Sacharize Isear, Respondent, v. William Daynes, Cornelius Van Der Hoogt and Others, Appellants

Sacharize Isear, Respondent, v. William Daynes, Cornelius Van Der Hoogt and Others, Appellants. Consolidating actions — they must he against the same defendants —action in an inferior court, when stayed—proper practice. Upon the hearing of a motion to consolidate with this action an action pending in a District Court of the city of New York, it was shown that, on the 16tli day of October, 1895, the plaintiff commenced an action in a District Court of the city of New York upon a policy of insurance against two persons named Daynes and Van Der Hoogt, who were alleged to be severally liable; that, on the 9th day of November, 1895, he began the present action upon the same policy against the same defendants and forty-eight other defendants, and claimed herein a several liability on the part of each defendant for the whole amount of the insurance for which the policy was written. The court denied the motion to consolidate. Held, that this was proper; That, to justify a consolidation, not only must the causes of action be such as might be joined, but the two actions must be brought against the same defendants; That, although the plaintiff might recover in this action a several judgment against the fifty defendants, the two suits were not brought against the same defendants; That the proper course for the defendants was, not to have moved to consolidate, but to have moved to stay the trial of the District Court action until the trial of the action in this court, and that the court had power to direct such a stay. Appeal by the defendants, William Daynes and others, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the New York Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of New York on the 19th day of December, 1895, denying a motion made by the defendants Daynes and Yan Der Hoogt to consolidate with this action an action pending in the District Court of the city of New York. Leonard J. Langbein, for the appellants. Albertus Perry, for the respondent. [MAJORITY — Patterson, J.:] Patterson, J.: It appeared by the affidavit of the moving parties that this action was instituted against fifty defendants, among whom were Daynes and Van Dei* Hoogt. It was brought upon a policy of insurance upon which each of the fifty defendants was alleged to be liable severally. The summons was served on the defendants Daynes and Van Der Hoogt on the 9th of November, 1895. It further appears that on the 16th of October, 1895, this plaintiff commenced an action in one of the District Courts of the city of New York on the same policy of insurance, but only against the two defendants on whose behalf the motion now under review was made. That motion is to consolidate the action pending in the District Court of the city of New York with this action, and for other relief. The court, at Special Term, denied the motion to consolidate, and also denied an application made at the same time under a demand of other relief to stay the trial of the action in the District Court until that pending in thi court shall be tried. The denial of these applications was upon the ground of want of power in the court. As to the consolidation, construing the order as meaning the wrant of power under the particular circumstances of this case, the action of the court was not erroneous. There can be no doubt of the power of this court in a proper case to consolidate with an action pending in it another which is brought in a District Court of the city of New York, but the same conditions must exist that would authorize a consolidation of actions pending in this court. Section 811 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that where two or more actions in favor of the same plaintiff against the same defendant for causes of action which may be joined are pending in the same court, the court may, in its discretion, by order consolidate any or all of them into one action ; and section 818 provides that where one of the actions is pending in the Supreme Court and another is pending in another court, the Supreme Court may by order remove to itself the action pending in the other court, and consolidate it with that pending in the Supreme Court. But the essential condition of the exercise of the power is that the two actions must be against the same defendants as well as on causes of action which may be joined. This action now pending in this court is not against the same defendants as that pending in the District Court. The complaint in this cause is upon the same instrument, but there are forty-eight other defendants, and the demand of the complaint is for a judgment against all the defendants for the sum of $2,500, which was the amount for which the policy was written in the aggregate. The right to maintain such an action against all of the underwriters upon the policy seems to be based upon the provision of the Code of Civil Procedure by which it is enacted that where two or more persons are severally liable upon the same instrument, they may all or any of them be included as defendants in the same action at the option of the plaintiff. (Code Civ. Proc. § 454.) These underwriters are severally liable. Instead of fifty suits, one against each, the practice allows one suit against all the parties. After the suit in the District Court was commenced the plaintiff elected to bring one action against all. It is, therefore, an action with different defendants, and although a several judgment may be obtained against these defendants, it is nevertheless not a suit against the same defendants. We think the proper practice in this particular case was for the defendants to move to stay the trial of the District Court action until the trial of that in this court. There is abundant power in this court to direct such a stay (Cushman, Trustee, v. Kneeland, 93 N. Y. 652), and in order that such an application may be made the order to be entered herecn may contain a provision staying all proceedings until the hearing and determination of a motion for a stay to be made at Special Term not exceeding twenty days. The order appealed from should be modified by the insertion of the provision above named and without costs. Van Brunt, P. J., Barrett, Bumsey and Williams, JJ., concurred. Order modified as directed in opinion, without costs to either party.