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In the Matter of the Voluntary Dissolution of Lenox Corporation. The People's National Bank of Waynesboro, Penn., Appellant; George Duchscherer, Temporary Receiver of Lenox Corporation, Respondent, 1901 — 167 N.Y. 623 · caselaw · US
Civil Procedure · MBE-tested
In the Matter of the Voluntary Dissolution of Lenox Corporation. The People's National Bank of Waynesboro, Penn., Appellant; George Duchscherer, Temporary Receiver of Lenox Corporation, Respondent
167 N.Y. 623·New York Court of Appeals·1901·NY
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Opinion
In the Matter of the Voluntary Dissolution of Lenox Corporation. The People’s National Bank of Waynesboro, Penn., Appellant; George Duchscherer, Temporary Receiver of Lenox Corporation, Respondent.
(Argued June 5, 1901;
decided June 21, 1901.)
Matter of Lenox Corporation, 57 App. Div. 515, affirmed.
Appeal, by permission, from an order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the fourth judicial department, entered January 16,1901, which affirmed an order of Special Term denying a motion to vacate an order appointing a temporary receiver in a voluntary dissolution proceeding. The following are the questions certified :
First. Did the petition of the directors in this proceeding, verified March 10, 1899, and the schedules thereunto annexed, and the affidavit of Edward C. Mason, sworn to March 11, 1899, show the Lenox Corporation to be insolvent within the intent and meaning of that term, as used in section 2423 of' the Code of Civil Procedure ?
Second. Did the court have jurisdiction in this proceeding to grant an order appointing a temporary receiver of the Lenox Corporation and enjoining its creditor^ ?
Thvrd. Did the court have any power or authority to grant the order of March 23,1899^ in this proceeding, amending the order appointing a temporary receiver and enjoining creditors mmc fro time f
Fourth. If said orders are void, is appellant, as a matter of right, notwithstanding his laches, entitled to have them vacated ?
James McO. Mitchell for appellant.
William L. Ma/rey for respondent.
[MAJORITY]
Order affirmed, with costs, and questions Nos. 1 and 2 answered by stating that from the petition and schedules the Supreme Court might find as a fact that the corporation was insolvent, and that, hence, it had jurisdiction to appoint a temporary receiver and grant an injunction. Questions 3 and 4 are not answered, the answer to the previous questions rendering them immaterial to the disposition of the appeal; no opinion.
Concur: Parker, Ch. J., Bartlett, Haight, Yarn, Lardón, Cullen and Werner, JJ.