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Arthur v. Rheims, 1877 — 96 U.S. 143 · caselaw · US
Tax
Arthur v. Rheims
96 U.S. 14324 L. Ed. 813·Supreme Court of the United States·1877
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Opinion
Arthur v. Rheims.
1. The rale that an article, dutiable by its specific designation, will not be affected by the. general.'words of the same or another statute, which would otherwise embrace it, applies as well to statutes reducing duties as to those increasing them.
2. As the twelfth section of the act of June 30,1864 (13 Stat. 213), imposes a duty of fifty per cent ad valorem upon artificial flowers eo nomine, they are not subject to the deduction of ten per cent allowed by the second section of tiie act of Juhe 6,1872 (17 id. 231), “on all manufactures of cotton of . which cotton is the component part of chief value.”
Error to the Circuit Court of the United. States for the Southern District of New York.
In 1874, Rheims; the plaintiff below, imported into the port of New York a quantity of artificial flowers, composed of iron, • paper, wire, and cotton, and on which Arthur, the collector, imposed, under the twelfth section of the act of June 30,1864 (13 Stat. 213), a duty of fifty per cent ad valorem.
RheimS claimed that, under the second section of the- act of June 6, 1872 (17 Stat. -231), the merchandise was- liable only to ninety per cent of the duty imposed by the act of June 30, 1864; but haying, under protest, paid the duty imposed by the collector, brought this suit to recover the excess.
Under th<j instructions of the court below, the jury found that the importer was entitled to the deduction. From the ■ judgment rendered upon the verdict, this writ of error is brought.
Mr. Assistant-Attorney- G-eneral Smith for the plaintiff in error.
Mr.' Stephen Cr. Glarke, eontra. .
[MAJORITY — Mr. Justice Hunt]
Mr. Justice Hunt
delivered the-opinion of-the court.
The question for decision in this case is, whether the defendant in error is entitled to the deduction of ten per cent allowed by the act of June 6, 1872.
Under the act of 1864, the duty of fifty per cent was imposed on “ artificial and ornamental feathers and flowers, or part's thereof, of whatever material composed, not otherwise provided for, beads and bead ornaments.” 13 Stat. 213. As no other provision was made, the goods were presumably subject to this duty.
The act of June-6, 18Í2 (17 id. 231), provides, in its second section, as follows: —
“ That on and after the 1st of August, 1872, in lieu' of the duties imposed by law on the articles in this section enumerated, there shall be levied, collected, and paid on the goods, wares, and merchandise in this section enumerated and provided for, imported from foreign countries, ninety per cent of the several duties and rates of duties now imposed by law on said articles severally, it being the intent of this section to reduce existing duties on such articles ten per cent of such duties; thaf is to say, on all manufactures of cotton of which cotton is the component part of chief value; ... on all iron and steel, and all manufactures of iron and steel of which such metals, or either of them, shall be the component part of chief-value, excepting cotton machinery.”
Many other articles are named.
The general words of the act of 1872, no doubt, are sufficiently comprehensive to embrace the ease before us. Artificial flowers are a manufacture of which cotton is the chief component, and, were that all, would be entitled to the deduction asked for.
But it is true, also, that they are dutiable under the law of' 1864, not as a manufacture of cotton, but specifically, ep nomine, as artificial flowers. It has been held in many cases, — as that of “ almonds and dried fruits,” the “ canary birds,” and at the present term, in the case of “ thread laces ” and of “ chocolate,” —that, when an article is intended to1 be made dutiable by its specific designation, i't will not be affected by 'the general words of the same or another statute, which would otherwise embrace it.
This' rule' applies both to statutes reducing and to statutes increasing duties. Giving it- such application here, we must •hold that “artificial flowers” are-not entitled to be classed as a manufacture-of cotton which is entitled to the' reduction provided for by act of 1872.
The ruling in this respect was erroneous, and the judgment must be reversed; and it is
iSo ordered