Criminal Law · MBE-tested

MARDER v. MASSACHUSETTS

377 U.S. 40712 L. Ed. 2d 405·Supreme Court of the United States·1964

with whom Mr. Justice Douglas joins, · Mr. Justice White is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.

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Opinion

MARDER v. MASSACHUSETTS. No. 819. Decided June 1, 1964. Appellant pro se. Edward W. Brooke, Attorney General of Massachusetts, for appellee. [MAJORITY — Per Curiam.] Per Curiam. The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed for want of a substantial federal question. [DISSENT — Mr. Justice Goldberg,] Mr. Justice Goldberg, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas joins, dissenting. This appeal raises the question of whether a person charged with a traffic violation (or presumably any other criminal offense) may be forced by a statute, General Laws of Mass., c. 90, §§20 and 20A, to choose between foregoing a trial by pleading guilty and paying a small fine, or going to trial and thereby exposing himself to the possibility of a greater punishment if found guilty. I express no view on the merits of this question. But I would note probable jurisdiction, since the issue, in my view, presents a substantial federal question, and since I am not convinced that the generally sound advice to “pay the two dollars” necessarily reflects a constitutionally permissible requirement. Mr. Justice White is of the opinion that probable jurisdiction should be noted.