Opinion
HOPT v. UTAH.
IN ERROR TO THE SUPREME COUET OF THE TERRITORY OE UTAH.
Submitted January 28, 1885.
Decided April 20, 1885.
Under tlte Utah Code of Criminal Procedure of 1878, a judgment upon a verdict of guilty of murder, the record of which states'that' the court' charged the jury, and does not contain the charge in writing, nor show that with the defendant’s eonsent it was given orally, is erroneous, and must be reversed on appeal.
This was a writ of error to reverse a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah, affirming, upon appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District of the Territory, a judgment and sentence of death upon a conviction of murder. The decisions of this court, after former trials of the case, are reported in 104 U. S. 631, and 110 U. S. 574.
One of the errors assigned in the brief filed in behalf of the ■ plaintiff in error was that the record did not comply with the statute of Utah requiring that the written charges of the- court should form part of the record.
In tbe copy of tbe record of tbe District Court contained in tbe record transmitted by tbe Supreme Court of tbe Territory to this court, tbe statement relating to tbe charge of tbe court to tbe jury, and tbe exceptions to tbe charge, were as follows : On May 5 tbe case was finally argued by tbe counsel for either party, “and tbe court charged tbe jury; defendant’s counsel, except generally to tbe instructions given by tbe court on its own motion, and exception allowed; and a verdict of guilty of murder in tbe first degree was returned and entered.” And on May 16, “ tbe time allowed by law for filing the bill of exceptions herein having passed, tbe court, upon application of defendant’s counsel, refuses to further extend the time. Defendant excepts.” Tbe record also showed that on May 10, after judgment and sentence, a notice of appeal was filed by tbe defendant with the clerk, and a copy of tbe notice served on tbe district attorney.
■ Appended to tbe brief filed in this court in behalf of tbe United States was an affidavit, taken January 7, 1885, of, tbe deputy clerk of the District Court, testifying that the counsel for tbe defendant at tbe trial in that court, who requested him to prepare tbe transcript of record on appeal to tbe Supreifie Court of tbe Territory, requested him to omit tbe written charge given by the court to tbe jury at tbe trial, and tqld him that no point was to be made by tbe defendant upon the instructions given by'tbe court to tbe jury; that the transcript prepared in accordance with that request was delivered by the clerk to the counsel, and by them filed with the clerk of tbe Supreme Court of tbe Territory ; that' by reason alone of that request the written charge wás omitted from tbe record; and that no bill of exceptions was ever filed, or offered to be filed, or presented to tbe Judge of the District Court for-settlement.
Mr. li. N. JSashin, Mr. S. II. Snider, and Mr. W., G. Van Horne for plaintiff in error. - -,
Mr. Assistmt Attorney-General Mawry for defendant in error.
[MAJORITY — Me. Justice Geay,]
Me. Justice Geay,
after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.
By the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure of 1878, the charge of the court to the jury “ must be reduced to writing before it is given, unless by mutual consent of the parties it is given orally.” § 257, cl. 7. Within five days after judgment upon a conviction, the clerk must annex together and file the papers necessary to constitute the record, including <k 4. A copy of the minutes of trial; 5. A copy of the minutes of the judgment ; 6. The bill of exceptions, if there be one; 7. The written charges asked of the court and refused, if there be any ; 8. A copy of all charges given and of the indorsements thereon.” § 339. The defendant may either take exceptions to the instructions of the court to the jury in matter of law at the trial of an indictment; or he may, without a bill of exceptions, appeal from a final judgment of conviction, on any question of law presented by written charges requested, given or refused, or any other question of law appearing on the record. §§ 309,315, 358, 360. The manner of taking an appeal is by filing a notice with the clerk of the court in which the judgment is entered, and serving a copy thereof upon the attorney of the adverse party. § 363.
• The statute expressly and peremptorily requires that the charge of the court to the jury shall be reduced to writing before it is given, unless »by mutual consent of the parties it is given orally; and, as has already been adjudged by this court in this case, the giving, without the defendant’s consent, of any oral charge or instruction to the jury, is an error, for which judgment must be reversed. 104 XJ. S. 631. The requirement of the statute -that .the clerk of the court in which the trial is had shall include, in making up its record, a copy of all written charges, as well as of the minutes of the trial, is equally positive. The object of these provisions, requiring the instructions to be in writing and recorded, is to secure an accurate and authentic report of .the instructions, and to insure to the defendant the means of having them revised in an appellate, court.
When the record shows that the jury were charged by the court, nothing can excuse the omission to set forth in the record a charge in writing, except express consent of the defendant that it should be given orally, and that consent must appear of record. The record must either set forth the charge in writing, or a waiver by the defendant of such a charge. If it does neither, it fails to show what is made by express statute an essential requisite to the validity of the conviction, and contains upon its face a fatal error, of which the defendant may avail himself by appeal, without tendering a bill of exceptions.
The duty of making up a complete record is the duty of the clerk; and the duty of seeing that the record contains everything that actually took place, necessary to support the conviction, is the duty of the district attorney. If the copy of the record made up by the clerk of the District Court, and entered by the defendant in the Supreme Court of the Territory, was defective in a material point,' the district attorney might have moved in the latter court to have the defect supplied by certiorari or other proper process. The defendant and his counsel were under no obligation to cure, and' cannot be held to have waived, any defect in the record, but were entitled to take advantage, either in the Supreme Court of the Territory, or in this court, of any error apparent upon the record as it stood in that court.
Applying these principles to the record before us, the conviction cannot be .supported. The record merely states that the court charged the jury, and does not state whether the charge was Avritten or oral. If the charge was \vfitten, it should have been made part of the record, which has not been done. If it was oral, the consent of the defendant was necessary, and that consent does not appear of record, and cannot be presumed.
It is hardly necessary to add that the affidavit taken since the entry of the case in this court cannot be considered. The lawfulness of the conviction and sentence of the defendant is to be determined .-by the formal record, made up and transmitted as required by law, of what was done in his presence at the trial in open court; and not by esparte affidavits of private conversations supposed to have afterwards taken place in bis absence between the counsel and the clerk:
Judgment reversed, and case remanded, with directions to order the verdict to be set mide and a new t/rial granted.
The Chief Justice and Me. Justice Hablan dissented.