Study aid, not legal advice. caselaw is not a law firm and does not provide legal advice or engage in the unauthorized practice of law (UPL). All briefs, outlines, and citation tools on these pages are educational summaries for law students; they are not a substitute for advice from a licensed attorney admitted in your jurisdiction. Bar-admission rules vary by state. For court filings or client matters, verify every authority against the official reporter and your court's local rules. Use of caselaw does not create an attorney-client relationship.
MURRAY v. CHICAGO, ST. P., M. & O. RY. CO., 1931 â 50 F.2d 374 · caselaw · US
Contracts · MBE-tested
MURRAY v. CHICAGO, ST. P., M. & O. RY. CO.
50 F.2d 374·United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit·1931
Brief incoming
Hand-reviewed Bluebook brief (procedural posture, facts, issue, holding, reasoning, dissent) ships once the AI generation pipeline runs through this case. Join the waitlist to get notified when 1L briefs go live.
Opinion
MURRAY v. CHICAGO, ST. P., M. & O. RY. CO.
No. 4472.
Circuit Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
June 11, 1931.
James E. Burns, of Chicago, Ill., for appellant.
Nelson Trottman and Nelson J. Wilcox, both of Chicago, Ill., William T. Faricy, of St. Paul, Minn., and I. C. Belden, of Chicago, Ill., for appellee.
Before ALSCHULER, EYANS, and SPARKS, Circuit Judges.»
[MAJORITY â ALSCHULER, Circuit Judge.]
ALSCHULER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Murray was a coal broker at Chicago, doing business under the name of Murray Coal & Coke Company. He represented certain coal mines, and under date of July 8, 1921, entered into three contracts with appellee railway company for the sale to the latter of coal. The contracts are identical, except that they are for different quantities, being for 70,000, 35,000, and 65,000 tons,, respectively, each terminating March 31, 1922, and specifying two kinds of coal, viz., âmine runâ and âegg,â at appelleeâs option, âmine runâ at $2.70 and âeggâ at $2.90 per ton. The contracts specified the mines to supply the coal, and provided that the ap-pellee should âplace orders for daily shipments of coal under this contract in as uniform daily amounts as practicable, due allowance being made- for the accumulation of a reasonable amount of coal in stock by the Railway at times when the natural conditions make it advisable to accumulate such stock.â
The practice was for appellee to send Murray weekly orders specifying the daily requirements for the week, which orders were transmitted by him 'to the mines, which thereupon shipped the coal to the points directed, notifying both Murray and appel-lee; and therefrom Murray rendered to ap-pellee monthly invoicesâ, upon receiving which appellee paid Murray.
It appears that during the last three months of the contracts there were shipped to appellee 34,000 tons of âmine" runâ and 27,580.31 tons of âeggâ; but the written orders which appellee from time to time placed for all this coal specified âspecial mine runâ coal, none of. them specifying âegg.â The invoices, however, which Murray, sent ap-pellee during that period specified âmine runâ and âeggâ in the above-indicated aggregates; but in each of these invoices the price stated for all the coal was $2.70 per ton, and it was at this price that appellee made its settle* ments with Murray.
âą The action was for the difference on the âeggâ coal between the contract price of $2.-90 peĂ; ton and the $2.70 per ton which ap-pellee paid. The cause was heard by the court without a jury, and judgment was given for appellee.
Murray testified that just prior to the beginning of the last three-month period Sed-don, who was appelleeâs purchasing agent, asked him to include in future shipments as much âeggâ coal as was possible, and that it was because of this oral request of Seddon that the âeggâ coal was thenceforth included. Seddon, testifying some seven years after the occurrence, when he was an old man and retired from his near half century of employment with appellee, said that some such conversation did take place, but he did not know whether any orders had ever been placed on such basis. While at first seeming to confirm Murrayâs version, he afterwards stated that on his own initiative he requested that âeggâ coal be sent for one week as an experiment, and that he was not certain how it happened to be sent thereafter. Prom a reading of his testimony it does not appear to be definite or convincing.
It does not definitely appear how appellee came to employ the term âspecial mine runâ in its orders. The contracts do not specify such grade. It was testified that it might indicate a modified âmine runâ or a modified âegg.â It is very possible that in the conversation between Murray and Seddon â it was suggested that somewhat larger coal be supplied, short of the grade of âegg,â and that thereafter the order specified âspecial mine runâ while the mines called it âegg,â and Murray charged it at $2.70.
Murray was not a producer of coal, but a seller, whose business was not so large but that it was* conducted by himself and his stenographer; and yet it appears that for four years after the billing, by him of the âeggâ coal at $2.70 per ton, and payment therefor on that basis, he did not, as. he testified, know of the supposed error, and became aware of it then only through an examination of his books by income tax agents of the government.
The fact that one in Murrayâs situation did not in all that time discover this error against him, involving over $5,000, was a circumstance tending to corroborate the conclusion that at the time of the transactions âeggâ instead of âmine runâ coal was sent for shippersâ convenience, or that it was then mutually understood by the parties that the price should not be in excess of $2.70 for any of the coal. Such conclusion finds further corroboration in the testimony of witnesses to the effect that the grades were produced by screening the coal, and that in filling their orders the mines would frequently accumulate a larger supply of âeggâ than was needed, and, in order to keep their mines running and shipments moving, would often supply âeggâ upon orders for âmine run.â This would tend to explain how it happened that, while no âeggâ was specified in appel-leeâs orders, âeggâ was billed, but was priced and paid for as âmine run,â which would tend to support appelleeâs contention that the supplying of the âeggâ upon orders for âmine runâ was for the convenience of the shippers of the coal.
The controversy involves facts only, and the District Court heard the contradictory evidence thereon â largely of witnesses testifying in open court. We are not at liberty to disturb the courtâs findings, and its judgment is affirmed.