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CORONA COAL COMPANY, Claimant of Steam Tug ADLER, Appellant, v. UNITED FRUIT STEAMSHIP CORPORATION, Appellee, 1928 — 24 F.2d 1015 · caselaw · US
Criminal Law · MBE-tested
CORONA COAL COMPANY, Claimant of Steam Tug ADLER, Appellant, v. UNITED FRUIT STEAMSHIP CORPORATION, Appellee
24 F.2d 1015·United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit·1928
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Opinion
CORONA COAL COMPANY, Claimant of Steam Tug ADLER, Appellant, v. UNITED FRUIT STEAMSHIP CORPORATION, Appellee.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
March 31, 1928.
No. 5170.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana; Louis H. Bums, Judge.
' Richard B. Montgomery and Richard B. Montgomery, Jr., both of New Orleans, La., for appellant.
Philip S. Gidiere, of New Orleans, La. (Philip S. Gidiere and Spencer, Gidiere, Phelps & Dunbar, all of New Orleans, La., on the brief), for appellee.
Before WALKER, BRYAN, and ROSTER, Circuit Judges.
[MAJORITY — PER CURIAM.]
PER CURIAM.
While the steamship Abangarez was lying in the Mississippi river in the port of New Orleans made fast to a dock, she was rim into by the steam tug Adler, while that tug was attempting to descend the river for the purpose of getting alongside another vessel which was docked at a point below the Abangarez. The Adler was libeled for the damage to the Abangarez caused by the collision. The claim asserted by the libel was resisted on the ground that the collision was the result of inevitable, accident. The decree was in favor of the libel-ant for the amount which the parties stipulated was the amount of damages sustained by the libelant as a result of the collision. We are of opinion that the evidence did not show that the collision was due to inevitable accident, and that the court did not err in rendering the decree appealed from. That decree is affirmed.