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ADVANCE AUTOMOBILE ACCESSORIES CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES, 1930 — 42 F.2d 595 · caselaw · US
Torts · MBE-tested
ADVANCE AUTOMOBILE ACCESSORIES CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES
42 F.2d 595·United States Court of Claims·1930
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Opinion
ADVANCE AUTOMOBILE ACCESSORIES CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES.
No. J-66.
Court of Claims.
June 16, 1930.
This is a suit to recover $6,142.09 manufacturer’s excise taxes on timers for automobiles, alleged to be illegally assessed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
The case was heard on a stipulation of facts upon which the court makes the following special findings of faet:
(1) The Advance Automobile Accessories Corporation during the times hereinafter mentioned was and now is a corporation organized, existing, and operating under and by virtue of the laws of the state of Delaware, with its principal place of business located at Homewood, Ill.
(2) During the times hereinafter mentioned, plaintiff was engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling timers.
(3) The timer for internal-combustion engines^ upon, which plaintiff paid taxes to defendant during the period from June, 1922, to September, 1925, is a device for closing the circuit through each cylinder as the cylinder is due to fire, and is a part of the engine, which engines are used for driving automobiles, motor boats, flying machines, tractors, concrete mixers, and water pumps. The timer device, the subject of this suit, was for a four-cylinder engine, and could be used on any of the engines for the purposes aforementioned. It could be interchanged on an engine used in a tractor and that used in an automobile.
(4) Plaintiff and all the officers thereof have at all times borne true allegiance to the United States of America and have not, nor have any of them, in any'way voluntarily aided, abetted, or. given encouragement to rebellion against the United States, and plaintiff is a citizen of the United States, the sole owner of the claim hereinafter stated, no part of which has ever been assigned or sold.
(5) Plaintiff made and filed its manufacturer’s excise tax returns thereon monthly for the period of June, 1922, to September, 1925, inclusive, showing the amount of tax due thereon which was duly assessed on such returns by the Commissioner of Internal Rev-. enue, paid by plaintiff, for the months in the amounts, and on the dates hereinafter set forth, as follows:
The articles taxed in this ease by the Commissioner were not primarily adapted for use on automobiles, but were suitable for use generally for other purposes.
(6) On July 6, 1926, plaintiff filed its claim for refund No. 354070 of manufacturer’s excise taxes so paid on timers during the period 1922, to September, 1925, inclusive, which was duly rejected by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue on March 14,1927.
Alex Koplin, of Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.
R. C. Williamson, of Washington, D. C., and Herman J. Galloway, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the United States.
Before BOOTH, Chief Justice, and GRAHAM and GREEN, Judges.
[MAJORITY — PER CURIAM.]
PER CURIAM.
It is therefore adjudged and ordered that the plaintiff recover of and from the United States the sum of $6,142.09, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum from the several dates of payment to such date as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may determine in accordance with the provisions of subsection (b) § 177, of the Judicial Code (28 USCA § 284(b), being a part of the Revenue Act of 1928 (section 615(a).
See Berg Bros. Mfg. Co. v. United States, 67 Ct. Cl. 165, and Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 50 S. Ct. 422, 74 L. Ed. 1051, decided by the Supreme Court May 26, 1930.