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US — Torts (AI set 1) — US law flashcards · caselaw · US
Torts · Torts
US — Torts (AI set 1)
US tort law — intentional torts, negligence (duty, breach, causation, damages), and the foreseeability frontier.
23 cards · tap a card to flip it
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What are the four elements of a prima facie intentional tort of battery?
Battery requires: (1) an act by the defendant, (2) intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact, (3) actual harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff's person, and (4) causation. Intent is satisfied if the defendant either desires the contact or knows to a substantial certainty it will occur. This is established common-law doctrine set out in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 13.
How does the objective 'reasonable person' standard apply to professional defendants in negligence?
A professional (e.g., physician or attorney) is held to the standard of care of a reasonably competent member of that profession under similar circumstances, not the ordinary layperson. This heightened objective standard reflects the specialized knowledge the professional undertook to exercise. The rule is codified in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A.
What three conditions must be met for res ipsa loquitur to shift the inference of negligence?
Res ipsa loquitur applies when: (1) the accident is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur without negligence, (2) it was caused by an instrumentality within the defendant's exclusive control, and (3) the plaintiff did not voluntarily contribute to the accident. The doctrine permits—but does not compel—the factfinder to infer breach. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D.
Pure comparative fault vs. modified comparative fault — key structural difference?
Under pure comparative fault a plaintiff recovers damages reduced by their own percentage of fault even if they are 99% at fault. Under the majority 'modified' form, a plaintiff is barred from recovery if their fault meets or exceeds 50% (or 51% in some states). Both systems replaced the all-or-nothing contributory negligence bar adopted at common law.
What is the 'but-for' test for actual causation, and when does it fail?
A defendant's negligence is an actual cause of harm if the injury would not have occurred but for that negligence. The test fails in concurrent independent cause cases where either of two separate negligent acts alone would have caused the full harm; courts then apply the 'substantial factor' test. Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical & Emotional Harm §§ 26–27.
Under strict products liability, what must a plaintiff prove about the product defect?
The plaintiff must show the product was defective (in design, manufacturing, or warning) when it left the defendant's control, and that the defect caused the plaintiff's harm; negligence and privity are irrelevant. A manufacturing defect exists when the product deviates from its intended design. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A; Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2.
Consent as a defense to intentional torts — what vitiates apparent consent?
Apparent consent is ineffective if it was induced by the defendant's fraud or misrepresentation going to the essential nature of the act, obtained under duress, or given by one legally incapable of consenting (e.g., a minor for certain acts). Consent to one act does not imply consent to a substantially different act. Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 49–60.
What damages are recoverable in a negligence action, and are punitive damages available?
A negligence plaintiff may recover compensatory damages—special (economic: medical bills, lost wages) and general (non-economic: pain and suffering)—for all harm that is a proximate result of the breach. Punitive damages are not available for ordinary negligence; they require proof that the defendant acted with malice, fraud, or conscious/reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights. This distinction is a bedrock common-law rule recognized in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908.
Palsgraf — which party bears the burden of proving the plaintiff was within the foreseeable zone of danger?
The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the defendant owed her a duty, which requires showing she was within the reasonably foreseeable zone of danger created by the defendant's conduct. In Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. (N.Y. 1928), Cardozo held that duty is defined by the relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff, not by negligence in the abstract. A defendant owes no duty to unforeseeable plaintiffs, even if the defendant acted negligently toward someone else.
What is the 'transferred intent' doctrine in intentional torts?
Under the transferred-intent doctrine, if a defendant intends to commit a tort against Person A but instead harms Person B, the requisite intent transfers to the unintended victim. The doctrine applies across the five historical trespass torts: battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to land, and trespass to chattels. A defendant who intends to frighten one bystander but accidentally strikes another is liable for battery to the person struck.
How does contributory negligence differ from assumption of the risk as a complete bar to recovery?
Contributory negligence is the plaintiff's failure to exercise reasonable care for her own safety, and at common law it completely bars recovery regardless of the degree of fault. Assumption of the risk, by contrast, requires the plaintiff to have actually known of a specific risk and voluntarily encountered it; it bars recovery even where the defendant was grossly negligent. The two defenses are conceptually distinct: contributory negligence is an objective standard, while assumption of the risk has a subjective knowledge requirement.
What is a 'superseding cause,' and how does it break the chain of proximate causation?
A superseding cause is an independent, unforeseeable intervening act that is so extraordinary that it would be unjust to hold the original defendant liable for the resulting harm. Courts ask whether the intervening act was within the scope of the risk that made the defendant's conduct negligent in the first place; if it was not foreseeable, it severs proximate causation. Foreseeable intervening acts — such as negligent medical treatment of the plaintiff's injuries — generally do not break the causal chain.
Under strict products liability (Restatement Second § 402A), is a defendant's negligence required?
No. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A imposes liability on a seller of a product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user without requiring proof of negligence. The rationale is that sellers who profit from placing products into the stream of commerce are better positioned to bear and distribute the cost of injuries than innocent consumers. A plaintiff need only prove the product was defective when it left the defendant's control and that the defect caused the injury.
How does the 'eggshell skull' rule affect the damages a negligent defendant must pay?
Under the eggshell skull (or thin-skull) rule, a defendant takes the plaintiff as she finds her and is liable for the full extent of the plaintiff's injuries even if those injuries are far greater than would have been suffered by an ordinary person. The rule is an exception to the general foreseeability requirement for damages: while the type of harm must be foreseeable, the extent or severity need not be. The rule is well-established in American tort law and is restated in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 461.
What duty of care, if any, does a landowner owe to a trespasser under traditional common law?
Under traditional common law, a landowner owes a trespasser only the duty to refrain from willful, wanton, or reckless conduct that causes injury. No duty to inspect or make the premises reasonably safe exists for undiscovered trespassers. A narrow exception applies to discovered (or anticipated) trespassers, to whom the landowner must warn of known artificial conditions involving risk of death or serious bodily harm that the trespasser would not be expected to discover.
What is the doctrine of negligence per se, and what must a plaintiff establish to invoke it?
Negligence per se treats a statutory or regulatory violation as conclusive (or in some states prima facie) evidence of breach of the duty of care. To invoke the doctrine, a plaintiff must show: (1) the defendant violated a statute; (2) the plaintiff is within the class of persons the statute was designed to protect; and (3) the harm suffered is within the type of harm the statute was designed to prevent. If these elements are met, the plaintiff need not separately prove that the defendant's conduct was unreasonable.
False imprisonment — what qualifies as a sufficient 'confinement' to satisfy the element?
False imprisonment requires that the defendant confine the plaintiff within fixed boundaries set by the defendant, using physical barriers, physical force, threats of force, or assertion of legal authority. The plaintiff must be aware of the confinement at the time it occurs, or must suffer actual harm from it. A mere moral pressure or future threat is insufficient; there must be no reasonable means of escape that the plaintiff knows about and can safely use.
What is the legal standard for 'intent' in intentional torts — purpose or knowledge?
Intent in intentional torts is satisfied either by the actor's purpose to bring about the forbidden consequence or by the actor's knowledge that the consequence is substantially certain to result from the act. This dual standard, reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A, means a defendant who fires into a crowded room 'intends' to strike those hit even without specific desire to harm them. Mere recklessness or negligence is insufficient.
Res ipsa loquitur — what procedural effect does the inference have at trial?
When res ipsa loquitur applies, it permits the jury to infer negligence from the mere happening of the accident without direct proof of a specific negligent act; in most jurisdictions it creates a permissive inference, not a mandatory presumption, so the defendant need not rebut it with evidence. The plaintiff still bears the ultimate burden of persuasion. The doctrine is recognized under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328D.
How is proximate cause analyzed under the 'scope of the risk' (risk rule) approach?
Under the scope-of-the-risk (or Restatement Third) approach, a defendant is liable only for harms that fall within the type of risk that made the defendant's conduct negligent in the first place. If the plaintiff's injury results from a different risk than the one that rendered the conduct unreasonable, proximate causation is not established even if but-for causation exists. This replaces the older 'direct causation' and 'foreseeability' tests with a unified risk-based inquiry under Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 29.
What is 'negligence per se,' and does it automatically establish breach?
Negligence per se substitutes a statutory or regulatory standard for the common-law reasonable-person standard when a plaintiff belongs to the class the statute was designed to protect and suffers the type of harm the statute was designed to prevent. In most jurisdictions the unexcused violation establishes breach as a matter of law, but the plaintiff must still prove causation and damages. The doctrine is set out in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286.
Under traditional contributory negligence, what is the effect of any plaintiff fault?
At common law, contributory negligence is a complete bar to the plaintiff's recovery: if the plaintiff's own negligence contributed in any degree to the plaintiff's harm, the plaintiff recovers nothing. This harsh all-or-nothing rule has been largely replaced by comparative fault statutes in nearly all states, but remains the default rule in the few jurisdictions that have not adopted comparative fault. The rule is reflected in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 467.
What is 'trespass to chattels,' and how does it differ from conversion?
Trespass to chattels is the intentional interference with another's personal property that causes actual harm to the chattel or dispossession of it, while conversion requires an interference so serious in nature or consequence that the defendant may justly be required to pay the full value of the chattel. The key distinction is magnitude: minor damage or brief dispossession supports trespass to chattels (damages limited to actual harm), while substantial dominion or destruction supports conversion (damages equal to full value). Both torts are recognized under Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 217–218 and 222A.