Pioneer Steamship Company, Appellant, v. Samuel Sanday and Others, Respondents, Impleaded with Williamson Forwarding Company, Inc., Defendant. (SS. McKinney. Action No. 1.)
Fourth Department,
September 24, 1924.
Removal of causes •— question whether cause is properly removed to Federal court is Federal question — method of review provided by United States Judicial Code, §§ 28, 29 and 37, is exclusive — complaint does not state cause of action.
Whether a proper ease has been made for removal of an action from a State to a Federal court is a Federal question, and the method of reviewing the action of a State court provided by sections 28, 29 and 37 of the United States Judicial Code where the application for removal is approved by the State court, is exclusive.
The complaint in this action does not state a cause of action against the defendant corporation.
Appeal by the plaintiff, Pioneer Steamship Company, from an order of the Supreme Court, made at the Erie Special Term and entered in the office of the clerk of the county of Erie on the 31st day of March, 1924, removing the case into the United States District Court for the Western District of New York and staying all proceedings herein in the Supreme Court.
Thomas C. Burke, for the appellant.
Ellis H. Gidley, for the respondents.
[MAJORITY — Per Curiam:]
Per Curiam:
Whether a proper case has been made for removal of an action from a State to a Federal court is a Federal question. The right of removal is derived from an United States statute. The method of reviewing the action of a State court, if it has approved an application for removal, is provided in the United States Judicial Code. While there is considerable diversity of opinion in the cases upon the subject, we are inclined to the opinion that the method of review provided in the Judicial Code is exclusive. (Railroad Co. v. Koontz, 104 U. S. 5; Madisonville Traction Co. v. St. Bernard Mining Co., 196 id. 239; Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. McCabe, 213 id. 207; U. S. Judicial Code, §§ 28, 29, 37; 36 U. S. Stat. at Large, 1094, § 28, as amd. by 38 id. 278, chap. 11; 36 id. 1095, § 29; Id. 1098, § 37.)
We have reached the conclusion that the papers presented to the Special Term were sufficient and that the complaint does not state a cause of action against the Williamson Forwarding Company, Inc. In order that both questions may be passed upon by the Court of Appeals, if the case reaches that court, we have decided to affirm the order rather than to dismiss the appeal.
All concur. Present — Httbbs, P. J., Clark, Davis, Sears and Taylor, JJ.
Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements.