Hardman vs. Chamberlain

July, 1841. Hardman vs. Chamberlain, In action on note defendant is not presumed to admit endorsements not denied under oath; but the plaintiff is bound to prove them. The statute rendering it unnecessary uto prove signatures not denied under oath does not apply to endorsements. This was assumpsit brought by Chamberlain against Hardman on a promissory note payable to Richard Ransford or order, and by him assigned to Chamberlain. The plaintiff on the trial offered to read to the jury the assignment endorsed on the note, to which the defendant by counsel objected, and the objection was overruled by the court, and the assignment was read to the jury. To this decision of the court overruling his objection the defendant excepts; and assigns for error First. The suit as appears by the record is founded on two promissory notes purporting to have been made by the plaintiff in error payable to Richard Ransford or order, and the defendant in error claims to sustain his action by virtue of an assignment, which assignment the court permitted to be read as evidence to the jury without proving the assignment. The case was submitted to the court without argument. [MAJORITY — BY THE COURT.] BY THE COURT. This action was brought on two promissory nates executed by the plaintiff in error to one Ransford and by him assigned to the defendant in error. On the trial the counsel for the plaintiff below offered to read the assignment without proof of the signature of Ransford, which was objected to by the defendant’s counsel, but the objection was overruled by the court. We think the court erred in permitting the assignment to be read without proof. The statute renders proof of the signature of a note unnecessary unless denied under oath. This statute is an encroachment on the common law and should not therefore be extended beyond the fair import of its terms. Besides the defendant must be presumed to know whether he has signed the note himself and may therefore be reasonably required to make the affidavit denying the signature. But he cannot with so much justice be called on to deny the endorsement in the same manner or else to admit its genuineness. The judgment below will therefore be set aside and the cause remanded for a new trial.