Charlotte W. Umfreville, Appellant, v. The Manhattan Railway Company and The Suburban Rapid Transit Company, Respondents

Charlotte W. Umfreville, Appellant, v. The Manhattan Railway Company and The Suburban Rapid Transit Company, Respondents. Discovery—examination before trial of a document alleged' to be forged — how conducted where other matter appea/rs in connection thereioith—proof of the necessity thereof. „ Where a defense is interposed in an action for an injunction and damages against the elevated railroad companies in New York city, to the effect that the plaintiff executed a .written consent to the operation of the railroads, an affidavit made by the plaintiff stating that she did not sign or authorize the alleged consent, had no recollection of so doing, and believed it to be forged, and that, in order to prepare for trial and collect evidence relevant to the issue of forgery, it was necessary and material for-k^r to obtain a discovery and inspection of the alleged consent, is sufficient under rule 14 of the General Rules of Practice to justify the court in. granting the application. The fact that the consent referred to is part of a very large document containing hundreds of signatures and embracing detailed information in which the plaintiff has no interest, and that the defendants urge that if the document is exposed as a whole it will be likely to assist the stirring up by interested attorneys of a huge and expensive mass of litigation, affords no reason why the plaintiff should not be permitted to inspect that portion of the' document affecting her, at the office of-the defendants’ attorney or in some other place to he determined by the parties.. Appeal by the plaintiff, Charlotte W. Umfreville, from an order ■ of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 21st day of June, 1899, denying her motion for an inspection of her alleged consent to the operation of the defendants’ elevated railway. Charles R. La Rue, for the appellant. Arthur O. Townsend, for the respondent. [MAJORITY — O’Brien, J.:] O’Brien, J.: The plaintiff’s action is the usual one for an injunction and for damages for alleged trespass upon property. In a separate defense, the defendants alleged that the plaintiff executed a consent in writing to the operation of the roads; and it is this document of which the inspection is sought. In support of the application the plaintiff stated that she did not sign or authorize the alleged consent, has no recollection of so doing, and believes it to be forged; and that in order to prepare for trial and to collect evidence relevant.to the issue of forgery, it is necessary and material for her to obtain "a discovery and inspection of the document mentioned. We think that the plaintiff’s statement was sufficient under rule 14 of the General Rules of Practice to justify granting the application, unless the opposing papers presented some good reason why the application should, in the present instance, be refused. The defendants show that the consent referred to is comprised and forms a part of a very large document, containing hundreds of signatures, and embracing detailed information in which the plaintiff can have no interest; and urge that, if exposed as a whole, it is likely “ to assist the stirring up by interested attorneys of a huge and expensive* mass of litigation.” This argument may be an answer to so much of the motion as asks that the document should be deposited in the county clerk’s office, and thus exposed to public view; but it furnishes no reason why the plaintiff should be refused an inspection of that part of the document which affects her, to which privilege we think she is entitled. Whether this object can be best .secured by the offer made by the defendants’ attorney to allow such an inspection at his office or in some other way, can be determined on the settlement of the order if the parties do not agree. The order should be reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and the motion for the inspection of the contract and the plaintiff’s signature granted, with ten dollars costs, the terms and conditions of the insjiection to be determined upon the .settlement of the order. Van Brunt, P. J., Rumsey and Ingraham, JJ., concurred. Order reversed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements, and motion granted,' with ten dollars costs, the terms and. conditions of the inspection to be determined on the settlement of the order.