Stewart v. Brown

*Stewart v. Brown. Exemption-law. A firm may claim the benefit of the exemption law, as to partnership property. ■ Appeal from the general term of the Supreme Court, in the eighth district, where a judgment entered in favor of, the plaintiffs, upon the report of a referee, had been affirmed. This was an action in the nature of a replevin, by John Stewart and Peter Stewart against Henry Brown, sheriff of Allegany county, for the recovery of a pair of horses and double harness, which had been levied on by the defendant, under an execution against the plain tiffs, as partners, in favor of Miller & Grainer, in disregard of their claim of the benefit of the exemption law. Peter Stewart died after judgment below, and the suit was prosecuted by the survivor. The case was tried before a referee, who found, in substance: That the plaintiffs were partners in the ownership of the horses and harness, which were worth $160. That they had no other property, except a few articles of household furniture of trifling value. That each of them was a householder, and each had a family for which he provided. That both the plaintiffs were teamsters, and they respectively derived their support from the use of the horses and harness, having no other means to provide for their families. That the judgment in question was for a firm debt, and that the defendant, under the execution issued thereon, took the team, claiming that it was subject to levy and sale. The plaintiffs replevied it, claiming that it was exempt property. Under this state of facts, the referee decided that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, and directed a judgment in their favor; and the same having been affirmed at general term, the defendant appealed to this court. Vedder, for the appellant. Angel, for the respondent. But see Bonsall v. Comly, 44 Penn. St. 442. [MAJORITY — Porter, J.] Porter, J. The argument submitted for the appellant is ingenious; but its fallacy is apparent, in view of the conclusions *to which it tends. If it proves anything, it is, that the property of a firm is not owned by the persons who compose it, either collectively or otherwise. ' It certainly does not belong to any one else, and, if the appellant is right, the title is in a state of abeyance. If the partners have such an ownership as subjects the property to seizure on execution, they have also such an ownership as entitles them to claim its exemption, in a case plainly falling within, the terms and intent of the statute. In the instance before us, the complaint alleges, and the answer admits, that the horses and harness in question were the property of the plaintiffs. The facts found by the referee meet all the requirements of the act, exempting from levy and sale the necessary team of “any person, being a householder, or having a family .for which he provides.” (4 Edm. Stat. 626.) It is insisted, that the clause applies only to a several owner, as the word “ person” is used in the singular number. The short answer is, that by a provision in our general law, when a statute refers to any matter or person, by words importing the singular number, several matters or persons shall be deemed to be included, unless such a construction would be repugnant to the general language employed. (2 R. S. 778, § 11.) In respect to articles, otherwise within the terms of the act, such ownership as suffices to make them subject to seizure, brings them within the exemption. If each of the respondents had owned a pair .-of horses, both teams would have been exempt, upon the state of facts found by the referee. It would be an obvious perversion of the statute, to hold, that the plaintiffs forfeited its protection, by owning but a single team between them, used for the common support of both. ' The language of the act should be construed in harmony with its humane and remedial purpose. Its design was to shield the poor*, and not to strip them ; the interest it assumes to protect is that belonging to the debtor, be .it more or less. The ownership of the team may be joint or *several; it may be or absolute. Whatever it be, within the limitations of the statute, the debtor’s interest is exempt, in view of his own necessity, and of the probable destitution to which its loss might reduce a family dependent on him for support. The judgment should he affirmed. Judgment affirmed.