James M. KELLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; et al. Defendants-Appellees

James M. KELLEY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; et al. Defendants-Appellees. No. 17-15489 United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. Submitted February 13, 2018 Filed February 23, 2018 James M. Kelley, Pro Se John M. Sorich, PIB Law, Costa Mesa, CA,. Heather Stern, Parker Ibrahim & Berg, LLC, Costa Mesa, CA, for Defendants-Appellees Before: LEAVY, FERNANDEZ, and MURGUIA, Circuit Judges. The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). [MAJORITY] MEMORANDUM James M. Kelley appeals pro se from the district court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment in Kelley’s adversary proceeding. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d). We review de novo. Suncrest Healthcare Ctr. LLC v. Omega Healthcare Inv’rs, Inc. (In re Raintree Healthcare Corp.), 431 F.3d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm. The bankruptcy court properly granted summary judgment because Kelley failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act (“FIR-REA”). See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)-(10) (setting forth FIRREA’s administrative claims process); Rundgren v. Wash. Mut. Bank, FA, 760 F.3d 1056, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2014) (§ 1821(d)(13)(D) strips courts of jurisdiction over claims against certain failed banks when such claims have not been exhausted through FIRRÉA’s claims process); Benson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 1207, 1209 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[A] claim asserted against a purchasing bank based on the conduct of a failed bank must be exhausted under FIRREA.”). Because a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be without prejudice, Kelly v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 377 F.3d 1034, 1036 (9th Cir. 2004), we remand to the bankruptcy court with instructions to amend the judgment to reflect that the dismissal of claims barred by FIRREA is without prejudice. We reject as without merit Kelley’s contentions that he properly rescinded under the Truth in Lending Act and his contentions in support of his objections to defendants’ proof of claims. We do not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal or matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). All pending motions are denied. AFFIRMED; REMANDED with instructions to amend the judgment. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.