William S. Custis and Virginia his wife, late Virginia Potter, and Edmond U. Potter and Sarah T. Potter, minors, by their next friend Benjamin Potter, complainants below, Appellants, v. George S. Adkins, administrator c. t. a. of Benjamin Potter, deceased, Chas. T. Fleming, trustee, and others, respondents below, Appellees

William S. Custis and Virginia his wife, late Virginia Potter, and Edmond U. Potter and Sarah T. Potter, minors, by their next friend Benjamin Potter, complainants below, Appellants, v. George S. Adkins, administrator c. t. a. of Benjamin Potter, deceased, Chas. T. Fleming, trustee, and others, respondents below, Appellees. As a general rule a party is entitled to interest' on account of delay in the payment of the principal sum or debt, and in respect to legacies it is well settled that interest is payable on them only from the time when they become actually due. Specific legacies, or bequests of a corpus, which in contemplation of law are considered as severed from the bulk of the testator’s property by the will itself, carry their product or interest from the testator’s death, along with the principal, and goes to the legatee, unless the will contains directions to the contrary. But general pecuniary legacies, where no time of payment is appointed by the testator, are not due and payable until one year after his death, and do not bear interest until after the expiration of that time. "With respect to general pecuniary legacies, when the time of payment is named by the testator, there is no general rule better settled than that such legacies do not carry interest before the arrival of the appointed time of payment, notwithstanding the legacies are vested. There are certain exceptions to this rule, however, to he found, in cases where the legatee is a child of the testator, or one towards whom he has placed himself in loco parentis, or where from the terms of the will it is manifest the testator intended the legatee should have the interest accruing on the legacy before the time of payment. In the absence of such intention expressed in the will, or clearly implied from its terms, the legacy does not in the meantime bear interest. In the case of a child of the testator, or one-towards whom he stands in the place of a parent, interest is given in the meanwhile upon the legacy by way of maintenance, where the child has no other provision; for it is not to be presumed that the parent in such a case was so regardless of the moral obligations resting upon him as to leave the child in the meantime in a state of destitution. Oases of intention apparent in the will to give the intermediate interest from the death of the testator speak for themselves. . Something must be' said in the will that shows such intention; otherwise such interest cannot be allowed. Bequests of the “ residue” are also properly distinguishable from the ordinary cases of general pecuniary legacies payable in futuro; for a bequest of the residue, although made payable in futuro, carries the interest in the meantime to the legatee. But the bequests in question present the ordinary case of vested legacies payable at a future day; namely, when the nephew should arrive at the age of twenty-one years, and the nieces at the age of eighteen; who are not children of the testator, nor persons towards whom he stood in loco parentis in his lifetime, and not being residuary legatees, and there being no direction or provision in the will from which it can be reasonably inferred that the testator designed to give them the interest accruing thereon in the meantime, they cannot take it; but the same would go to the residuary legatee. Appeal from the decree óf the Chancellor, sitting in Kent County. Before Gilpin, C. J., and Milligan, Wootten, and Houston, Justices. The appellants, complainants below, had filed in the court below their bill of review, which stated that George S. Adkins, administrator c. t. a. of Benjamin Potter, deceased, had previously filed in that court his bill of complaint against the present complainants and sundry other parties, legatees of the said Benjamin Potter, deceased, setting forth among other things that the said Benjamin Potter, on the 26th day of July, 1839, had made and published his last will and testament, and had afterwards made three several codicils thereto, by which he had bequeathed certain legacies therein stated, to the parties respondent to the said bill. That among the bequests in the said bill set forth as contained in the said last will and testament, was the following: “Item 6th. I give and bequeath to my nephew, Benjamin Potter, son of John R Potter, deceased, four thousand dollars. I give and bequeath to my nephew Edmond Upsher Potter, son of John R Potter, deceased, one thousand dollars. I give and bequeath to my niece Sarah T. Potter, daughter of John R Potter, deceased, five hundred dollars. I give and bequeath to my niece Virginia Potter, daughter of John R Potter, deceased, five hundred dollars. All the sums bequeathed to the four above-named legatees to be paid by my executor, or guardians appointed by the Orphans’ Court, to the males when they arrive, at the age of twenty-one years, and to the females when they arrive at the age of eighteen years.” That by one of the codicils to his will the testator after-wards modified the bequest as follows: “ I hereby cancel, annul and make void all that part and parcel of item 6th written and stated in my last will and testament aforesaid, so far as it mentions, relates to, or concerns my nephew Benjamin Potter, son of John R Potter, deceased, and in the stead and place of four thousand dollars therein given and bequeathed to him, I hereby give and bequeath to him, my said nephew Benjamin Potter, all that farm or tract of land whereon I now live, and also seven acres and forty-five perches recently purchased by me of the heirs of Doctor Mark Greer, to him, his heirs and assigns forever. Thirdly. In addition to the bequests or legacies made and given to my nephew Edmond Upsher Potter, son of John R Potter, deceased, and to each of my nieces, Sarah T. Potter and Virginia Potter, daughters of John R Potter, deceased, as written and mentioned in the. aforesaid sixth item of my last will and testament aforesaid, I hereby give and bequeath to them, my said nephew Edmond Upsher Potter, and my nieces Sarah T. Potter and Virginia Potter, children of John R Potter, deceased, the four thousand dollars mentioned in the aforesaid sixth item, to them, the said Edmond Upsher Potter, and Sarah T. Potter and Virginia Potter, share and share alike; the same to he paid to them in the same manner and at the same time as is directed and mentioned in the aforesaid sixth item of my said last will and testament.” That upon the final account passed by the said administrator on the estate of the said testator, there was an unappropriated balance of $7392.84 remaining in his hands applicable to the legacies in the said last will and codicils bequeathed; and that all the legatees therein named had survived the testator" and were still living, with the exception of one, whose administrator was made a party to the hill. The bill also set forth the periods at which the several legacies were, under the terms of the said will and codicil, respectively payable, and that the legatee Virginia Custis, late Virginia Potter, attained the age of eighteen years on the 14th of August, 1845, at which time the legacy bequeathed to her became payable, and that she was then the wife of the said William S. Custis; and that the said Sarah T. Potter was horn on the 5th day of May, 1836, and the said Edmond Upsher Potter on the 8th day of August, 1834. That the legacies in the said will and codicils bequeathed amounted in the aggregate to the sum of $16,400, exclusive of a bequest of $12,000 for an insane asylum, in the State of Delaware; and that consequently the unappropriated balance of the personal estate in the hands of the administrator was greatly insufficient to pay the whole of them, even excluding the said lastnaentioned bequest. And the said hill of complaint, after further setting forth certain payments, which the said administrator had made on account of said legacies, and suggesting that questions had arisen which he could not determine .touching the construction and effect of certain parts of said will and , codicils,' and particularly touching the validity of the said last-mentioned bequest for an insane asylum,, and the proper mode of apportioning the said.unappropriated balance among the several legatees, prayed the Court to instruct him in the premises. That all the defendants named in the said bill of complaint, duly appeared to the same, and put in their answers thereto, by which they admitted all the facts therein stated, and submitted1 themselves to the decision of the Court, touching the several questions raised thereby. Whereupon, it appearing to the Chancellor that the testator had bequeathed to the said "Virginia Custis the sum of $1833.335, payable when she should arrive at the age of eighteen' years; to the said Sarah T. Potter, the1 like amount, payable when she should attain the same age, and to the said Edmond Upsher Potter, the sum of $2333.335, payable when he should arrive at the age of twenty-one years; and that the said Virginia Custis had attained the age of eighteen years on the 14th day of August, 1845, and that the legacy bequeathed to her became payable on that day, and that Sarah T. Potter would attain the age of eighteen years on the 5th day of May, 1854, when the legacy bequeathed to her would become payable, and that the said Edmond Upsher Potter would attain the age of twenty-one years on the 8th day of August, 1855, when the legacy to him would become payable; it was considered by the Chancellor, that in ascertaining the then present value of the said legacies respectively, for the purpose of determining their several proportions of the said unappropriated balance of personal estate, interest at the rate of six per centum per annum should be calculated upon the legacy of the" said Virginia Custis, from the said 14th day of August, 1845, when it became due and payable, and that a discount at the same rate should be deducted from the legacies of the said Sarah T. and Edmond Upsher Potter, from the date of the decree in said cause to the times at which they should respectively become payable, to wit, as to the former, to the 5th day of May, 1854, and as to the latter, to the 8th day of August, 1855; and upon which basis of calculating the value at that time of the three several legacies aforesaid, they were ascertained by the decree of the Chancellor in the said cause to be as follows : the legacy of the said Virginia Custis was $2253.77, the legacy of the said Sarah T. Potter was $1416.61, and the legacy of Edmond Upsher Potter was $1703.57; and calculating upon the same basis the value of the whole of the legacies under the will and codicils (exclusive of the bequest for the insane asylum, which was adjudged by the Chancellor to be void and of no effect) was by the said decree at that time to be the sum of $11,737.43. And that it further appeared to the Chancellor, after deducting the costs-of the said suit, that there would rémain in the hands of the said administrator the sum.of $8186.69J, applicable to the said legacies, and that it was insufficient to pay the whole amount thereof, whereupon it was considered and decreed by him that all the legacies should abate pro rata, and what portion of the said last-mentioned sum should be paid, by the said administrator, to the several legatees respectively whose legacies were then payable,' and what portion he should retain for those respectively whose legacies were not then, due, but would be payable at future periods; and from which appeared, among others, that the sum decreed to be paid to the said William 8. Custis on account of the legacy of his wife, the said Virginia Custis, was $1571.83, and that the amount to be retained for the said Sarah T. Potter, was $988.42, and for the said Edmond Upsher Potter, $1188.38. That in and by the said last will and codicils, the testator had devised all the residue of his estate, real and personal, to Potter Griffith, George S. Adkins, and Martin W. Bates, upon certain charitable uses and trusts in said will and codicils particularly set forth, who after the death of the testator declined to take upon themselves the burden of the same, whereupon the said Charles T. Fleming was appointed by the Court trustee of such residuary estate; and that all of the said legatees in said last will and codicils named, had afterwards exhibited in that Court their original bill of complaint against the said George S. Adkins, administrator, and the said Charles T. Fleming, trustee as aforesaid, praying that the residue of said legacies remaining unpaid might be raised by the sale of said real estate, or so much thereof as might be necessary, under the order of the Court, to which the defendants had duly appeared and put in their answers, whereupon it was adjudged and decreed hy the Chancellor, that the legacies in said will and codicils bequeathed, were by the terms and effect of the same charged upon the rents and profits accruing from the said residuary real estate, and that the residue of the said legacies should be raised by the gradual accumulation of the rents and profits thereof, but not that the same should be sold; from which decree the complainants appealed, and on that appeal it was adjudged and decreed by the Court of Errors and Appeals, that the said legacies were charged by the terms and effect of the said will and codicils on the said residuary real estate, and that the same, or so much thereof as should be necessary, ought to be sold under the order of the Court of Chancery, to satisfy the residue of said legacies ; which was afterwards duly made at the March Term 1853, of the said last-mentioned Court, and so much of said real estate was thereupon sold hy the order of the said Court as was necessary to raise the residue of the legacies remaining unpaid as aforesaid. But that the complainants in the present hill of review had been advised that the decree first above mentioned, made by the Chancellor on the 10th day of June, 1849, was erroneous, in so far as it had adjudged that in ascertaining the value of the legacies in the aforesaid will and codicils to the present complainants, Virginia, Sarah T., and Edmond Upsher Potter, interest at the rate of six per centum per annum should' he calculated upon the legacy of the said Virginia, from the day it became due and payable, to wit, the 14th day of August, 1845, and that a discount at the same rate should be deducted from the legacies of the said Sarah T. and Edmond Upsher Potter, from the date of said decree to the times at which they would respectively become payable,- to wit, in the case of the former, on the ■ 5th day of May, 1854, and in the case of the latter, on the 8th day of August, 1855 ; because by the terms and effect of the several bequests made to them in the said will and codicils, and agreeably to the rules of law and equity in that behalf, they were severally entitled to receive lawful interest upon their respective legacies from the expiration of one year after the death of the said testator, to wit, from the 21st day of October, 1844, and not from the times when the same should become respectively payable as aforesaid; and therefore, that it ought to have been in and by the said decree adjudged, that in ascertaining the value of the said legacies at that time, interest at the rate of six per centum per annum should be calculated upon them respectively from the said 21st day of October, 1844, as aforesaid. Wherefore the complainants in the bill of review prayed the Chancellor that the aforesaid decree, so far as the same was erroneous, might be reversed, and that the complainants should be adjudged by him to be entitled to interest on their respective legacies from the date last mentioned ; and for other and further relief, &c. To this bill the defendants appeared and entered demurrers, and upon the argument of the same before the Chancellor, the bill of complainants was dismissed with costs; and from this decree the present appeal was taken. D. M. Bates, for the appellants: The appeal is from a decree of the Chancellor, on a bill of review filed in his Court, and the only question to be considered here is whether certain legacies payable in futuro, bequeathed by the testator, Benjamin Potter, to the children nominatim, of his nephew, John B. Potter, deceased, bore interest until they were payable, or not. The case comes up here on the bill and demurrers filed in the Court below, and this is the only question presented by them. The legacies in question are vested legacies, payable at a future period, and are not contingent legacies. As a general rule, I admit that legacies payable at a future period do not bear interest until the time of payment. 2 Wms. on Exrs. 1024. But there are exceptions to this rule; as, where the testator stands in the relation of a parent, or in loco parentis, as the books term it, to the legatee, in which case the legacy bears interest before the time of payment. Also, where the legacy, by the terms or directions of the will, is to he severed from the bulk of the estate before the time of payment, and is to become a specific fund producing interest, the legatee takes the interest accruing from the death of the testator, unless it is otherwise disposed of by him; because it is presumed in such a case, that the testator intended that the legatee should have the interest. 2 Wms. on Exrs. 1021. Ror is it necessary that the bequest should be of a specific fund at the time, as of stock, for instance, in order to carry interest; for it is sufficient if it is to become specific in its nature afterwards, as in the case of the bequest of a residue. Nicholls v. Osborne, 2 Pr. Wms. 420; Chauworth v. Hooper, 1 Bro. Ch. Cases, 82. The same is the rule when the legacy must be taken out of or severed from the residue, and thus becomes specific in its character, in order that the residue may be disposed of under the will before the legacy becomes payable. Because in this case, if the interest accruing in the meantime from the death of the testator is not otherwise disposed of by him, the fruit follows the principal, and the legatee will take, for it can belong to no one else. Ackerley v. Vernon, 1 Pr. Wms. 783. The case of Heath v. Perry, 3 Atk. 101, which will probably he cited on the other side, I am aware is in apparent conflict with this decision; but in that case, it was held that the intermediate interest did not pass to the legatee, because there was an intention to the contrary apparent on the face of the will, and was otherwise disposed of by the testator; and besides that, it was not the duty of the executor to sever the legacy from the bulk of the estate in the meanwhile. I am also aware that the rule is, that no one in this connection can stand in loco parentis to any but a lawful child, or to one towards whom he has stood in that relation in his lifetime: not even a grandfather to a grandchild, a father to a natural child, or an uncle to a niece. Leslie v. Leslie, 10 Eng. Ch. Rep. 386, in note. But the case of Seamer and others v. Bingham and others, 3 Atk. 54, and the case of Crickett v. Dolby, 3 Ves. 10, will show that judges have not always accurately apprehended and appreciated the distinction involved in that point, or the true ground of the decision in the case of Ackerley v. Vernon, as that case did not turn at all on the relationship in which the testator stood to the legatee, but was decided wholly irrespective of that relationship. That case is sustained, too, by the case of Tyrrell v. Tyrrell, 4 Ves. 1. Another class of exceptions to the general rule that the legacy does not bear interest until it becomes payable, is where the bequest is to infants, in which case the postponement of the payment of it is on account of the infancy of the legatee, and not for the benefit of the estate; and the legatee will therefore take the interest. Tyrrell v. Tyrrell, 4 Ves. 1; 2 Wms. on Exrs. 1025; Mills v. Roberts, 5 Eng. Ch. Rep. 556; Branstrom v. Wilkenson, 7 Ves. 421. In the two cases last cited, the Court inferred, from the fact that the testator had appointed a guardian or trustee for the infant in the meanwhile, that he intended the infant should have the benefit of the interest. Leslie v. Leslie, 10 Eng. Ch. Rep. 384; Boddy v. Dawes, 15 Ibid. 363. How, I cite all these cases to show, that although in a bequest to an infant, infancy of itself would not suffice to take the case out of the operation of the general rule in regard to the interest, when the payment of the legacy is postponed to a future period, yet the Court will incline in such cases to lay hold of any indication of an intention on the part of the testator in the will, to give the interest accruing in the meanwhile to the infant; and all the cases referred to will be found to sustain me in this position. And were there no such indications in the will and codicils before the Court ? They were evident in almost every part of them. The complainants were his preferred legatees. They were the infant children of a preferred and deceased nephew, and were the objects of the peculiar affection and the peculiar bounty of an aged, wealthy, and childless uncle, and as they were then of tender age, it is but reasonable to presume that he intended they should take the interest for their benefit during their minority; and the important fact that ,the will clearly contemplates, although it- does not positively direct, for it is inartificially expressed, that guardians shall in the meantime be appointed by the Orphans’ Court for these legatees, but strengthens and confirms that presumption, and requires such a construction on the authority of the cases cited. Comegys, for the appellees: Had the testator stood in the relation of a parent, which he did not, to these legatees, there could be no controversy between the parties in this case as to the appropriation of the interest in dispute for their benefit. They were, however, but the children of a deceased nephew of the testator, and were never treated, or regarded by him in his lifetime, as standing in the relation of children to him, and there is no allegation or pretext contained in their bill of complaint, to warrant the Court in presuming for a moment that any such relation ever subsisted between them. The decision in the case of Ackerley v. Vernon, so much relied upon on the other side, was based alone upon this circumstance in the case, and not upon the ground that the legacies were to be severed from the residue of the estate before they became payable, as appears from the report of it in 3 Bro. Parl. Cases, 85. Wliere the legacy is to be carved out of a particular debt due the testator, or is to be taken out of a particular fund, there it is specific in its nature, and the consequence of the severance attaches and controls the disposition of the interest accruing in the meantime on the legacy, and gives it to the legatee. But where it is not so given, but is to be taken out of the great or general tree of estate, there is no ground to sever á branch from it in favor of a general legatee, and the principle does not apply. Heath v. Perry, 3 Atk. 103. Where there is a general bequest, or of a sum of money payable at a future time, it bears no interest until that time, because it cannot be demanded before that time, and as interest is awarded by way of compensation for the unlawful detention of the debt, until it can be demanded, interest will not accrue to the legatee, unless it is given by the will in the meanwhile. There is but one exception to this rule in regard to a general legacy, and that is in the case before adverted to, where the testator stands in loco parentis as to the legatee, and is presumed to have voluntarily assumed the obligations as well as the relation of a parent towards the child. The case before referred to, cited on the other side, has never been followed on any other ground than this. Crickett v. Dolby, 3 Ves. 10, 2 Wms. Exrs. 1024; Hurl v. Greenbank, 3 Atk. 679; Boddy v. Dawes, 15 Eng. Ch. Rep. 363. In the last case the interest was held to be payable to the legatee, on the ground that there was an intention apparent in the will that he should have it. Where the legacy is specific, as of stock, the legatee will take the interest as part of the fund, but not where the legacy is general. Where the interest is claimed for the legatee upon a general legacy payable in futuro, it will be found to have been allowed from an intention so expressed by the testator, or from terms employed in the will which indicated such an intention. Mills v. Roberts, 5 Eng. Ch. Rep. 556; Leslie v. Leslie, 10 Eng. Ch. Rep. 384. But there is no such intention apparent upon the will of the testator in this case, and there is not one word employed from which such a purpose on his part can be implied. The learned counsel for the appellants had maintained that they were the peculiar objects of his affection and the principal objects of his bounty; but such was not the case; on the contrary, the trust established in it for the benefit of the poor of Kent County was the great and paramount object of Ms will; and he never intended that these legatees, who stood merely in the relation of nieces and nephews in the second degree to him, should be maintained in the meantime until their respective legacies had become payable, out of the interest accruing upon' them. Neither is there any ground for the assumption, on the other side, that the will contemplates that guardians in the meanwhile should be appointed for them by the Orphans’ Court. There is, therefore, no good ground for this appeal, and the decree of the Chancellor should be affirmed. Bates, in reply: I do not contend that the bequest of a general legacy payable at a future time will necessarily constitute a severance of the legacy from the residue, and carry the interest in the meanwhile to the legatee. But I do maintain that where the residue in the meantime has to be disposed of pursuant to the terms of the will, then the legacy in point of fact has to be severed from the bulk of the estate, and it then assumes the character of a fund set apart for the specific purpose of paying the legacy; and then the question arises, where is the interest in the meanwhile accruing on that fund to go ? It cannot go into the residue, for that has been already ascertained and disposed of pursuant to the directions of the will, and if it does not go to the legatee, it must be thrown away and cannot go to any one. And this is the extent and effect of the ruling in the case of Ackerley v. Vernon, both as reported 1 Pr. Wms. and in 3 Bro. Parl. Cases. He also recited in support of the principle the remarks of Lord Hardwicke, in regard to the governing circumstance in that case, in Heath v. Perry, 3 Atk. 103; and also what Lord Bedesdale said of the same case in Ellis v. Ellis, 1 Sch. & Lefr. 5. [MAJORITY — Gilpin, Ch. J.,] Gilpin, Ch. J., announced the opinion of the Court. Benjamin Potter, by the sixth item of his will, dated the twenty-sixth of July, A.D. 1839, bequeathed to his nephew, Benjamin Potter, four thousand dollars; to his nephew, Edmond Upsher Potter, one thousand dollars ; and to his two nieces, Sarah Tabitha Potter and Virginia Potter, five hundred dollars each; and then proceeds, in the same item, to .say that, “ All the sums bequeathed to the four above-named legatees, to be paid by my executors or guardians, appointed by the Orphans’ Court, to the males when they arrive at the age of twenty-one years, and the females when they arrive at the age of eighteen years.” By the second codicil to his will the testator revokes the legacy of four thousand dollars, given by the sixth item of his will to his nephew Benjamin Potter, and bequeaths the said four thousand dollars to his said nephew and nieces, namely, Edmond Upsher Pottei’, Sarah Tahitha Potter, and Virginia Potter, “ share and share alike, the same to be paid to them in the same manner and at the same time as is directed and mentioned in the aforesaid sixth item of my said last will and testament.” The question presented by the bill and demurrer, for the consideration of the Court, is, whether the legatees first named, who are the complainants in this case, are entitled to interest on their several legacies from one year after the death of the testator, until they attained their respective ages of eighteen and twenty-one years. It may be laid down as a general rule, that a party is entitled to interest on money, on account of delay in the payment of the principal sum or debt. And in respect to legacies, it is well settled, by a long series of decisions, that interest is payable on them only from the time at which the principal of the legacies becomes actually due. It is important, therefore, in the first place, to ascertain the precise time at which the principal becomes payable, since interest cannot begin to accrue before that time. Specific legacies, or bequests of a corpus, which, in contemplation of law, are considered as severed and separated from the bulk of the testator’s property by the will itself, carry their product or interest from the testator’s death, unless the will contains directions to the contrary. G-eneral pecuniary legacies, where no time of payment is appointed by the testator, are governed by a different rule. They are not due. or payable until one year from the death of the testator, and do not, therefore, carry interest until after the expiration of that time, since interest in such cases is only allowed for delay of payment, and there can be no such delay until after the year is elapsed. With respect to general pecuniary legacies, when the time of payment is named by the testator, there is no general rule more uniformly laid down by the elementary writers, or better settled by adjudged cases, both in this country and in England, than that such legacies do not carry interest before the arrival of the appointed period of payment, notwithstanding the legacies are vested. Such, then, being the general rule, recognized by all the cases cited in the argument, or which can be found in the books, we proceed to' consider the exceptions to it. What are they? The exceptions to the rule are to be found in cases where the legatee is a child of the testator, or one towards whom he has placed himself in loco parentis; or where, from the , terms of the will, it is manifest the testator intended to give interest before the time for payment of the principal. In the absence of such intention expressed on the face of the will, or clearly implied from its terms, the legacy does not carry interest. , In the case of a child of the testator, or one towards whom he stands in the place of a parent, interest is given in the meanwhile upon the legacy, by way of maintenance, where the child has no other provision; for it is not to be presumed that the parent, in such a case, was so regardless of the moral obligations resting upon him, as to leave the child in a state of destitution in the meantime. Cases of intention, apparent upon the face of the will, to. give interest from the death of the testator, speak for themselves. Something must be said in the will that shows such intention; otherwise .such interest can not be allowed. Do the .legatees, in this case, bring themselves within either of these exceptions ? If they do not, what ground have they tó stand on? The bequests in question present the ordinary cases of vested legacies payable at a future day; namely, when the testator’s nephew should arrive at the age of twenty-one years, and when his nieces should arrive at the age of eighteen years. The legatees are not children of the testator, nor persons towards whom he had placed himself in loco parentis. They are not residuary legatees. There is no direction in the will for the payment of interest, nor anything in the clauses containing the bequests in question, nor in the manner in which the residue of the estate is disposed of, nor in any other provision of the will, from which it can be fairly or reasonably inferred that the testator intended to give interest. It may be proper to advert for a moment to the cases which have been cited in the argument. The case of Heath v. Perry, 3 Atk. 101, is anything but an authority in favor of the complainants. Lord Hardwicke there lays down the rule in express terms, in the case of a vested legacy payable at twenty-one, that “ it shall not cony interest unless something is said in the will that shows the testator intended to give interest, in the meantime;” and he "decreed that the residuary legatee should take the interest. The same doctrine is fully recognized as of binding authority, in Crickett v. Dolby, 3 Ves. 10; and in Tyrrel v. Tyrrel, 4 Ves. 1. ' The cases of Chaworth v. Hooper, 1 Bro. C. R. 82, and Butler v. Butler, 3 Atk. 60, were bequests of the “ residue,” and are properly distinguishable from the present case; for a bequest of .the residue, although made payable in futuro, carries the interest. The bequest in the case of Banstrom v. Wilkinson, 7 Ves. 421, which was of “ one dock share in ' the • present new dock, at Kingston-upon-Hull,” was specific in its character, and comes within the rule in relation to specific legacies. The cases of Mills v. Roberts, 5 Eng. C. R. 557, Leslie v. Leslie, 10 Eng. C. R. 384, and of Boddy v. Dawes; 15 Eng. C. R. 363, are all cases where the intention of the testator to give interest may be fairly and reasonably implied. In the language of. Lord Hardwicke, as used in the case of Heath v. Perry, there is “ something in the will that shows the testator’s intention to give interest.” The case of Ackerley v. Vernon, 1 Pr. Wms. 783, rests on its own peculiar circundstances. Lord Hardwicke was dissatisfied with it;, and Lord Redesdale, in Ellis v. Ellis, 1 Scho. & Lef. 1, calls it a singular case, and seems to have doubted it. And although it has never been overruled, still it has never been followed, upon the ground taken by Lord Macclesfield, that the legacy was severed from the bulk of the estate. It has been sustained, However, by later decisions, upon the ground of the testator’s having placed himself in loco parentis to the legatee. We have been unable to discover anything in the will and codicils which should withdraw this case from the operation of the general rule denying interest on general legacies payable in futuro; and we therefore affirm the decree of the Chancellor in all respects, and remand the record to the Court below.