caufe the fa&s on which they found their Decree fully to appear. The qther modes of ftatin~ a c~ife by agreement of the parties, or, if they çiifagree, by an a& of the Court, are merely alternatives to be adopted when th~ other is iiieffe&ual; and as, in the pt-dent in{+ance, the plead- ings and Decree fully thew all the fa&s, on which the Court formed their judgn~ent, all that is fuperadded. is unneceffary and unauthorifed. Befide~, to~cate a cafe, and to furnith an ~bftra& of the evidence, are certainly things of a very distinct and distinguishable nature. In no case does the law require an abridge- nient or teltimony; anu in tots cale it is obvious mat me law reouires the faa to be hated, and not the evidei~ce of the. faa. Even, indeed, in the inffance of a fpecial verdi~,-if the )ut~r. ftate the evidence of the fa&, and do not find the fa& itfeif, the Court ~vi11 di(regard it ; and here, independent of the Decree,. rio fa~ is f~und, but merely an abf~ra~ of the evidence iscerti- fled by the Court. The faa effablilhed by th~ ~videnQe w~ fraud; and the Decree dire&~d the fraudulent deeds to be ca~i celled: In this there can certainly b~ no error in law~ Fraud is~ indeed, a matter to he tried by a Jury; if the ju~ifdiaion is ever changed, i~ muff either be the eWeSr of pofitive law, ~r the aaof thejdry themfelves; arid the que{'cions of fraud or not had b~n prcvioufly Iubmitred to a jury in the very authorities citad from i Burr. 396. 3~4. Suppofe this cafe had been (a~ it might have been) fubmitte~I to ajury,andtheyhad pronoun~ ced the Deeds to be fraudu]ent~ the Court could not for that caufe afterwards interfere to reverie the judgp~ent, as a jury has cxciufiye power upon the quePcion of fafL The pleadings and Decree~ then, ftate the fa&, and if after fitcha flatement the ab-ftra& pfth~' evidence coui~d not be judicially `fubmitted to this Court, the Court will difregard the abtha&,though ~t is transmitted. as an aooenda~e~ with the record. ELSw0RTH chief YtLflice. The queftion~ how far a ffate~ thent of fa~s by the Circuit Court is conclufive, having been already argued another cau~e~, we are prepared t~ give an opinion upon that point conIidera- • ~ion, the oh~c~&ion~ that the prefent d,ecree is not fuch a ftate- gnent of fi~±s, as the law contem~iates. caufe~ o~ equity or admiralty ~uri1th~.hon are removed hi- ther, acco~ip~inied with a flatement of fads, but without the evidepce~ it is well and the Ifatewent is concli~five as to all the ta~ls, which ii contains. `fhi~ ;~ unanimoufly the opinion of the courtS • if fuch cnuf~s are removed with a ifatement of the faas, and aIf~ wiih the evidence ;-PtiiI the flatement is conclufive, as t, ~i11 the f~t~ cor~taincd in, it. This is the opinion of the court; ISut not.un~inimouiTv. ~VV~LS~N, f~ifiicc~ I confider the ruleeftablilhed by the fe- cond prbpofition to be of~ fuch im;gnitude~ that being in the mi- nority on the decilion, I am deinous of ftating, as bri€fly as I can, the prindples of my.di1i~nt~ 0 • The deciliori niuft~ indeed, v~y The deciliori niuft~ indeed, v~yniaterially aWe~t the jurif- diction of all the courts of the United 8tates, p~rticuiary of the Supreme Court,- as - well as the ~general adminiftration of juf- rice. it becomes n~ore high'y important, as it refpe~s the iighis and prerenfions of foreign nations, who are ufuaUy in- teref}ed in caufes of admiralty and maritime jurifdi&ion. It appea~s, however, that two opinionshave been formed or~ this c~ucftion-how far. thoIe fii~s involved in the inve{tigation of a caufi~ of admiralty aid marithne ~urifdi~ion7 that were be1iev~ the Chief juf'tice referrel to given in evidence in the Circuit Court, ihould, alfo,.appear in this court, on a writ of error, or appeal ? For my part, 1 concur in the opinion, that, notwithftanding the provisions-of the judicial a£t, an appeal is the natural and proper mode of removing an admiralty'caufe; and, in that cafe, there can be no doubt, that all the teftimony Which was produced in the court below, ihould alfo be produced in this court. _ .Such.an appeal is• exprefsly fandlioned by the Conftitution;'it may,, therefore, clearly in the firft view of the fubject, be confidered as the moil regular procefs ; and as there are not any words in the judicial adt reftridting the power.of proceeding by appeal, it muft be regarded as llill permitida and approved. Even, indeed, if a pofitive reftridtion exifted by law, it would, in my judgment, be fup-erfeded by the fuperior authority of the . conftiiutional provifion. The claufss in the adt which more immediately relate to this i'ubjedt, are the srft and 2sd fedtions. The material words are.-theie: S. 21; “ From filial decrees in a Diftridl Court 1» caufes of admiralty and maritime jurifdiStioni, where the matter in difpute exceeds, the fum or value of 300 dollars, exclufive of colts, an’appeal Jhall be allowed to the next Circuit Court to be held in fuch Diftridl.” S. 22. “ Final decrees and judgments in civil actions in a Diftridl Court, where the matter in difpute exceeds the Turn or value of 50 dollars, exclufive of cofts, may be re-examined and reverfed or affirmed in a Circuit Court, holden in the fame Diftridl, upon a writ of error, ' whereto (hall be annexed and returned therewith at the day and' place therein mentioned, an authenticated trfirifeript of the record, and alignment of errors, and prayer for reverfal, &c. And upon a like proccfs may final judgments and decrees incivil alliens, andfuits hr equity hi a Circuit Court, brought there by original procefs, or removed there fr'orn courts of the- feveral States, .or removed there by appeal from a- Diftridl Court, where the matter in diipute exceeds the, value of 2000 dollars, exclufive of cofts, beTe-examined and reverfed or affirmed in the Supreme Court, &c.” Though the term “ civil caufes” is often defcriptivejy applied, in contradiftindlion to “ criminal caufes yet,, it is not uncommon to apply it, likewife, in contradiftindlion to caufes’ of Maritime and Admiralty jurifdidlion ; and, if we carefully compare the two fedlions to which Í have referred, I think the' .latter diftindlion will plainly appear to be the genuine objedlof the Legiila-ture, Thus, in the aift .fedlion, provifion ⅛ made for removing caufes of Admiralty and Maritime jiirifdidtion by appeal from-the Diftridl to the Circuit Court; and immediately afterwards, in the' 22I fedtion, another provifion is made for removing final decrees and judgments in civil áSlions ■ by writ of error from a Diftridt to a Circuit Court. Here, then, is a diredt ufe of the term “ civil actions,” in contra-diftindtion to “ admiralty caufes and, purfuing the diitinct nature of the refpective fubjedts, w.ith technical precifion, we find that an appeal is allowed ir. admiralty caufes; and the remedy by writ of error is ilrictiy confined, in this part of the fedtion at Ieait, to civil aSiions. There would, perhaps, be little difficulty in the cafe, if the adt flopped here. But the sad fedtion, after mentioning a writ of error, proceeds to declare, that “ upon a like procefs,” the final judgments and decrees of the Circuit Court in civil actions, and fuits at equity, whether originally inftituted there, or removed thither, from the State' Court; or by appeal from the Diftridt Coiirts, may be re-examined in the Supreme Court: And it has been urged,'that an admiralty caufe is a civil fuit, and that fuch á fuit being removed by appeal to the Circuit Court, can only be finally transferred to this court by a like procefs; that is by a writ of error. If, however, caufes of admiralty jurifdidlion are fairly excluded from thefirft member of the 22d fedtion, that provides for a removal from the Dif-tridl te the Circuit Court, impartiality and confiftency of con-ftrudtion muftlead us likewife to exclude them from this mem-berof the fedtion, that provides for a removal from the Circuit to the Supreme Court. By fo doing, the two fedtions of the law can be reconciled ; and, by fo doing, without including admiralty caufes, every defeription of fuit may be reafonably fatisfied. But, if admiralty caufes are not to be' removed by writ of error from the Circuit Court, to which we fee they may be transferred from the Diftridt Court by appeal, it has been aiked, how they are tobe brought hither for final adjudication ? It is true, the adt of Congrefs makes no provifion on the fub-jedt; but, it is equally true, that the conflitution (which we muft fuppofe to be always in the view of the Legiflature) had previoufly declared that in certain enumerated cafes, including admiralty and maritime cafes, “ the Supreme Court (hall have appellate jurifdidtion, both as to law and. fadt, with fuch exceptions, and under fuch regulations as the Congrefs fhall make.” -The appellate juiifdiction, therefore, flowed, as a confequence, from this fource ; nor had-the Legiflature any occafion to do, what the Conflitution had already done. The Legiflature might, indeed, have made exceptions, and introduced regulations upon the fubject j- but as it has not done fo, the cafe remains upon the ftrong ground of the Conflitution, which in general terms, and on general principles, provides and authorises an appeal; the procefs that, in its very nature, (as I have before remarked) implies a re-examination of the fact, as well as t'ne'law. This ecnftruction, upon the- whole, prefents itfelf to my mind ; not only as the natural refult of a candid and connected confideration of the Conftitution and the act-of Congrefs; hutas a pcfition-in our fyftem of iurifprudence, efiential to the fecurity and the dignity of the linked States., And if it is 'of moment to our dofceftic tranquillity, and foreign relations, that caufes of Admiralty arid Maritime jurifdietion, ihould, in point of fact as well as of law, have all the authority of the decifion of our higheft tribunal; and If, at the fame time, fo far from being prohibited, we find it fanctioned by the fuprerne law of the land ;T think the jurifcliction ought to be fuftained. Elsworth, Chief fuftice. I will make a few remarks in jupport of the rule. The Conftitution, diftributing the. judicial power of the United Staf-u, veils in the Supreme Court, an original as well ⅝ as an appellate jurifdietion. The originalijurifdiction, however, is confined to cafes affecting ambafiadors, other public minifters and. confuís, and thofe in which a State (hall be a party. In all other cafes, only an appellate jurifdietion is given to the court; and even the appellate jurifdietion is, likewife, qualified ; inafmucb as it is given “ with fuch exceptions, and under. fuch regulations, as the Congrefs fhall make.” ' Here, then; is the.’ground, and the.only ground, on which we can fuftain an appeal. If Congrefs has provided no rule to regulate our proceedings,'we cannot exercife an appellate jurifdiction ; and if the rule is provided, we cannot depart from it. The queftion, therefore, on the cor,ftit-utional .point of 'an appellate jurifdietion, is fimply, whether Congrefs has eftablifhed any rule for regulating its exercife ? It is to be confidéred, then, that the Judicial Statute of the United States fpeak's of an Appeal and of a Writ- of Error; but it does not confound the terms, nor ufe them promifeuoufly. They áre tó be linderftood, when.ufed, according to their ordinary'acceptation, .unlefs fomething appears in the a£t itfelf to controul, modify, or change, the fixed and technical fenfe which they, have previoufly borne. An appeal is a procefs of, civil law origin, and removes a oaufe entirely; fubjefting'thc-facl as well as the law, to a review and re-trial t but a writ of error is a procefs of common law origin, and it removes nothing for re-examination but the law. Does the Statute ob-ferve this obvious diftinftion ? I think it does. In the 21ft fection there is a provifion for allowing an appeal in Admiralty and maritime caufes from the DiftriS to the Circuit Court; . but it is declared that the matter in difputemuft exceed the value of 300 Dollars, or no appeal can be fuftained ; and yet in the preceeding fedtion, we find, that Decrees and Judgments in civil adtions may be removed by writ of error from the Diftridl to the Circuit Court, though the value of the matter, in difpute barely exceeds 50 dollars. It is unnecefiary, however, to make ary remark on this apparent divérfity: The only queftion is, whether the civil actions, here fpoken of, include caufes of ad-mi;a!ty and maritimejurifdiction ? iN.ow, the term civilaclions would, from its natural import, embrace every fpecies of lint, which is not of a criminal kind; and when, it is considered, that the Diftrict Court has a criminal as well as a civil jurifdiction, it is clear, that the term was ufed by the Legislature, not to cliftin'guiih between Admiralty caufes, and other civil actions, but to exclude the idea of removing judgments in criminal pro-fecutions, from an inferior to a fupenor tribunal. Befides, the language of the firft'member of the 22cl. fection feems calculated to obviate every doubt. It is there faid, that final Decrees and judgments in civil actions in a Diftridt Court may be removed into the Circuit Court upon a writ of error and fince-there cannot be a decree .in the Diftrict Court in any cafe, except cafes of admiralty and maritime jurifdiction, it follows of courfe, that filch caS’es muft be intended, and that if they are re moved at all, it can only be done by writ of error! ' • In this way, therefore, the appellate jurifdiction.of the Circuit Court is to be exercifed; but it remains to enquire, whether any provifion is made, for the exercife.of the appellate ju~ rifdictipn of the' Supreme Court; and, I think, there is, by unequivocal words of reference. Thus, the 22d fection of the act declares, that “ upon a like procefs,” that is upon a writ of error, final judgments and decrees in civil a Pao ns (a defeription ftill employed in contradistinction to criminal profecutións) and fuits in equity in the Circuit Court, maybe here re-examined 'and reyerfed or affirmed. Among the caufes liable to be thus' brought hither upon a writ of error, are fucb as had been previously removed i,nto the Circuit Court, “by appeal from a Diftrict Court, ” which can only be caufes of admiralty and maritime jurifdiction. It is obferved, that a writ of error is a pr6"cefs.morc limited in its effedls than an appeal: but, whatever may-be the operation, if an appellate jurifdi&ion can .only be exercifed by t-his court conformably to fuch regulations as are made by the Cón-grefs, and if Congrefs has preferibed a writ of error, and no other mode, by which it can be exercifed, ftill, I fay, we are bound to purfue that mode, and can neither make, ñor adopt, another. The law may, indeed, be improper- and inconveni- . -ent-; but it is of more importance,- for a judicial determination, to afeertain* what the law is, than to fpeculate upon what it ought to be. If, however^ the conftrudh’on, that a ftatement of fails by the Circuit Court is conclufive, would amount to a denial of juftice, would be oppreffively injurious to individuals, or would be produilive of any general mifehief, I ihould then be difpofed to refort to ,any other rational expofition of the law, which would not be attended with thefe deprecated confequences. But, furely, it, cannot be deemed a denial of juftice, that a man fhall not be permitted'to try his caufe two or three times over. If he has one opportunity for the trial of all the parts of his cafe, juftice is fatisfied; and even if the decifion of the Circuit Court had been made final, no denial of juftice could be imputed to our government; much lefs can the imputation be fairly made, becaufe the law direits that in' cafes of appeal, part lhall be decided by one tribunal, and part by another; the fails by the court below, and the law by this court. Such a diftribution of Jurifdiilion has long been eftabliihed in England. Nor is there anything in the nature of a fait, which renders it ¡mpraíticablebr improper to beafeertained by a judge; and, if there' were,- a fail could never be afeertained in this court, in matters of appeal. If, then, we are competent to afeertain a fait when aflemb'led here, I can difeern no reafon why we ihould net be equally competent to the talk, when fitting in the Circuit Court; nor why it ihould be fuppofed, - that a judge is more able, or more worthy, to afeertain the fails in a fuit in equity (which, indifputably, can only be removed by writ of error) than to afeertain the fails in a caule of admiralty and.maritime jurifdiilion. The ftatute has made a fpecial provifion, that the mode of proof, by oral teftimony, and examination of witnefles, fhall be the fame in all the Courts of the United States, as well in the trial of caufes in equity and of admiralty and maritime ju-rifdiilion, as of ailions at common law: But it was perceived, that, although the perfonal attendance of witnefles could eafily be procured in the Diftriil or Circuit Courts, the difficulty of bringing, them from the remoteft parts of the union to the feat of government, was infurmountable; and, therefore, it became neceflary, in every defeription of fuits, to make a ftatement of the fails in the Circuit Court definitive, upon ' an appeal to this court. If, upon the whole, the original conftitutional grant of an appellate jurifdiilion is to be enforced in the way that has been fuggefted, then all the teftimony muft be tranfmitted, reviewed, re-examined, and fettled here; great private and public inconveniency, would enfue ; and it was ufelefs to providefthat the Circuit Courts.fhould caufe-the fact;s on which they found their fentence or decree fully to appear upon the record. ” But, upon the conftruction contained in die rule laid down by the Court, there cannot, i,n any cafe, be juft caufe of complaint, as to the queftion of fact,- fince it is afcertained by an impartial and enlightened tribunal; and, as to the queftion of law, the re-exarnination in this court is wifely meant and calculated to pr-eferve unity of principle, in the adminiftrat.ion of juftice throughout the United States. On the 12th of Auguff, the Chief Justice delivered the opinion of the court upon the point, whether there wasj in this caufe, fuch' a ftatement of fails, as the Legiflature contemplated ? Derdell, Justice. The Court below did not intend that the Decree in this case should have the force of statement of facts, but transmitted the record according so its present form, merely in compliance with the precedents established in other circuits. This oral declaration, however, can have no effect to expound the record ; nor to influence the final judgment now to be pronounced. the w~ * Chase, Justice. Fraud is sometimes a matter of fact, sometimes a question of law , and sometimes both: But whenever thw quo animo is the gift of the inquiry, it is always a question of be1iev~ the Chief juf'tice referrel tothe cafe of Pintado verfuc l3er- ned, an ~dinira!ty cafe, which was at~s~ed a few days before, dur~ag n~y abfenc~ from the coui~t. dur~ag n~y abfenc~ from the coui~t. See Jennings ct at. vet/us The brig Perfrwrance) poft. where Paterson, Justice¡ (aid he had been of opinion with Wilson, Jujiicc, on the ad Rule eftablifhed by the c.ourt. ' [MAJORITY — By the Court] By the Court The decree ftates, that certain convey- anees are fraudulent; and had it flopped with that general de-tdaration, fome doubt might reafonably b.e entertained, whether it was not more properly an inference, than the ftatement of a fait; fince fraud muft always principally depend upon the quo animo. But the court immediately afterwards proceed to deferibe the fraud, or quo animo, declaring, that “ the conveyances were intended to defraud the complainant, and to prevent his obtaining fadsfaition for a juft demandwhich is not an inference from a fait, bufa ftatement of the fail itfelf. It is another fail illuftrative of this pofition, that “ the grantee was a1 party and privy to the fraud.” We are, therefore, of opinion, that the Circuit Court have fufficiently caufed the fails, on which they decided, to appear from the pleadings and decree, in conformity to the ait of Congrefs. The decree affirmed.