Baker & Bro. vs. Ramsburg's Sons

Baker & Bro. vs. Ramsburg’s Sons. Law. No. 23,795. Decided March 23, 1885. The Chibe Justice and Justices Wylie and Jambs sitting. Under the Statute ol Limitations in force in this District (Md. Act of 1715-eh. 23, sec. 2) the limitation begins to run on the day after the cause of action accrues. STATEMENT OE THE CASE. This was aD action on a promissory note for $306.75, dated 5th February, 1879, made by defendants in favor of plaintiffs, and payable five months after date, at plaintiff’s office, in the city of Staunton, Virginia, with interest. By the statute of Virginia the note was not entitled to days of grace, so that the note matured on the 5th of July, 1879. The declaration was. filed, summons issued, and service had on defendants July 6, 1882. Counsel for respective parties agreed that, unless the note was barred by limitations, judgment might be entered for plaintiffs. Under this agreement the only question raised in the case was whether in the computation of the three years’ limitation the day when the cause of action accrued, viz., the 6th of July, 1879, was to be included or not. The court below included that day and rendered judgment for defendants, from which the plaintiffs appealed. C. M. Matthews for plaintiffs: The statute provides that action shall be brought “ with* in three years ensuing the cause of such action, and not after.” Act 1715, ch. 23, sec. 2. A later part of the same section providing for limitations of actions in tort, “within one year from the time of the cause of action accruing.” The limitation in contrakt should read “within 3 years next after the cause of action accrued.” 2. In the case at bar, the note was due July 5, 1879, and the defendants had all that day within which to pay; no action lay until the whole day (July 5) had expired, and the right of action did not accrue until the 6th of July, 1879. Beaman vs. Cooke, 48 Vermont, 203; Whitewell vs. Brigham, 19 Pick., 121, 122, and cases cited. Little vs. Blunt, 9 Pick., 491; Hathaway vs. Patterson, 45 Cal., 299; Davis vs. Eppinger, 18 Cal., 381; Coleman vs. Carpenter, 9 Barr, 179; Thomas vs. Shoemaker, 6 Watts & Serg., 182. The right of action is the right to pursue in a judicial tribunal what is due and arises when and as soon as the party has a right to apply to the proper tribunal for relief. Angelí Limit., § 42. 3. The statute providing that suit shall be brought “ within three years ensuing (or next after) the cause of action,” (or the time of the cause of action accruing), the date, July 6, 1879, when the cause of action accrued, must be excluded from the computation of the three years. As a general rule, where a period of time is to be reckoned from a particular event or date, whether. under a contract or a statute, or in legal proceedings, the day of such date or event is to be excluded from the computation. Judd vs. Fulton, Blackman vs. Nearing, 43 Conn., 56; 10 Barb., 117; Paul vs. Stone, 112 Mass., 27; Beaman vs. Cooke, 48 Vermont, 203; Merge vs. Frick, 73 Pa. St., 140; Cornell vs. Moulton, 3 Denio, 13; Sheets vs. Selden, 2 Wallace, 177; Bemis vs. Leonard, 118 Mass., 505. Which latter case discredits the cases cited in Angelí, § 45. The terminus from which to compute time is in matters of bills and notes excluded. Angelí, §49. It is submitted that in none of the cases cited for defendant are the facts of the present case found, and that the statute does not bar this action. B. A. Burton for defendants: 1. The statute begins and runs the moment credit expires or the debt has become due and demandable. Little vs. Blunt, 9 Pick., 488; Hathaway vs. Patterson, 45 Cal., 299; Davis vs. Eppinger, 18 Cal., 381; Angell Lim., par. 42, 45, 49; Parsons Notes & Bills, vol. 2, 639, 640. 2. Plaintiff had three full years following the day on which the note matured within which to bring his action, and no longer. Presbry vs. Williams, 15 Mass., 193; Hibernia Savings & Loan Society vs. O’Grady, 47 Cal., 519; Beaman vs. Clark, 48 Ver., 201. [MAJORITY — Mr. Justice James] Mr. Justice James delivered the opinion of the court. The note on which this suit is brought was due July 5, 1819, and the suit was begun on July 6, 1882. The only defence interposed is the Statute of Limitations, which provides that such suits shall be brought “ within three years ensuing the cause of such action, and not after.” Act 1115, ch. 23, sec. 2. If the day on which the cause of action accrued, which in this case was July 6,1819, is to be included, the action"was begun one day too late; if excluded, it was brought in proper time. Authorities differ on this point, but we prefer the rule followed in New York and Pennsylvania, which excludes the day on which the cause of action accrues, as a point of time after which the limitation ensues. The three years of limitation ensuing the 6th of July, 1819, had not expired when this suit was brought. Judgment is, therefore, for plaintiff.