WILLIAM (a slave) vs. THE STATE

WILLIAM (a slave) vs. THE STATE. [indictment eor murder.] 1. Partial confessions not admissible. — A slave’s confession to his master, though voluntary, is not admissible evidence against him, when it is ■ shown that his master interrupted him, and would not let him finish his statement. Feom tbe Circuit Court of Greene. Tried before tbe Hon. A. A. Coleman. The indictment in this case, wbicb was found at tbe October term, 1863, charged that tbe prisoner, wbo was a slave, “unlawfully, and witb malice aforetbougbt, killed Clarissa, a slave, tbe property of J. L. Bozeman, by cutting ber witb a knife, or instrument of like kind.” “On tbe trial, at tbe October term, 1864,” as tbe bill of exceptions states, “tbe State introduced J. L. Bozeman as a witness, wbo was tbe owner of tbe prisoner, and proposed to adduce as evidence certain confessions made by tbe prisoner to said witness, early in tbe morning of tbe day tbe homicide was committed. Tbe prisoner objected to these confessions going to tbe jury as evidence, and asked leave of tbe court to examine tbe witness on bis voir dire ; wbicb was granted. Tbe witness then stated tbe following facts : Early in tbe morning on tbe day of tbe homicide, before witness bad got out of bed, tbe prisoner came to bis bouse, and sent word in to him that be desired to see him; and be sent back word, asking what be wanted. Tbe prisoner did not say what be wanted, but again requested that witness would come out and see him. His request was refused, but was again repeated; and witness then got up, dressed himself hastily, caught up a loaded whip, witb wbicb be usually whipped bis slaves, went out into tbe yard where tbe prisoner was, and, in an angry and excited manner, said to him, ‘What in tbe bell do you want witb me’ ? or words to that effect. Tbe prisoner said, ‘Master, I have killed Clarissa’. Witness exclaimed, ‘What! where did yon kill her’ ? Tbe prisoner answered, ‘At the gin-house’. Witness then asked, ‘How did yon kill her ?’ and the prisoner answered, ‘I cut her throat’. Witness asked some other questions, to which the prisoner replied, (but witness did not remember what,) and was going on to make other statements in regard to the killing, when witness stopped him, and would not hear anything more from him, and went immediately to the gin-house. On this state of facts, the prisoner objected to the confessions going to the jury as evidence against him, 1st, because said confessions were made through the hope' of reward, or fear of punishment; and, 2d, because said confessions were only partial, and the prisoner was prevented by his master from making a full and fair statement of the facts in relation to the killing.” The court overruled these objections, and allowed the confession to go to the jury as evidence; to which rulings of the court the prisoner duly reserved exceptions. Wm. P. Webb, and W. Coleman, for the prisoner. M. A. BALDWIN, Attorney-General, contra. [MAJORITY — PHELAN, J.] PHELAN, J. When the confessions of a prisoner are adduced against him, there is no rule of evidence better settled, than that which requires that all he said at the time, or which made part of the res gestee, shall be received in evidence, and taken together as a whole. It is true the jury are authorized, and required, to weigh the whole, and may give more credence to one part than to another, or none whatever to some part, according to their sound discretion; but the entire statement must be received. All the authorities concur in this, and the rule itself is founded on the most obvious principles of reason and justice. — 1 Greenl. Ev. § 218 ; 2 Russell on Crimes, 868; Roscoe’s Or. Ev. 55. In the present case, the prisoner, after making certain confessions about having killed the woman Clarissa, and when he was going on to make further statements respecting the transaction, was stopped by his master, and not permitted to make his statement ox confession complete. The bill of exceptions says, that the witness, who was master to the slave, asked some other questions, “to which the prisoner replied, (but witness did not remember what,) and was going on to make other statements in regard to the killing, when witness stopped him, and would not hear any thing more from him, and went immediately to the gin-house.” The prisoner had come to the house, and called his master out, and then told him, “Master, I have killed Clarissa.” Witness exclaimed, “What! where did you kill her?” The prisoner answered, “At the gin-house.” The witness then asked, “How did you kill her?” and the prisoner answered, “I cut her throat.” Then follows what is stated above, when the master stopped the slave, and would not allow him to complete his statement. Notwithstanding the prisoner was thus stopped by his master, and was not allowed to make his statement of the transaction full, though he desired to do so, the court permitted the confessions, as far as they were made, to go to the jury, against the objection of the prisoner’s counsel. In this we think the court erred. I have not been able, after careful search, to find any case exactly corresponding with this in its facts; that is, where a prisoner had made a partial or unfinished statement or confession, and was prevented from finishing his' statement, or making his confession full, by the command of some one having lawful authority over him. Such cases, in the nature of things, must be rare. But the principle above laid down, that all that the prisoner has confessed at the same time shall be received or none, entirely covers the case. If a magistrate, who is required to take down the statement or confessions of a prisoner in writing, should hear and take down a part of his statement, and then forbid the prisoner to proceed further; can there be any question, that such partial statement, when offered in evidence, would be ruled out ? In the case of a slave, speaking with his master, the authority over him would be as great, if not greater than, that of the magistrate in the case supposed; and if the slave is forbid by his master to proceed with his statement, all that he has said ought to be rejected. When the prisoner said, “I cut her throat,” and was about to proceed, how can it be known that he was not about to add, if lie bad been permitted, “but it was to keep ber from cutting mine.” Tbe prisoner confesses an act, wbicb, unexplained, makes bim guilty of murder. He is about to proceed to make other statements, but is authoritatively forbid. Indulging tbe presumption in favor of innocence, wbicb tbe law always does, tbe presumption would be, that be was about to offer some explanation or exculpation of bis conduct ; and is this to be denied? A partial and unfinished statement of this kind should not be received in evidence. We can not fairly judge a writer or a speaker, on any given topic, upon tbe most ordinary occasions of fife, until we have beard all be has to say on that topic ; and when be has spoken, we are required to consider together all be has said, and are not allowed to garbled That wbicb common fairness and justice universally forbid, in tbe most ordinary, and even insignificant affairs of life, tbe law can never sanction as a rule of evidence. Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.