Phile, qui tam, v. The Ship Anna

Phile, qui tam, v. The Ship Anna. Forfeiture of vessel. Under the act of assembly of 1787, a vessel was liable to forfeiture, in case goods were unladen from her, before due entry, whether the owners were privy to the transaction, or otherwise. This was an information filed by the Naval Officer of the port of Philadelphia, against the ship Anna, lately arrived from Bristol, upon the discovery of Peter Cooper, that forty-two hampers of porter, part of her cargo, had been landed, without being duly entered at the collector’s office, conformable to a law of this state, passed the 15th day of March 1787 (P. L. 241), which enacts, among other things, “That every vessel or boat, from which any goods, wares or merchandise shall be unladed, before due entry thereof, at the office of the collector of the port of Philadelphia, and every carriage into which any such goods shall be first put or loaded, after removal from such vessel or boat, together with the horse, horses or cattle drawing the said carriage, at the time of seizure, shall be forfeited, and seized by the collector last aforesaid, or the naval officer,, or any of his or their deputies, &e.” It appeared in evidence to the jury, upon the part of the informants, that the master of the Anna, had only exhibited twenty hampers of porter in his official manifest, whereas, a much greater quantity was found on board the ship, besides forty-two hampers landed and deposited in the store of one Smith, and twenty-four hampers actually delivered on shore to the master himself, agreeable to his orders given for that purpose in the store of the claimants. It was proved, likewise, that a considerable number of hampers ’ of porter, had, during the passage, been removed from the *hold, and stowed away in the state-rooms, til dug from the floor to the ceiling, so that any person who was in the least attentive, must L have observed them, upon entering the cabin ; and it appeared, that the owners and their agent had been several times on board before the seizure, and before the removal of the hampers from that situation. The customary privilege of a master in the Bristol trade was described to be limited to one ton, and the gross number of the hampers of porter discovered by the informants, was computed to amount to a little more than eighteen tons. The mate, who, the claimants alleged, was the delinquent on this occasion, had been retained in their service, on board the ship, for two or three weeks after the seizure ; but he had lately absconded, under the apprehension of a prosecution for the penalty of 500i. For the claimants, it was given in evidence by a passenger, that he was told by the mate of the Anna (who, it seems, was a man of some property), that he had clandestinely shipped a quantity of porter, which he intended to dispose of here, without paying the freight to the owners, or the duties to the state, and which he had an opportunity of doing, even without the master’s knowledge, as it was the custom for mates to superintend the loading and unloading of the vessel. The witness had likewise, during the passage, purchased a dozen of porter from the mate, who then solicitously requested that the circumstance might not be communicated to the master ; and who (as several witnesses proved), after his arrival at Philadelphia, had treated with several persons for the sale of porter, repeatedly informing them that it was his private adventure, and that the owners of the vessel had not a bottle on board. When the hampers were removed, at sea, from the hold into the cabin, the master, who had long been indisposed, was then particularly sick, owing to his exertions during a storm that had happened the preceding night ; and the father of one of the owners, who had taken charge of the vessel upon her arrival, affirmed that he did not, while in the cabin, observe the hampers that were stowed away in the state-rooms ; that he had been very cautious in directing the manifest to be made out according to the invoices and bills of lading, and that he had personally enjoined all the officers of the ship, not to land a single article without a regular permit from the collector. It was in proof, likewise, that a hamper of porter which the sailors were hoisting out of the hold, was hastily let down again, upon the appearance of one of the owners. The evidence on both sides being stated, the counsel for the claimants, Messrs. JRawle, Sergeant and Lewis, argued, that the present question was of the greatest importance to the commercial interests of the country, as it was now to be determined, whether an innocent owner of a ship was responsible for all the unwarrantable actions of her officers and crew ? A rigid construction of the law upon which this prosecution is grounded, cannot fail, indeed, to counteract the object of the legislature in framing it; as the attempt to secure our revenues by indiscriminately *inflicting -1 upon the unoffending merchant, the penalties resulting from the illicit practices of his master, will so multiply the risks of commerce, that the hope of gain, and the ardor of enterprise, must cease to operate, and in the eventual loss of trade, will be involved the total dissolution of the impost system. We should, therefore, be particularly cautious what principles we establish, at this crisis of our commerce ; and, in imitation of the wise precedents transmitted to us by our ancestors, we should so interpret the letter of the law, as to render its operation reasonable and just, the source of punishment to the guilty, but of certain acquittal to the innocent. In the present case, it has been fully demonstrated, that the claimants were not interested in the commodity which has been surreptitiously introduced into this city, and that so far from knowing and consenting its the fraud, the utmost vigilance and circumspection were exercised on their behalf to prevent it. The questions then, to be now considered, may be fairly comprehended in an inquiry — How far the property of the owners is liable to confiscation, for the misconduct of their officers and crew ; and whether, by a liberal construction of the acts of assembly, the ship itself, under all the circumstances appearing in evidence, is a subject of forfeiture ? 1st. It must be admitted, as a general rule, that the master is responsible for the agency of his servant, while acting in that capacity; but, on the other hand, the moment he steps aside from the line of his duty, this relative responsibility is at an end. Thus, if a drayman, in drawing a pipe of wine, staves it, his master must certainly indemnify the owner to the value of the wine that is lost; but if he leaves his dray, engages in a quarrel, and does an injury to his antagonist, neither law nor justice will transfer the damages to his master. So, likewise, if a farrier’s journeyman lames a horse in shoeing it, an action lies against the master, not, against the servant; but still, in this, and in every similar instance, the damage must be done, while he is actually employed in the master’s service, otherwise, the servant answers for his own misbehavior. It is, therefore, readily agreed, by analogy to the principles thus established, that the claimants are responsible for the conduct of their officers, so far as it respects the business of navigation, and the cargo of the ship ; but in no other view can the master be considered as their agent, and, consequently, on no other account, can they be affected by his transactions. What then is understood by the term cargo ? The privileges allowed to the mariners are not surely to be comprehended in the description ; and if a master or a mate clandestinely exceeds his privilege, this ought not in justice to be a ground for altering the case. The meaning of the word cargo must, therefore, be restricted to such goods, wares and merchandise as belong immediately to the owners of the ship, or such as yield them a profit upon freight. Now, it is in evidence, that the porter, landed from the Anna, did not belong to the owners, and that they were not to receive any profit upon the freight of that article ; it was, consequently, no part *of her cargo ; it had not been intrusted by the claimants to the r*2oo superintendency of the master or any other person on board ; and L therefore, it cannot be said, that the entry was neglected by “ them, their agents, factors or consignees,” which is expressly required by. an act of assembly (and all the laws upon the subject must be taken together), in order to work a forfeiture. If this discrimination is disregarded, what vigilance, what precaution, can protect the property of the most upright merchant from confiscation ? The tobacco pouch of a sailor, or the secret till of a passenger’s chest (for, according to the construction urged by the informants, the most trifling article is sufficient for their purpose), may contain the instrument of ruin, and it would be in vain to show, that the sufferer was ignorant of the fraud, and diligent to prevent it, while ita lex scripta est furnishes the ready, but harsh, answer to the sincerity of his plea. With respect to the cargo then, it is admitted, that, however improper the master’s conduct may be, it will affect his owners, even without their knowledge or connivance ; but for anything beyond the cargo, and such we allege is the commodity which gives rise to the present litigation, their knowledge is, at least, requisite, in reason, justice, and in law too, before they can be condemned to make atonement for his offences. 2d. It has been already said, that laws should be so construed as to prevent an injury being done to the innocent; and accordingly, a multitude of eases are to be found, in which the force of the expression has been rejected, when evidently contrary to reason and justice. There was a law, that those who in a storm forsook the ship, should forfeit all property therein ; and the ship and lading should belong entirely to those who stayed in it. In a dangerous tempest, all the mariners forsook the ship, except only one sick passenger, who, by reason of his disease, was unable to get out and escaixe. By chance, the ship came to port: the sick person kept possession and claimed the benefit of the law. Now, here, all the learned agree, that the sick man is not within the reason of the law; for the reason of making it was, to give encouragement to such as should venture their lives to save the vessel; but this is a merit which he could never }iretend to, who neither stayed in the ship upon that account, nor contributed anything to its preservation. Again, there was an edict which condemned any man to death, who should scale the walls of a certain city. One who had discovered the approach of an enemy, got over the wall at night, in order to give the alarm. He was afterwards tried under this law, and, though the case came manifestly within the words, his judges pronounced, that it could not be the intention of the legislature to punish an action that proceeded from such meritorious motives ; and therefore, they acquitted him. But we have a memorable instance, of a more recent date, arising from an ordinance of congress, which declared, that any vessel conveying goods, &c., to the enemy, should be subject to capture and condemnation. A Dutch vessel, „. -, called “the Golden *Rose,” had been taken by a British cruiser, and J while her captors were carrying her into New York, she was retaken by an American privateer. It was seriously contended, upon that occasion, that the Dutch vessel was a lawful prize, according to the words of the ordinance; but the court would not allow so extravagant a claim, grafted upon the strict letter, to pervert the politic but equitable meaning of the act of congress. Let us then try whether the acts of assembly, on the subject in discussion, may not, by a liberal interpretation, operate so as to relieve the claimants from the injury with which they are threatened, and at the same time, promote the rational views of the legislature. In the section upon which the informants proceed, it is said, “ that every vessel or boat, from which any goods, wares or merchandise shall be unloaded, before due entry thereof, &c., shall be forfeited.” Here, then, if we understand the word “ thereof ” to refer to the entry of the vessel, though it may produce a slight deviation from the grammatical relation to the next immediate antecedent, we shall certainly give a more reasonable and benevolent explanation to the law, than by making the vessel liable to forfeiture, for the non-entry of the goods, wares and merchandise. By the first construction, a duty is imposed upon the owners, with which it is in their power to comply; by the second, they are exposed to loss and ruin, for the negligence or malversation of others, which they could not foresee, and cannot prevent. The ship, and its contents, are indeed distinct things, in their nature, and may thus be rendered (as they ought to be) distinctly responsible for the management of those to whom they pre intrusted. If the ship is not entered, let the penalty fall there ; and if the cargo is not entered, let that be doomed to confiscation; but the idea of making them reciprocally responsible, is contrary to natural justice, and must be incompatible with sound policy. No foreign merchant will trust his vessel in our ports, and no citizen of Pennsylvania will be hardy enough to engage in commerce, upon such precarious terms. But it is to be further observed, in this place, that the legislature having changed the expression, we may justly infer-, that the object of the law was likewise changed. In the preceding act relative to the impost, the words “ ship or vessel ” are employed, and not “ vessel or boat,” as in the section above cited ; it is, therefore, to be presumed, that it was only in contemplation to destroy the petty fleets of smugglers which infest our creeks and rivers; and as it is a maxim in law, that “ a statute treating of things or persons of an inferior rank, cannot, by any general words, be extended to those of a superior,” a ship, which in maritime affairs is of the highest order, cannot be designated by the subordinate title of a vessel. There is, however, an additional and very forcible argument, to show that the informants are not entitled to a verdict of condemnation against the Anna, which is drawn from the regularity of the entry that has been made. By the act of assembly, in which this *cause originates, no form of entry is prescribed ; we must, therefore, apply for instruction to the <- preceding impost law, which directs “ the master of any ship or other vessel to exhibit to the collector a true manifest, signed by him, of all the goods, wares and merchandise imported in such ship or vessel;” and after sundry other regulations, calls upon him to make oath, “ that the manifest faithfully states the respective goods, wares and merchandise, therein mentioned, and that no other is laden or imported in his vessel, to the best of his knowledge or belief.” Has any of the requisites to constitute a formal entry been neglected by the master of the Anna ? It appears, that he has, in due season, exhibited an official manifest, and that he has sworn to the truth of its contents. This is surely all the law exaets, at least, for the discharge of the ship ; and though the omission of any article may be a cause for forfeiting that article (as it has already happened with the porter upon this occasion), and may likewise be a proper foundation for a charge of perjury, it cannot be extended, to divest the property of an owner, who had not practised any ■deceit himself, and who could not derive any advantage from the deceit practised by another. The counsel for the informants (Messrs. Ingersoll and Bradford), in reply to the preceding arguments, stated : That the determination of this cause would certainly produce consequences of an important nature, and either render the act of assembly upon which it is founded, a dead letter, or a productive instrument of public revenue. In governments differently constituted, where regal pageantry, or military force, can invite or compel respect and obedience to the law, little danger is to be apprehended from the occasional indulgence of learned men in their ingenious and novel comments upon the sense and expressions of the legislature ; but under a democratical constitution such as ours, should the people acquire a habit of yielding to logical subtleties and specious declamation, there is no power to control the evil that must ensue ; the principles of jurisprudence would become weak and fluctuating, and the virtue and dignity of the commonwealth would be contaminated and eventually destroyed. Instead, therefore, of cor sidering how to escape from the strong expression of the act before us, it is Dur duty to give it the fullest operation that is necessary for suppressing the mischief to which the legislative attention was originally directed ; and here we uordially embrace the position of our antagonists, that the meaning of those who framed the law, is the best guide to direct us in carrying it into execution. What then was the evil complained of, at the time that this act was made ? The atrocious frauds committed upon the revenue. What was the remedy provided? It could not be merely the forfeiture of the smuggled goods; as the claimants insinuate, for that was imposed by an antecedent law ; but the truth is, that every other penalty having proved ineffectual, this statute was enacted, expressly to superadd the forfeiture of the vessel or boat from which the goods should be clandestinely unladed. But here it is -•¡¡onq! remarke^5 that the legislature has changed its language, and there- -* fore, it has changed its object. It would be idle, indeed, to attempt by argument to prove that a vessel is a term sufficiently comprehensive to describe a ship — but surely the sequel of the same law must remove every doubt, Avhen it enacts, that “ where forfeiture of the ship, vessel, boat, &c., shall have been incurred, the naval-officer and his deputies may seize the same.” Again, it is said, that by dispensing with a rule in grammar, it will appear, that the neglect to enter the vessel herself, is the sole circumstance which exposes her to forfeitnre. But if this construction is allowed, it follows, that every boat, as well as every ship, must be duly entered at the collector’s office, for the sentence will then run in this way, “ every vessel or boat, Avhich, before due entry thereof, shall unlade, &c.” — a position that is necessarily defeated by its OAvn absurdity. The claimants, pursuing this curious system of defence, have not only endeavored to persuade us that the porter was no part of the cargo, but likewise that one hundred and thirty-two hampers (which was the gross quantity contained in the ship) make a mere trifle, too insignificant to produce a forfeiture. To these ideas, how is it possible to oppose a serious refutation ? The understanding of mankind is not, at this day, to be deceived by a distorted definition of words, nor will mere assertion be alloAyed to overthrow the strong evidence of the senses. Confine the meaning of the term cargo, according to their suggestion, to such goods, wares and merchandise as belong immediately to the oAvners, or such as yield them a profit upon freight, and it. may happen, that the ship shall be deeply laden, and yet it will be said, that she had no cargo on board — a paradox not readily to be comprehended ! But whence is derived this gigantic notion of things, through the medium of which the quantity of eighteen tons is considered as a trifle f No, this is not an insignificant article, easily to be secreted ; it cannot be squeezed into a sailor’s tobacco-pouch, nor stowed in the private till of a passenger’s chest. We find that it occupied a considerable space in the hold of the ship, that it filled the state-rooms from the floor to the ceiling ; and, besides the amount of the freight and tonnage, it ought to have contributed more than eighty pounds to the revenues of the state. It is boldly said, likewise, that such an entry has been made, as is sufficient to satisfy the law, and to prevent a forfeiture of the ship. The master of the Anna has exhibited a manifest, it is true — but is it not a partial statement ? and can the accuracy of the form compensate for the fraudulent omission of a substantial item ? But the master has sworn to the truth of the manifest — and can his perjury cure the evil, AAdiich his malversation has introduced ? This naturally calls for some observations upon the leading principle used on behalf of the claimants, to wit, their innocence, and total ignorance of the transaction, which has involved them in this prosecution. It is not necessary, and therefore, it will not be attempted, to press the circumstances which raise a presumption, that the ^claimants were either acquainted with the conduct of their officers, or were guilty of the grossest negligence : but it should he remembered, that they might have seen the porter on board the ship, if, as their own witness expressed it, they had chosen to look — that the contraband unlading took place at their wharf, and but a few yards distant from their counting-house, that it was a matter known to every sailor on board the ship, and that the mate, who is supposed to have done them so severe an injury, was retained in their service for two or three weeks after the seizure. Still, however, the innocence of the claimants has no connection with the present question, which depends upon this single issue, whether the allegation contained in the information is, or is not true? — in other words — whether forty-two hampers of porter have been unladed from the ship Anna, before they were duly entered at the collector’s office ? Much declamation, indeed, has been exercised upon this proposition, “ that the innocent ought not to suffer for the guilty but, however just it -may be, in the abstract, the state of society necessarily introduces many striking exceptions. Thus, if a carrier is attacked by robbers, and, after a brave defence, is overpowered, notwithstanding his innocence and his misfortune, he is still answerable for the goods of which he was plundered ; nay, if his master, on whom no shadow of blame could possibly be reflected, is called upon, he must render to the owner a full indemnification. Again, if a man lends a piece of furniture to another, which is distrained with the goods of the borrower, for arrearages of rent, is there anything culpable in his conduct ? and yet the law works a forfeiture of his property, to satisfy the demands of the ■ landlord. How many virtuous wives suffer for the depravity of their husbands — how many inoffensive children, for the dissipation of their parents ? In short, the relative obligations of social life are such, that we may trace the fortunes and happiness of mankind to a dependence upon the actions of each other, in almost every sublunary station — but in none is it more observable than in the important connection between master and servant. From every book that treats upon the subject, as well as from daily experience, we find, that the master is responsible for the actions of his servant, the owner for the agency of his captain ; but we shall readily concur with our antagonists in acknowledging, that this responsibility continues only while the servant or captain is engaged in the business of the master or owner. What then is the pz’esent case ? The law requiz-es the master of any ship or other vessel to exhibit a true manifest, upon oath, to the collector of the port — does it not consequently become his duty to do so ? and is not his neglect or evasion in this respect, a neglect or evasion committed, while in the actual transaction of the owner’s business ? Upon their own construction, therefore, the claimants are liable ; and it is uzxnecessary for us to prove, as we could do, that had the fraud been perpetrated,.even by the sailors, a forfeiture of the vessel would have ensued. In England, the owners, r^os to the utmost *extent of their fortunes, were likewise amenable for L the conduct of the mariners they employed, until an act of parliament inter-fez’ed, and limited their responsibility to the value of the ship and cargo. In Pennsylvania, a late determination has recognised the doctrine for which we contend ; and Capt. Angus, and the owners of the vessel which he commanded, have in vain pleaded their innocence and ignorance of the malpractice of others, to excuse them from the resulting damages. Such, after all, is the law — and it can be no ground for counteracting the evident intention of the legislature, that the claimants have been deceived by the persons to whom they have, perhaps, too implicitly confided their interests. Purviance v. Angus, ante, p. 180. [MAJORITY — Shippen, President.] The President delivered the following charge to the jury : Shippen, President. This is an information exhibited against the ship Anna, as being a vessel from which forty-two hampers of porter were unladen, without a previous entry at the collector’s office. The evidence on the part of the informants proceeds from several witnesses, one of whom discovered the drays going from Clifford’s alley, and pursued them to Smith’s, where the porter was lodged. Two porters have proved the unlad-ing and the seizure ; and by the manifest, it appears, that only twenty hampers were entered, though forty-two were carried to Smith’s, twenty-four to the captain’s store, and above fifty remained on board the ship : so, the evidence is full and clear, that more goods have been unladed, than were entered with the collector. The claimants, on the other hand, have filed their claim, and say, that no act has been done, which, under the laws of Pennsylvania, incurs a forfeiture. This, therefore, is the province of the jury to try and determine. The words of the act of assembly upon which this prosecution is grounded, have been the subject of animadversion on both sides ; but as they are few, we will repeat them. “ Every vessel or boat, from which any goods, wares or merchandise shall be unladed, before due entry thereof at the office of the collector of the port of Philadelphia, &c., shall be forfeited.” Some doubts have been raised with respect to the thing meant to be entered ; but the rrubject-matter of the act plainly refers to “ goods, wares and merchandise and it would be highly absurd, if taken otherwise, as boats are never entered. This act does not say what shall be a due entry, but the next precedí ag one requires, that “ the master of any ship or vessel shall exhibit to the collector a true manifest of the goods, wares and merchandise imported in such ship or vessel, &c., and swear that there are no other on board, to the best of his knowledge and belief.” It has been suggested, that the master having delivered in a manifest, and sworn to it, this duty is done, and that in case of an omission, only the goods omitted are to be forfeited. But if the master is obliged by law to deliver in a manifest, he does not comply, unless he exhibits a true and accurate one ; and his committing perjury upon the occasion, so far from saving the vessel, must greatly increase the offence. *20fil ^bis has been repeatedly called a hard law ; but the truth *is, that J revenue laws are of a harsher nature than any others, and necessarily so ; for, the devices of ingenious men render it indispensable for the legislature to meet their illicit practices with severer penalties. Thus, if the sheriff has a writ against any man, he cannot break open his door to execute it — but if liquor is smuggled into a cellar, the law says it is better that an individual should suffer in his personal privileges, than that the public should be cheated of its duties ; and therefore, allows the officer to force locks, &e., in order to make a seizure : in the first case, between citizen and citizen, a man’s house is considered as his castle; in the second, between the public and the private character, it is no longer regarded in that sacred light. We do not mean, however, to reflect on laws of this description; we know they are necessary, as every society stands in need of assistance from its members. If the end can be accomplished, without infringing the private rights of the subject, it is so much the better; but, at all events, the exigencies of government must be satisfied. It has been said, that, if the law is enforced, as the informants contend for, the merchants will not be safe, no foreign vessels will be sent to our ports, and, eventually, the revenue must fail. But, nevertheless, it is requisite that such laws should be strictly worded, though, undoubtedly, there are cases where the construction of the words must be such, as to prevent more injury being done than was intended. The navigation act of England says, that goods imported as merchandise shall be forfeited, if they do not pay a certain duty; and the case in 2 Strange 943 (Chapman v. Lamb), is a seizure of shirts, night-gowns and caps, under this law. It was there argued, that the word “ goods,” would certainly include those articles, but the judges were of opinion, that it could not be the meaning of the legislature, to make wearing-apparel subject to forfeiture. The case in Bunbury is the single one that reaches the point before us. There, the question arises, whether goods put on board secretly, and unladen without the knowledge of the master, would occasion a confiscation; and the judges agreed, that if it was a small matter, and no part of the cargo, it would not. The claimants therefore, to have the benefit of this case, should show : 1st. That the subject of the present prosecution, is a small matter : 2d. That it was no part of the cargo: and 3d. That it whs smuggled, without the knowledge of the master. 1st. Then a small matter is an indefinite phrase, not to be ascertained by mere words,-but by the evident meaning of the judges who used it; and from that criterion, it should seem to be a trifling thing, easily concealed, and which might fairly escape the notice of the master; but it cannot be extended to large and weighty goods, deposited in the hold of the vessel and which then constituted a part of her cargo, 2d. The counsel for the informants have suggested, that only such goods as belong to the owners, or yield them a profit upon freight, can be called a eargo; whereas, in truth, the cargo is the lading of the vessel, and, though by bribery or craft, some articles *might be introduced into the hold, without the knowledge ^ of the owners, or the master, yet everything which is put on board *- the vessel, is, in general, comprehended in that description. But 3d. The knowledge of the master is here proved by strong presumption. The quantity of porter that was put on board, the removal of it at sea, the evidence of the delivery of twenty-four hampers at his store, and by his order, are circumstances from which, we suppose, the claimants themselves did not think his ignorance of the transaction tenable. Then, there remains only the great point upon which the counsel for the claimants seem chiefly to rely, to wit, their innocénce and ignorance, with respect' to the fraud that has been committed. There is no evidence, indeed, that tends to show, that the owners of the ship meant to do anything unfairly ; but, on the contrary, that the mate brought the goods hither with the avowed intention to defraud them, as well as the state. The question then recurs, what difference does it make, whether they knew it or not ? Here is a positive law that directs a due entry of all goods, wares, and merchandise imported into this state, under certain penalties, and one of them is the forfeiture of the vessel or boat from which they are unladed. It does not speak of the knowledge of any person, but seems to be studiously worded to avoid that construction. It is not a novel laiv, though perhaps it is stricter now than formerly : for, in England, it has long existed, and before the revolution, it was known in Pennsylvania. The legislature has thought that nothing else would answer, and the judges and the jurors are equally bound to obedience. If, indeed, the law was doubtful or latitudinal, admitting one interpretation, which would be just, and another which would be unjust, it would become us to prefer the former. But if the policy of the legislature seems to bear hard on the subject, we are not to judge, and determine upon its propriety (that is a matter for the deliberation of those who made the law), and however unjust it seems, we must acquiesce, or there must be a dissolution of society. It must certainly affect every humane man to see the innocent suffer ; but in society this is not strange or uncommon ; and the distinction may properly be taken between criminal and civil cases. The law never punishes any man criminally but for his own act, yet it frequently punishes him in his pocket, for the act of another. Thus, if a wife commits an offence, the husband is not liable to the penalties ; but if she obtains the property of another, by any means, not felonious, he must make the payment and amends. There are a variety of other instances, in which men are responsible for one another, in consequence of their connection in society. The drayman, if he drives over and kills a child, must himself suffer the judgment of the law ; but if he staves a pipe of wine, his master must make the compensation. Upon the whole, it is neither a hard nor a novel case, since men must occasionally employ others to act for them, and ought to answer for those in whom they confide. If the legislature has thought proper to subject the owners to this forfeiture, we must submit. With the jury, therefore, the *2081 P0AV’er AS happily lodged, *which was formerly exercised by a single J judge, and it is their duty finally to acquit or condemn the ship, as in their consciences they think ought to be done. The jury, after a short adjournment, returned a verdict in favor of the informants. See Vasse v. Ball, 2 Dall. 273, 276. Greeby v. Palmer, Bunb. 232, n. See Vasse v. Ball. 2 Dall 270; s. c. 2 Yeates 178; Perot v. United States Peters C. C. 206; Unitod States v. The Hunter, Id. 10; United States v. Cave, 3 Hall’s Law Journal 176; Case of Le Tigre, 3 W. C. C. 567. By the general maritime law, vessels are made responsible for the unlawful acts of their masters and crews; and this extends even to forfeitures by positive law. United States v. The Malek Adhel, 2 How. 210; Smith v. Maryland, 18 Id. 76-6; The Siren, 7 Wall. 162; Dobbins’ Distillery v. United States, 96 U. S. 400.