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BLUEBLAZE MOTOR SPECIALTIES CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES, 1930 — 42 F.2d 719 · caselaw · US
Torts · MBE-tested
BLUEBLAZE MOTOR SPECIALTIES CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES
42 F.2d 719·United States Court of Claims·1930
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Opinion
BLUEBLAZE MOTOR SPECIALTIES CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES.
No. H-350.
Court of Claims.
June 16, 1930.
This is a suit to recover manufacturer’s excise taxes on timers for automobiles, alleged to be illegally assessed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
The ease was beard on a stipulation of facts, upon which the court makes the following special findings of fact:
(1) The Blueblaze Motor Specialties Corporation, during the times hereinafter mentioned was, and now is, a corporation organized, existing, and operating under and by virtue of the laws of the state of New York with its principal place of business located at Long Island, N. Y.
(2) The plaintiff is engaged in the assembling, sale, and distribution, among other things, of timers for use on motors, adapted for use in connection with motorboats, automobiles, ete. The timers assembled by plaintiff were not designed exclusively for use as a part of or in connection with automobiles.
(3) Plaintiff and all the officers thereof have at all times borne true allegiance to the United States, and have not, nor any of them, in any way voluntarily aided, abetted, or given encouragement to rebellion against the United States. Plaintiff is a citizen of the United States, and the sole owner of the claim hereinafter stated, no part of which has been assigned or sold.
(4) The plaintiff made and filed its manufacturer’s excise tax returns thereon monthly for the period February 1, 1922, to May 23, 1926, inclusive, showing the amount of tax due thereon, which was duly assessed on such returns by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, paid by plaintiff, for the months, in the amounts, and on the dates hereinafter set forth as follows:
The articles taxed in this ease by the Commissioner were not primarily adapted for use on automobiles, but were suitable for use generally for other purposes.
(5) On August 12,1926, plaintiff filed its claim for refund, No. 355112, of manufacturer’s excise tax, so paid on timers during the period February 1,1922, to May 23,1926, which was duly rejected by the Commissioner of Internal Bevenue on July 5,1927.
Alex Koplin, of Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.
R. C. Williamson, of Washington, D. C., and Herman J. Galloway, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the United States.
Before BOOTH, Chief Justice, and GRAHAM and GREEN, Judges.
[MAJORITY — PER CURIAM.]
PER CURIAM.
It is therefore adjudged and ordered that the plaintiff recover of and from the United States the sum of $7,568.49, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum from the several dates of payment to such date as the Commissioner of Internal Bevenue may determine in accordance with the provisions of subsection (b), section 177, of the Judicial Code (28 USCA § 284(b), being a part of the Bevenue Act of 1928 (45 Stat. 877).
See Berg Bros. Mfg. Co. v. United States, 67 Ct. Cl. 165, and Universal Battery Co. v. United States, 50 S. Ct. 422, 74 L. Ed. 1051, decided by the Supreme Court May 26, 1930,