THE NATIONAL SAFE DEPOSIT, SAVINGS AND TRUST COMPANY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. SWEENEY

THE NATIONAL SAFE DEPOSIT, SAVINGS AND TRUST COMPANY OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA v. SWEENEY. Orphans’ Court Practice; Wills; Caveats; Testamentary Capacity. 1. In framing issues upon the caveat of a will, for submission to a jury, no more than one issue should be granted presenting the same substantial question. 2. Therefore, where one issue' is whether the decedent was “ of sound and disposing mind and capable of executing a valid deed or contract,” a second issue of whether the decedent was “ under the influence of any insane mental hallucination, insane illusion, or insane delusion, which rendered him incapable of making a valid will and testament,” is improper. 3. In addition to the general issue as to the mental capacity of the decedent, a second issue in some cases, would be properly based upon the alleged existence of some special insane delusion, on his part with respect to the natural objects of his bounty, or some other special matter, which may have controlled or unduly influenced in a legal sense a mind in other respects sufficiently sound. But to entitle the caveator to such an issue there should be some foundation therefor in the allegations of the caveat. 4. An issue of whether the alleged will was executed by the decedent “ under the undue influence of the importunities, suggestions, or persuasions of another person or other persons,” is not objectionable' for the generality of its statement. No. 330. Submitted May 16, 1894. Decided June 4, 1894. Hearing on an appeal, allowed by this court on petition, by the caveatee from an interlocutory order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, holding a special term' for Orphans’ Court business, transmitting certain issues to the Circuit Court for a jury trial. Reversed. The Court in its opinion stated'the case as follows: This is an appeal, allowed on petition therefor, from an interlocutory order of the Orphans’ Court transmitting to the Circuit Court for trial by jury, certain issues arising on the caveat of Mary E. Sweeney against the will of Michael Crane, deceased, which had been offered for probate. Michael Crane died February 15, 1894, leaving a will in which the National Safe Deposit, Savings and Trust Company of the District of Columbia and R. Ross Perry, appellants, are named as executors. The will was offered for probate by the executors. Whereupon Mary E. Sweeney filed her caveat against the same. She alleges therein that she is the sister and only heir-at-law of deceased; that the said paper-writing is not the last will and testament of deceased; that he was-not of sound and disposing mind, nor capable of executing a valid will; and that if executed at all, it was under the undue influence of the importunities, suggestions and persuasions of some person or persons at present unknown, and was not the free and voluntary act .of said Michael Crane. The following issues'were framed and ordered transmitted for submission to a jury: xst. Was said Michael Crane at the time of the execution and acknowledging of said paper-writing of sound and disposing mind and capable of executing a valid deed or contract? 2d. Was said Michael Crane at the time of the execution and acknowledging of said paper-writing under the influence of any insane mental hállucination, insane illusion, or insane delusion which rendered him incapable of making a valid will and testament? 3d. Was said paper-writing executed by said Michael Crane under the undue influence of the importunities, suggestions or persuasions of another person or other persons? No objection is taken by the appellants to the first issue. It is substantially in the language of the Maryland act of 1798, Ch. 101, Subch. 1, which is in force in the District of Columbia. Objection is taken to the second issue as wholly unnecessary. It is contended that the sole legal issue is, whether or not the testator was of sound and disposing mind and therefore capable of executing a valid will; and that this embraced all phases of mental incapacity, including insane delusion with respect to any special person or thing that may have influenced or controlled the making of the particular will. Mr. R. Ross Perry for the appellants. Mr. A. S. Worthington and Mr. H. W. Sohon for the appellee. [MAJORITY — Mr. Justice Shepard] Mr. Justice Shepard delivered the opinion of the Court: The objection to the second issue, we think, is well taken. If the jury should answer the first in the negative there would be no need for an answer to the second; and an affirmative answer to it would leave some uncertainty as to whether the incapacity was general, or special on account of the delusion, or both. It would be impossible to ascertain to what extent the answer to the first may have been influenced by the opinion with respect to the second issue. Again, if both questions should be answered in the affirmative, there would be an apparent conflict between the two findings. A sound rule of practice with respect to the framing of issues to be transmitted to another court for trial by jury is stated in Sumwalt v. Sumwalt, 52 Md., 338, as follows: “ It is the duty of the Orphans’ Court to present the questions of fact in dispute, and to be determined by the jury, in a plain and clear way; there is obvious impropriety in multiplying the issues unnecessarily and especially in presenting the same substantial question in two separate and distinct issues. * * * In our opinion, the correct rule to be observed, and the one which will best subserve the purposes of justice, is to grant no more than one issue presenting the same substantial question; and, secondly, not to multiply the issues unnecessarily, and to grant such only as distinctly present the real question in dispute.” The foregoing is applicable, in our opinion, to the second issue as it stands. It is proper to add, however, that, notwithstanding the first and broad issue, may in all cases be ample to cover the entire range of probable incapacity to make a valid will, we think there are many instances in which it would be proper to submit, and might be error to refuse, in addition and in subordination to the first, in order that the conflict noted above may be avoided, a second issue based on the alleged existence of some special insane delusion of the testator with respect to the natural objects of his bounty, or some other special matter, which may have controlled or unduly influenced iú a legal sense a mind in other respects sufficiently sound. In order to entitle the caveator to demand- the submission of such a special issue, there should at least be some foundation therefor in the allegations of the caveat in order that the Orphans’ Court may have a proper opportunity to determine the necessity or expediency of the demand. We think there is no sound objection to the form of the third issue, though such generality of statement is ordinarily reprehensible. It seems to be in accordance with the general practice of the courts of this District and of Maryland, whence it was derived. Of the many cases in both jurisdictions where such issues have been framed and transmitted, we have been referred to none in which this question has ever been raised or decided. In many cases, whose records have been examined, the issue with regard to undue influence has been found stated in the same general, indefinite way; no person or persons having been named as the agents or instigators thereof. Sometimes the issue connects the undue influence with some certain person by name and “ others unknown.” Under the peculiar difficulties which often beset preliminary inquiries into matters of this nature, we think it not unreasonable to permit an exceptional latitude of statement. A caveator, by reason of such difficulties, might sometimes be deprived of a right by requiring a precise statement of the names of persons as well as the grounds of contest. ■Moreover, those who seek to probate the will could rarely, if ever, be taken by surprise by the evidence, introduced in support of this issue, all the facts concerning which, if there be any foundation whatever for the charge, must naturally be supposed to be within their knowledge. It follows that the ot'der appealed from must be reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to reframe the issues to be transmitted, in conformity with this opinion; and it is so ordered, with costs to the appellants.