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ROSENBERG BROS. & CO. v. HOROWITZ, 1929 — 35 F.2d 784 · caselaw · US
Contracts · MBE-tested
ROSENBERG BROS. & CO. v. HOROWITZ
35 F.2d 784·United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals·1929
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Opinion
ROSENBERG BROS. & CO. v. HOROWITZ.
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
December 2, 1929.
Patent Appeal No. 2150.
Clarence G. Campbell, of New York City, for appellant.
George Hesselman and W. B. Morton, both of New York City, and Richard K. Stevens, of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before GRAHAM, Presiding Judge, and BLAND, HATFIELD, GARRETT, and LENROOT, Associate Judges.
[MAJORITY — LENROOT, J.]
LENROOT, J.
This is.an appeal from the decision of tbe Commissioner of Patents dismissing tbe opposition in a trade-mark case.
Tbe opposition was filed by appellant against tbe trade-mark application of appellee. Tbe trade-mark sought to be registered consists of the words “Washington Park,” arranged in a somewhat rectangular border, with what is presumed to be an outline of tbe bead of George Washington arranged at tbe lower part of tbe border.
The marks of appellant upon which tbe opposition is based consist of tbe words “Fashion Park,” “Fashion Park Clothes,” and “Tailored at Fashion Park”; all of the registrations, in addition to tbe words used, have a figure of two men on horseback. Tbe goods of both parties to which tbe marks are applied are tbe same, namely, men’s outer clothing.
Tbe only question in tbe ease is whether applicant’s mark so resembles that of opposer that confusion in trade is likely from their use. None of the testimony of opposer tended to show such confusion, and the matter must be determined from a consideration of tbe marks themselves.
The only common feature of appellant’s and appellee’s marks is tbe word “Park.” Appellant has not acquired tbe exclusive use of the word “park” in a trade-mark, and therefore tbe question' is: Do tbe words “Washington Park” so nearly resemble the words “Fashion Park” as to cause confusion or mistake in tbe mind of tbe public, or to deceive purchasers?
We agree with tbe Commissioner that tbe words “Fashion” and “Washington” have nothing in common in appearance, sound, or significance, and we do not believe that tbe use of tbe words “Washington Park” would be confused by purchasers of men’s outer clothing with tbe words “Fashion Park.”
Tbe decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
Affirmed.