Study aid, not legal advice. caselaw is not a law firm and does not provide legal advice or engage in the unauthorized practice of law (UPL). All briefs, outlines, and citation tools on these pages are educational summaries for law students; they are not a substitute for advice from a licensed attorney admitted in your jurisdiction. Bar-admission rules vary by state. For court filings or client matters, verify every authority against the official reporter and your court's local rules. Use of caselaw does not create an attorney-client relationship.
Samuel KLUFT, Appellant, v. FEDERAL FIREPROOFING CO., a Corporation, Appellee, 1931 — 48 F.2d 1068 · caselaw · US
Contracts · MBE-tested
Samuel KLUFT, Appellant, v. FEDERAL FIREPROOFING CO., a Corporation, Appellee
48 F.2d 1068·United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit·1931
Brief incoming
Hand-reviewed Bluebook brief (procedural posture, facts, issue, holding, reasoning, dissent) ships once the AI generation pipeline runs through this case. Join the waitlist to get notified when 1L briefs go live.
Opinion
Samuel KLUFT, Appellant, v. FEDERAL FIREPROOFING CO., a Corporation, Appellee.
No. 5076.
Court of Appeals of District of Columbia.
Argued April 14, 1931.
Decided May 4, 1931.
E. Hilton Jackson, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
David L. Riordan, H. Winship Wheatley, Geo. C. Gertman, and P. J. J. Nicolaides, all of Washington, D. C., for appellee.
Before MARTIN, Chief Justice, and ROBB and GRONER, Associate Justices.
[MAJORITY — PER CURIAM.]
PER CURIAM.
Appeal from a decree in the Supreme Court of the District overruling exceptions to the master’s report in a proceeding to enforce mechanics’ liens.
Appellee, the Federal Fireproofing Company, contracted to erect a building for appellant within a certain time. Before completion of the building, appellee, for reasons it deemed sufficient, ceased work. It then claimed to be due the sum of $46,900, for which it filed a' mechanic’s lien. Appellant contended that there was no justification for the abandonment of the contract. The question, among others, was referred to the special master, who found in favor of appellee, and his finding was confirmed by the court. Prior to the report of the special master, appellee’s claim, covering “full amount due,” ‘was assigned to appellant. It is apparent that on the date of the decree below the parties had effected a compromise, and that therefore the ease became moot.
The appeal must be dismissed, with costs.
Dismissed.