Beach vs. The Bay State Company.
In the redress which the statutes of 1847 and 1849 (Laws of 1847, p. 575 ; Laws of 1849, p. 388) afford to the families of those who have been deprived of life by the wrongful act, neglect or default of others, they are remedial, and are to he construed liberally.
The legislature did not intend to confine the operation of those statutes, in their remedial features, to injuries committed within the territorial limits of this state, so as to exempt from liability persons, natural or artificial, residing in other states; provided the necessary steps are taken to obtain jurisdiction over such persons.
Accordingly, an action may he maintained here, under those statutes, to recover for injuries resulting in death; without alleging whether the injuries were inflicted in this state, or elsewhere.
Such an action will he, even on the assumption that the injuries were inflicted without the territorial limits of this state.
DEMURRER to complaint. The action was brought by the plaintiff, as administratrix of John 0. Beach deceased. She was also his widow. The complaint alleged that the plaintiff was a resident of the city of New York, where her husband also resided, at the time of his death. It stated the death of John C. Beach, and the .issuing of letters of administration to the plaintiff; that the deceased left him surviving the plaintiff, and two brothers and sisters; that the defendant was a corporation, organized under the law of Massachusetts, and having an office in the city of New York, where it transacted its business; that being engaged in the business of transporting passengers by steam vessels between Fall river and the city of New York, the defendant, on &c. received the deceased as a passenger, upon the “ Empire State,” one of its boats, to be safely carried from Fall river to New York; that while on the passage, by the negligence of the defendant and its,agents and servants, the boat experienced a disaster, by the explosion or escape of steam, whereby the deceased was greatly injured and wounded, and in about ten hours died in consequence of the injuries. The complaint further alleged that both the plaintiff and the next of kin mentioned therein had sustained pecuniary damages to the amount of $>5000, hy the death of the deceased; and that hy reason of the statute of the state of ¡New York in such case made and provided, referring to the acts of 1847 and 1849 by their titles and dates of passage, an action had accrued to the plaintiff. The complaint did not allege where the alleged injuries were received, whether within the state of ¡New York or elsewhere. The defendant demurred, on the ground that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
D. D. Lord, for the defendant.
Mann & Rodman, for the plaintiff.
See next preceding case, contra.
[MAJORITY — Clerke, J.]
Clerke, J.
It cannot he denied that any one state or nation has a right to give its citizens redress for any personal injury committed without, as well as within, its territorial limits, when it obtains the means of exercising jurisdiction on the wrongdoer. This has always been recognized in the common law. Many, if not most, of the actions instituted in our courts of justice are transitory and not local; and if the cause upon which any one of them is founded arose in Japan, it would he just as tenable as if it arose in the state of ¡New York. The authority of the state, in this respect, is not curtailed because the redress is given hy statute, instead of having been permitted hy the common law. They are both, alike, the expression of the supreme power, and equally entitled to obedience and respect. It is erroneous, therefore, to say “ that statutes (which means all statutes) are local, and only effectual within the limits of the state, on acts therein done.” A penal law, indeed, is strictly local, and has no operation beyond the jurisdiction of the county where it was enacted. But whether a remedial statute is extra-territorial in reference to the class of injuries for which it proposes to afford redress or compensation, depends, like other statutes, upon the intention of the legislature, to he gathered from the language employed, the law as it previously existed, in relation to the same subject, the mischief, to be prevented, and the remedy to be applied ; and -we must also bear in mind that every such statute is to be liberally construed.
It has been asserted that the statutes of 1847 and 1849, allowing compensation to the representatives of deceased persons-, for causing the death of those persons by wrongful act, neglect, or default, are penal and not remedial statutes. The second section of the act of 1849 is undoubtedly penal. But a penal statute may also be a remedial law; (1 Wils. 126;) and a statute maybe penal in one part and remedial in another. (Doug. 702.) But in the redress which these statutes afford to the bereaved families of those who have been deprived of life by the wrongful act, neglect or default of others, they are entirely remedial, and they are calculated to be most beneficial in their operation—not only in their,, compensatory effect in warding off, at least for a season, the destitution of many a family bereft of its 'provider, but in preventing the frequent occurrence of the melancholy disasters, which are too often the result of the most culpable carelessness and disregard of human life.
I can see no reason to infer that the legislature intended to confine the operation of -these acts, in their remedial features, to injuries committed within the territorial limits of this state, so as to exempt persons, natural or artificial', residing in other states, provided the necessary steps are taken to obtain jurisdiction over such persons. The language is, doubtless, very general, and does not expressly specify injuries committed without the state, and does not specify any thing relative to the residence or citizenship of the perpetrators of the injury; or, if they are artificial, persons, the place or country where they were organized. But, on the other hand, it does not ex- . cent such injuries, or such persons. And there is no reason whatever to suppose, when we consider the nature of the calamity to be redressed, and the purpose for which redress is prescribed, that the legislature intended any restriction beyond what the generality of the language itself imports.
[New York Special Term,
May 3, 1858.
Clerke, Justice.]
With regard to the penal section of the act of 1849, we cannot by that construe the remedial section. Bach stands by itself, on the well known rules of the constitution-—a strict construction for the one, and a liberal construction for the other. And, in the absence of any thing to the contrary, we are to suppose that the legislature, intended that the acts in question should be interpreted according to those rules, which are part and parcel of the law of the' land, recognized by the legislature as well as by the judiciary; and all laws, it must be presumed, are formed in reference to them.
And after all, do not these statutes merely provide, in then-remedial character, an extension of the remedy afforded by the common law ? To be sure the death of the deceased, and not the injury which .caused the d,eath, is the immediate ground of the action. But the death is the sad result and serious aggravation of the injury by which the family are deprived of ■ the means of support, as the deceased person himself, if he survived the injury, would, according to the extent of it, be deprived of the ability to contribute to their support. If Mr. Beach were maimed and mutilated by this explosion, and survived the accident, he certainly would, by the common law, have a right of action for damages, against the defendants, whether it occurred within this state or not. The action would be, undeniably, transitory. Do these acts, in their remedial features, go any further than to extend and transmit this common law right, giving compensation, for the injury that produced the death, to the family and representatives of the deceased ?
For these reasons I hold that this action is well brought, even on the assumption that the explosion occurred without the territorial limits of the state of New York.
Demurrer overruled with costs, with liberty to answer within ten days, on payment of costs.