MARY WALL vs. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

MARY WALL vs. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. 1. When property offered at a delinquent tax sale is bid off by the Commissioners of the District of Columbia in the name of the District, conformably to the Act of Congress of March 3,1877, the District thereby acquires a statutory lien upon said property enforceable only in this Court, in the manner prescribed by that act; and accordingly the Collector of Taxes cannot, at a subsequent offering, sell such property to an individual and thereby affect the District’s rights as to such lien. 2. A sale of property by the Collector of Taxes of the District of Columbia, upon the demand of the holder of a tax lien certificate issued under the Act of the Legislative Assembly of June 25, 1873 (as amended-June 26, 1873), precludes the District from thereafter demanding any taxes which were in arrears upon the property at the time of such sale, and which might have been included in the delinquencies for which such sale was made; but the District may yet demand the taxes accruing upon the property between the time of sale and the giving of the tax deed based thereon. Equity. No. 10,201. Decided December 5, 1887. The Chief Justice and Justices Hagner, James and Merrick sitting. Hearing in General Term, in tbe first instance. Statement oe the Case. This was a suit in equity to obtain a decree directing the Commissioners of the District of Columbia to issue to complainant deeds for certain unredeemed lots of land purchased by her at the annual tax sales of 1880,1881,1882,1883 and 1884, and further to restrain the Collector of Taxes from selling said lots, as it was averred he was about to do, for taxes accruing several years prior to said' sale to complainant, on the ground that said lots had already been sold for said prior taxes and been purchased by the District before they were sold by it to complainant. The amended bill, besides averring at length the facts of which the above is the substance, averred that a few days after each of said sales she applied to the collector for a certificate of sale, which was given her; but in each case before delivering it the collector unlawfully and wrongfully stamped upon the certificate words purporting to be a condition or qualification of the sale which in fact had no existence and which was contrary to the terms and conditions upon which the sale was made, the words so stamped upon the certificate being as follows: “This certificate is issued subject to the payment of all arrears of taxes before the issue of the deed; ” that complainant protested thereat but could obtain no other certificate; that if, however, said words were a part of said certificate, “they should be construed to include the taxes that became due after advertising the sale at which complainant purchased, and no others; but that the defendants are wrongfully construing them to include taxes that accrued in prior years and are refusing on that ground to execute deeds to her.” That at the sales for taxes which took place prior to the said sale to her the said lots were sold to pay each and all the taxes levied prior to those for the payment of which the said lots were sold to her, whereby the said prior taxes were canceled and annulled; and furthermore that by selling said lots to plaintiff the District waived and abandoned all claim and right to collect any of said prior taxes. For a further cause of suit as to three other lots it was set forth to the effect that they were sold to one Spaulding, to satisfy tax levies thereon for the fiscal years 1872-73; that Spaulding on December 15,1880, received tax deeds thereon and shortly after conveyed them to complainant. Prior to the deeds to Spaulding the lots in question were advertised for sale, for default in payment of taxes, and were struck off to the District, by which sale complainant claims that all taxes then in arrear were canceled and annulled, notwithstanding which the collector was now threatening to sell said lots for taxes purporting to have been assessed and remaining unpaid prior to said sale. The answer of the District admitted the various tax sales alleged in the bill and also the alleged threatened sales, but denied complainant to be entitled to the deeds. It also denied that the Collector of Taxes determined, or pretended to determine, the years and the amount of taxes remaining due and in arrears on said lots; or that they were advertised, sold or purchased for or on account of all taxes in arrears; or that the stamping of the specified words on the tax certificates was illegal; or that those words import a condition or qualification of the sale which had no existence; or that all the taxes levied on said lots prior to those taxes for the non-payment of which the lots were sold to the complainant have been canceled and annulled by sales made to the District, and avers on the contrary that prior to the time at which the lots were sold to the complainant, each of them had been offered for sale by the Collector of Taxes and were bid in by the defendant, the District of Columbia, as by law provided, and subject to the provision of law in that behalf; but it was denied that by selling the said lots to the complainant, as alleged, the District waived and abandoned its claim or right to collect any of the said taxes. As to the three lots defendants denied that the sale and conveyance to the complainant’s grantor, Harvey Spaulding, was made in satisfaction of all taxes in arrears at the time of the sale to him; or that the District by its deeds conveyed to said Spaulding all the interest which it then had in the lands conveyed; or conveyed the lands to him free from all liens on behalf of the said District and free from the taxes in the bill mentioned. On the contrary it was averred that the sale to Spaulding was only to enforce the specific lien for taxes of 1873, and that the deeds to him have no other effect; that the' refusal to execute deeds to the complainant was because of the non-payment of taxes mentioned in the bill; in that advertising the sale for taxes the collector failed to mention all the taxes which had accrued, and that thereby the sales to the complainant are void. In addition to the bill and answer an agreed statement of facts was also filed as follows: “1. It is agreed and admitted as matter of fact that the certain lots and parts of lots in the third' paragraph of the amended bill mentioned and described (being all the lots in question except the three last above mentioned) were advertised by the Collector of Taxes to be sold at the times in said paragraph mentioned, and for the taxes levied on the' same for the certain years in the said paragraph mentioned; that in the advertisment of such sales the amount of taxes specified as those for the non-payment of which the sales would be made was, in each instance, identical with the amount set down against the lot or part of lot in the last preceding assessment of taxes, and the advertisement made no mention of. any other tax than that assessed during the year next preceding the sale; that at the said sales the complainant paid no more than the amount so advertised and the interest, charges and costs thereon; and that upon such sales the defendant, the Collector of Taxes, issued to complainant certificates thereof with the words stamped thereon mentioned in the fourth paragraph of said amended bill. “ 2. That the taxes set out in the fifth paragraph of the amended bill were all assessed in and for the respective years mentioned in said paragraph five, and were in arrears and unpaid at the time of the sale of the said several lots and parts of lots, and each of them, respectively; and that the said taxes in the said fifth paragraph mentioned have not, nor has any one of them, or any cost, charge or penalty thereon or thereabout, been (since or at any time) paid or discharged, unless by the striking off or sale of the lots or parts of lots to the District of Columbia, as hereinafter mentioned; but that prior to the times at which the said lots and parts of lots were respectively so sold as aforesaid each thereof had been offered for sale by the Collector of Taxes for the District of Columbia on account of taxes due for the several years mentioned, and had at such offerings, for the want of sufficient bidders in that behalf, been struck off to the District of Columbia, according to the form of the statutes in such case made and provided. “ 3. That the lots in the sixth paragraph of said amended bill mentioned were advertised and sold by the' Collector of Taxes of the District of Columbia to the said Harvey Spaulding, in the said paragraph mentioned, in the year 1875, but only for the taxes assessed and levied thereon for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1873; that the deed to the said Harvey Spaulding by reason of such sale was executed and delivered on the 15th day of December, 1880, as in the said paragraph alleged, and that the said Harvey Spaulding has since conveyed to the complainant all the right, title and interest which he acquired by his said purchase in the premises; that the taxes mentioned in the ninth paragraph of said amended bill became due and. payable in the years in the said paragraph mentioned, and that as to so much of said taxes as so became due between the date of the-said sale, to wit, 1875, and the date of said deed, to wit, December 15, 1880, were not, nor was any part thereof, paid, unless by the striking off or sale of the lots to the District of Columbia, as hereinafter mentioned; but that a sale was made by the Collector of Taxes of the said lots for-each of the said annual taxes, and that in conformity to law the same were, for want of other sufficient bidders, struck off to the District of Columbia, according to the form of the statute in such case made and provided. “4. That each and every of the sales hereinbefore mentioned was an annual tax sale. “5. That no one of the said pieces or parcels of land aforesaid has been redeemed from the sale or sales aforesaid, and that the District of Columbia has filed no bill to enforce the lien acquired by it by reason of such striking off to it of the said lots, or any of them, in the premises. “And it is agreed that this cause may be heard upon the pleadings and the foregoing agreed statement of facts, all questions of law in the premises being expressly reserved.” The cause was then certified to be heard in the General Term in the first instance. Mr. W. W. Upton, for complainant: When the complainant purchased, the lots were sold to her in pursuance of the public advertisement, which specified the amount of- taxes then in arrears, as required by law; and she paid the full amount then in arrears, as the same had been duly stated and published by the proper officer, together with all charges thereon, and no redemption has been made. It is submitted that the District, by the prior purchase, had become a redemptioner, and that questions at issue in relation to these lots have been considered and determined in favor of the purchaser in the former rulings of this Court.Brewer vs. Dist, of Col., 5 Mackey, 274. The Act of May 17, 1848, re-enacted in 1874 as Section 153 of the Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia, requires that real property, “on which one or more year’s taxes have become due and remain .unpaid * * * be sold to satisfy the same,” and it has not been repealed or modified by any subsequent statute. The acts of the Legislative Assembly were subordinate to, and were in harmony as well as in pari materia with, that enactment, and the Act of August 23, 1871 (L. D. C., pt. 2, p. 142), and the Act of March 3, 1877 (19 Stat. at L., 396), substantially re-enact the provision, and make it the duty of the Collector of Taxes, prior to such sale, to make out an account of all taxes due, giving the number of each square and lot, together with the aggregate amount of all taxes due thereon; and the act of 1877, in providing that it shall be the duty of the Collector of Taxes in said District to prepare a complete list of all taxes in arrears on real property upon which the same are levied, emphasizes the idea of satisfying all taxes, whether of one or more years, by “including all taxes due to the late corporation of Washington City, Georgetown, Levy Court and the District of Columbia.” The action of an administrative officer taken within his jurisdiction, no matter how limited the jurisdiction may be, in determining a matter which the law requires him to determine, protects third parties; and after being acted upon his proceedings cannot be set aside or disregarded because he erred as to the law or mistook the facts. Van Wormer vs. Albany, 15 Wend., 262; Lynde vs. Winnebago Co., 83 U. S.; 16 Wall., 6; Martin vs. Mott, 25 U. S.; 12 Wheat., 19. If this rule did not exist, and if it was incumbent on the complainant to show that the aggregates of the collectors of taxes were correct during the long series of years prior to 1886, and that they properly omitted from the official statement and list those taxes for the satisfaction of which the land had already been sold, entire justification of that mode is furnished by the statutes. That mode is required both by the act of 1877 and by the statutes in force prior to that time. If it were the duty of the collector to advertise and sell in a different manner, and if in selling to the complainant he departed from the law by selling for a less amount than all taxes in arrears, he is not permitted to set up his violation of the law as a defense; and the other defendants, having answered jointly with him, cannot set up that he failed to discharge his duty or proceeded contrary to law. A municipal corporation cannot set up that it is not bound by the acts of its agent, the collector of taxes. To issue a certificate before payment of all the contract obligates the purchaser to pay, or to embody in the certificate a condition for a future payment, is not only unauthorized but is in violation of the statute, and that the condition is, therefore, void. The words stamped upon the certificate are: “This certificate is issued subject to the payment of all arrears of taxes before the issue of the deed.” The defendant’s construction of these words is untenable: 1. Because the words do not necessarily refer to taxes other than such as may accrue subsequent to the sale. 2. After sale there can be no unsatisfied taxes that were in arrears before the sale. And— 3. If such could exist, it would be unlawful for the collector to bargain in regard to their future payment. If the law were such that these words could be made part of a contract of sale, their true construction would refer them to such taxes as should become due subsequent to the sale and before the issue of the deed. - Sayles vs. Davis, 22 Wis., 230. In regard to the second cause of suit relative to the three lots last mentioned in the bill, the complainant claims : 1. That the conveyance made to her grantor in 1880 vested in him ■ whatever legal title, or right to the legal title, the District had then acquired. And— 2. That as the land had been sold, under’the act of 1877, to the District on account of the taxes of 1878, 1879 and 1880, and that as all subsequent taxes having been paid by the complainant, the collector has no authority or power to sell; and if the District has a lien arising upon sale to the District, the statute of 1877 gives to the complainant the right that such lien shall be foreclosed in equity, and gives to her .the right and privilege of showing in such suit that the taxes are irregular and void, before any sale can lawfully be made. - Mr. Henry E. Davis, for the District of Columbia: The successive acts of Congress and the Legislative Assembly make clear several things: 1. There is to be an annual sale for default in payment of taxes. 2. Any bidding off by the District, past or future, is intended only to give the District a lien, enforceable by suit. 3. Until such suit is actually begun the delinquent owner may redeem, notwithstanding the provision for annual sale; and until redemption the property so bid off by the District is accessible and taxable as though not bid off. 4. Wherefore, a purchaser at an annual sale (at least, a purchaser subsequent to March 3, 1877) takes title subject to the District’s liens acquired prior to his purchase, for there is no obligation on the District to sell its liens and no provision whereby it may do so; and the purchaser is chargeable by law with notice thereof. The inconsistency, real or apparent, of these various provisions cannot effect the question; but the collector, out of abundant caution and in the only way practicable, warns the purchaser of the prior liens by stamping across the certificate of sale (which the purchaser is at liberty to refuse) the statement that it is issued subject to all existing arrears. So far from being unlawful, this action is for the benefit and protection of the purchaser. As corroborative of these views, the Act of March 3, 1887 (24 Stat. at L., 560), is conclusive. By that act it is provided that all taxes in arrears on July 1, 1886, may be paid by November 30, 1887, with only 6 per cent, per annum interest, in lieu of all other rates and penalties. To give this act effect the tax salé of 1887 (on the first Tuesday of September) could only be for taxes accruing in the fiscal year 1886-87, for if the sales were for prior years it would, destroy the privilege thus given the delinquent-taxpayer by compelling him to redeem with the rate and penalties otherwise demandable. So, too, the Act of June 27,1879 (21 Stat. at L., 36), recognizes the lien feature of these tax sales. By that act the liens of the District were made dischargeable by payment of arrearages with 6 per cent, interest; and it was distinctly provided that “Where property has been sold under the tax sales and bought in by any other party than the District' of Columbia * * * the parties owning the property thus sold * * * may tender to the purchaser * * * on or before the first day of October, 1879, the amount due and 6 per cent, interest, which, when received, shall be in full of principal, interest and penalties attached thereto by law.” It is noteworthy that this act places no limitation upon the time when the tax sales may have been made, and it is impossible to contend that Congress would thus have dealt with what it regarded as a fee simple title. The decision of this Court in the case of Brewer vs. D. C., 5 Mackey, 274, is thought to be decisive of this; but in that case the sale was made January 3, 1876, for the general taxes for the year 1871-72. This was prior to the act of 1877; and the sale was, according to the terms of the tax deed, made under the Act of June 25, 1873, as amended. However properly it may be held that the collector was obliged to sell in 1876 for all taxes then due, it cannot be be denied that this was changed by the law of 1877, giving the District the right to bid in annually for prior taxes and to hold until redemption, continuing all the while to assess and levy taxes for years subsequent to such bidding in. Moreover, the collector is forbidden by. the act of 1877 (borrowing the provision of the act of 1875), to sell upon any bids not sufficient to meet the amounts of tax, penalty and costs due at the date of sale. The complainant was advised by the terms of the advertisement that, as to the lots mentioned in paragraph 3 of her bill, the proposed sale was to be only for one year’s taxes, and accordingly (on her own assumption) that the collector was intending to do an act beyond his authority, and so not binding on the District; and as to lots mentioned in paragraph 6 of the bill she was chargeable with notice that, as she herself, alleges in paragraph 10, the lots had already been bid in by the District .under the provision of law above quoted. [MAJORITY — Mr. Justice Merricic] Mr. Justice Merricic delivered the opinion of the Court: So far as we have been able to gather, from the averments of the amended bill, the answer and the agreed statement of facts filed in the cause, the complainant sues in respect to ten several parcels of property, which are identified, and which it is averred she purchased from the District of Columbia at the sales for delinquent taxes, made by the Collector of Taxes in the years 1880, 1881,1882 and 1884. All of these parcels had been bought in and were held by the District of Columbia under antecedent tax sales, there having been no sufficient bid at said tax sales within the terms of the Acts of Congress of March 3, 1875, chap. 162, and of the Act of March 3,1877. As to all these lots she claims that she is entitled to a deed from the proper authorities, but that they have refused to execute deeds therefor, claiming that they are further entitled to the payment of all arrears of taxes accrued before the issue of a deed, by virtue of a' reservation to that effect contained in the certificates of purchase issued at the time of sale over and above the full price bid by her at the sale and paid in due season. Under these circumstances she claims by her bill that a court of equity should enforce the execution and delivery of deeds to her without requiring payment of any arrears for taxes. She also sues in respect to three other parcels of land which are described, averring herself to be the assignee by deed from Harvey Spaulding, who purchased said parcels at a tax sale in 1875, receiving a deed therefor from the District on the 15th of December, 1880, conveyed the same to her on the 30th of December, 1880. As to these three parcels she avers that the District is unlawfully attempting to sell them for taxes, some of which were in arrear, but not embraced in the advertisement for delinquent taxes and in the sale, therefor, of 1875, and for others which accrued between the sale of 1875 and the deed to Spaulding of December, 1880; and she also avers that between 1875 and 1880, the District bought in these three lots at delinquent tax sales. She gives in her bill a list of the taxes for which the District now threatens to sell; some of them antedating the sale to Spaulding, and others being subsequent to 1875 and prior to 1880. She does not in her bill tender payment of any part of the alleged arrears; but claims that.she is no less exempt by virtue'of the deed for those accruing between 1875 and 1880 than for those which were in arrear and which might have been included in the offer of sale in 1875. In this state of case the Court is unanimously of opinion, upon the complainant’s own showing, that she has no standing to claim the relief which she prays in respect to any of the lots embraced in the third paragraph of her amended bill (being the first mentioned ten lots), for the reason that the District of Columbia, having, by force of the Acts of March 3, 1875, and March 3, 1877, acquired only a definite statutory lien under the purchases made in its own name and behalf, at the delinquent tax sales mentioned, could no longer advertise and sell property thus circumstanced at an ordinary delinquent tax sale by the collector; but that the only way in which the District of Columbia could sell under the combined operation of those statutes was by on application to the equity side of this Court for a sale in the nature of a foreclosure sale, pursuant to the terms and subject to the limitations of said act of 1877. Consequently, the attempt of the .collector to sell property thus circumstanced was an act entirely ultra vires; and his acts, therefore, conferring no title, legal or equitable, the complainant has no right or title, whatever giving her a standing in this Court to assert any demands with regard to the property thus circumstanced. By virtue of other provisions of law she doubtless has a right to reimbursement for the several sums she has paid to the District, for and on account of the property in question; but that demand cannot be availed of under the present form of procedure, even if there were averments in the bill of sufficient precision to advise the Court of the state of the account between the parties to the cause. With regard to the three lots described in the sixth paragraph of the bill, it is quite clear to the Court upon the authority of the case of Brewer vs. District of Columbia, 5 Mackey, 274, which case received a very careful examination by the judges who decided it, that by the legal operation of the tax sale to Harvey Spaulding in September, 1875, the District of Columbia forever lost all right against the purchaser at that sale, and those claiming title under him, to demand any taxes then in arrear and which might have been included in the delinquencies for which such sale was made; but that that case did not decide and was not intended to decide anything with regard to taxes accruing upon property intermediate between the last default for which a tax sale could be had, and the date of the deed given in completion of such a sale. ■ And we are of opinion that when the deed was given it related back to the time of the sale only, and cannot be relied upon, by way of estoppel or otherwise, to extinguish the right of the District to enforce by appropriate proceedings the payment of taxes maturing due, and becoming enforceable subsequently to the date of a tax sale. However, if this case presented that simple predicament, the complainant would be in no situation to ask relief by way of injunction; first, because it does not appear that she has tendered the amount of taxes which fell in arrear between 1875 and 1880; and, second, because under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and this Court in McCormick vs. District of Columbia, 4 Mackey, 396, a bill in equity does not lie to restrain an illegal tax sale unless some equity, supervenient upon the illegality of the attempted sale, is disclosed in the bill. Nevertheless, it is to be remembered (inasmuch as the District of Columbia is disabled from selling, at collector’s sale, the three lots described in the sixth paragraph for the same reason that it is disabled from selling those described in the third paragraph of the amended bill, because according to the agreed state of facts, after the act of 1877 went into operation, it itself purchased in those lots for taxes in arrear subsequent to. the sale of 1875 to Spauding) that it is competent for the complainant to redeem them, and the District would be compelled to accept the redemption money should it attempt, in the only way now open to it, to sell those lots under a judicial proceeding-in equity for foreclosure as prescribed by the said Act of of 1877. For the reasons thus briefly set forth we are of opinion that the complainant is not entitled to' any relief upon the case made by the proceedings in the cause, and that her bill must be dismissed, with costs.