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DRUCKMAN v. FORSYTH FURNITURE LINES, Inc., 1928 — 23 F.2d 493 · caselaw · US
General
DRUCKMAN v. FORSYTH FURNITURE LINES, Inc.
23 F.2d 493·United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit·1928
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Opinion
DRUCKMAN v. FORSYTH FURNITURE LINES, Inc.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
January 10, 1928.
No. 2629.
Continuance <S=>7 — New trial <§=>6 — Granting continuance or new trial is in trial court’s discretion.
The granting or refusal of a motion for continuance or of a motion for new trial is in the discretion of the trial court.
In Error to the District-Court of the United States for the' Western District of North Carolina; Edwin Y. Webb, Judge.
On petition for rehearing. Petition denied.
For former opinion, see 22 F.(2d) 59.
David L. Podell, of New York City, and F. P. Hobgood, Jr., and Sidney S. Alderman, both of Greensboro, N. C., for plaintiff in error.
J. H. Clement and Fred S. Hutchins, both of Winston-Salem, N. C., for defendant in error.
Before PARKER and NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judges, and ERNEST F. COCHRAN, District Judge.
[MAJORITY — PER CURIAM.]
PER CURIAM.
The plaintiff in error has presented a petition for rehearing, on the ground that the court overlooked the assignment of error which alleged error in the trial court in declining to grant his motion to set aside the verdiet and judgment, and grant a new trial, by reason of his alleged illness and unavoidable absence. The point was not overlooked, hut was fully discussed in the opinion in connection with the refusal of the trial court to grant a continuance. The granting or refusal of the motion for continuance was in the discretion of the trial court. The granting or refusal of the motion for new trial, was likewise in the discretion of the trial* court; and no useful purpose could have been subserved by further discussion.
Petition for rehearing denied.