Winston Jones, as Assignee, etc., Respondent, v. The Merchants' National Bank of the City of New York, Appellant

Winston Jones, as Assignee, etc., Respondent, v. The Merchants’ National Bank of the City of New York, Appellant. (Argued March 19, 1889; decided March 26, 1889.) Appeal from order of the General Term of the Supreme Court in the first judicial department, made May 18, 1888, which affirmed an order of the Circuit canceling the clerk’s minutes of trial and substituting other minutes, and an order of Special Term amending judgment for plaintiff and reconstructing the judgment-roll. The following is the mem. of opinion: “ The verdict of the jury disposed of the real issues involved in the action. It remained only to compute the interest and ascertain the value of the property at the time of the trial and to put the verdict in proper form. The appellant claims that at the time the verdict was directed there was an agreement, by consent in open court, that the interest should be subsequently computed by the court unless counsel could agree upon the same. On the other hand, it is claimed by the plaintiff that it was stipulated that counsel should agree between themselves upon the interest and the value of the property, or if they could not, that the evidence as" to them should be taken before the judge, without the jury, before the entry of judgment. As there was a conflict in regard to what the precise agreement was, we must take the facts here as claimed by the plaintiff. The interest was subsequently computed and proof of the value of the property at the time of the trial was taken before the judge, and all that the courts have been trying to do since, and have actually accomplished, has been to carry out the stipulation and to put the verdict in proper form and cause the entry of the proper judgment. The verdict and judgment as finally recorded and entered are in precise conformity with the agreement of counsel and the requirements of the law; and the only relief against the judgment, to which the appellant is now entitled, is by an appeal therefrom. “We think the court had the power to make the orders appealed from in the exercise of its discretion, and this appeal should, therefore, he dismissed, with costs.” John E. Burrill for appellant. Burton N. Harrison for respondent. [MAJORITY — Per Curiam mem.] Per Curiam mem. for dismissal of appeal. All concur, except Gray, J., not voting. Appeal dismissal.