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US — Criminal Law (AI set 1) — US law flashcards · caselaw · US
Criminal Law · Criminal Law
US — Criminal Law (AI set 1)
US criminal law & procedure — actus reus, mens rea, defenses, and the constitutional rights of the accused.
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Gideon v. Wainwright — what constitutional right did it establish?
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is incorporated against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, so indigent felony defendants must be appointed counsel. A conviction obtained without counsel (and without a valid waiver) violates due process.
Miranda v. Arizona — what four warnings must police give before custodial interrogation?
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), requires police to inform a suspect: (1) the right to remain silent; (2) anything said can be used against them; (3) the right to an attorney; and (4) if indigent, an attorney will be appointed. Statements obtained without these warnings are generally inadmissible.
Under Miranda, when is a suspect 'in custody' triggering the warning requirement?
A suspect is 'in custody' for Miranda purposes when formally arrested or when a reasonable person in the suspect's position would not feel free to terminate the encounter and leave. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Routine roadside traffic stops are generally not custodial.
MPC § 2.02 — what are the four mental states, ranked most to least culpable?
Under MPC § 2.02, the four mental states are: (1) purpose — conscious object to engage in conduct or cause result; (2) knowledge — awareness that result is practically certain; (3) recklessness — conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk; (4) negligence — failure to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk a reasonable person would perceive.
How does the MPC distinguish first- from second-degree murder?
The MPC does not itself use degree labels, but most states following MPC § 210.2 treat murder (killing with purpose or knowledge, or extreme recklessness — 'depraved indifference') as the base offense. Premeditation and deliberation elevate a purposeful killing to first-degree murder under many state statutes; second-degree covers knowing or depraved-indifference killings without premeditation.
What distinguishes voluntary manslaughter from murder under the MPC?
Under MPC § 210.3, a homicide that would otherwise be murder is reduced to manslaughter when committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance (EMED) for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse. This is a broader mitigation than the common-law 'heat of passion' doctrine, which required adequate provocation and no cooling-off period.
MPC § 5.01 — what is the test for criminal attempt?
Under MPC § 5.01, attempt requires (1) the purpose to commit the target offense and (2) a 'substantial step' strongly corroborative of that purpose. This replaces the more restrictive common-law 'last proximate act' and 'dangerous proximity' tests, allowing earlier intervention by law enforcement.
What is the MPC's insanity defense, and how does it differ from M'Naghten?
MPC § 4.01 excuses a defendant who, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality of conduct or to conform conduct to law. M'Naghten (1843) only excuses those who did not know the nature of the act or that it was wrong — a narrower cognitive-only test with no volitional prong.
MPC § 2.01 — what conduct qualifies as a voluntary 'actus reus'?
A person is not guilty of an offense unless their liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or omission to act when there is a legal duty to act. Reflexes, convulsions, or acts performed while unconscious do not qualify. This is codified in MPC § 2.01.
MPC § 2.02 — what does it mean to act 'recklessly' vs. 'negligently'?
Recklessness requires conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, while negligence requires only that the actor should have been aware of such a risk. The distinction is subjective awareness: the reckless actor knows the risk and ignores it; the negligent actor does not. Both are defined in MPC § 2.02(2)(c)-(d).
Miranda v. Arizona — can a suspect waive Miranda rights, and what is the standard?
Yes. A suspect may waive Miranda rights, but the waiver must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), placed the burden on the prosecution to demonstrate a valid waiver; a mere silence after warnings does not alone constitute waiver.
What are the elements of the duress defense under the MPC?
Under MPC § 2.09, duress is an affirmative defense when the defendant was coerced by the use or threat of unlawful force that a person of reasonable firmness would not have been able to resist. Unlike common law, the MPC does not categorically exclude duress from homicide offenses, though recklessly placing oneself in the situation may bar the defense.
How does the MPC define felony murder, and how does it limit the doctrine?
MPC § 210.2(1)(b) creates a rebuttable presumption of extreme recklessness (and thus murder) when death occurs during the commission of certain enumerated felonies such as robbery or rape. The defendant may rebut the presumption by showing the killing was not reckless, significantly limiting strict-liability felony murder compared to common law.
MPC § 2.02 — what mental state applies when none is specified in a statute?
Under MPC § 2.02(3), when a statute is silent on mens rea, the minimum required mental state is recklessness. This default prevents strict criminal liability for elements that are not explicitly addressed by the legislature.
Under the MPC, what is 'strict liability' and when is it permitted in criminal law?
MPC § 2.05 limits strict liability (no mens rea required) to violations — offenses punishable only by fine or civil penalty — and expressly prohibits it for crimes carrying imprisonment. Any offense that can result in imprisonment must have at least one culpable mental state under § 2.02.
Under the MPC, is voluntary intoxication a defense to a crime requiring 'purpose' or 'knowledge'?
MPC § 2.08(1) provides that voluntary intoxication is a defense only when it negates an element of the offense — specifically, it can negate purpose or knowledge but cannot negate recklessness because a person who is unaware of a risk due to self-induced intoxication is treated as having acted recklessly. This is a partial defense limited to specific-intent-equivalent crimes.
What is 'depraved heart' murder, and how does the MPC capture that concept?
Common law 'depraved heart' murder covers killings reflecting extreme indifference to human life without intent to kill. The MPC captures this in § 210.2(1)(b) as murder committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting 'extreme indifference to the value of human life,' treating it as second-degree murder.
MPC § 4.01 — what two prongs make up the Model Penal Code insanity test?
Under MPC § 4.01, a defendant is not responsible if, as a result of mental disease or defect, they lacked substantial capacity either (1) to appreciate the criminality of their conduct (cognitive prong) or (2) to conform their conduct to the requirements of law (volitional prong). This broader test rejects the strict 'knowledge of right and wrong' limitation of the M'Naghten rule.