US — Torts — Quiz 1
US tort law — intentional torts, negligence (duty, breach, causation, damages), and the foreseeability frontier.
- 1.
A passenger standing on a train platform is injured when a railroad employee, while helping a distant passenger board, negligently dislodges a package of fireworks. The fireworks explode, causing scales at the far end of the platform to fall and strike the plaintiff. The plaintiff sues the railroad for negligence. Under the rule of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., which outcome is most likely?
- 2.
During surgery, a patient is under general anesthesia and has no ability to observe what is happening. After surgery, the patient's right arm—which was not the site of the operation—is found to be paralyzed. The surgeon offers no explanation. The patient sues. Which doctrine best supports the patient's ability to reach the jury on breach without direct evidence of a specific negligent act?
- 3.
A driver runs a red light and strikes a cyclist. The cyclist, not wearing a helmet (as required by a local ordinance), suffers a head injury that would have been prevented by a helmet. The jurisdiction applies pure comparative negligence. The jury finds the driver 80% at fault and the cyclist 20% at fault and awards $100,000 in total damages. How much may the cyclist recover?
- 4.
A store owner knows that a section of his parking lot has a large pothole that has caused several near-falls over the past month but has not yet repaired it. A customer steps into the pothole at night, breaks her ankle, and sues. On the question of breach, which factor is MOST relevant under the Hand Formula (B < PL) analysis?
- 5.
A defendant intentionally shoves the plaintiff as a joke, not intending any injury. The plaintiff falls and breaks a wrist that was unusually fragile due to an undisclosed bone disease. The defendant argues he should only be liable for the harm a person with normal bone density would have suffered. Which doctrine governs this situation?
- 6.
A gun store owner sells a firearm to a buyer who appears agitated and makes an ambiguous comment about 'settling a score.' The next day, the buyer shoots a third party. The third party's estate sues the gun store owner in negligence. On the question of proximate cause, which analysis is MOST accurate?
- 7.
A landlord rents an apartment and, before the tenant moves in, negligently fails to repair a broken staircase railing. The tenant's guest, while visiting, grabs the railing, it gives way, and the guest falls and is injured. The guest sues the landlord. The landlord argues he owes no duty to the guest because the guest is not a party to the lease. What is the most accurate statement of the landlord's duty to the guest?
- 8.
During an argument, the defendant lunges at the plaintiff with his fist. The plaintiff, reasonably believing he is about to be struck, ducks to avoid the blow, stumbles, and breaks his arm. The defendant's fist never made contact with the plaintiff. Which intentional tort, if any, has the defendant committed?
- 9.
A plaintiff is injured in a car accident caused by the defendant's negligence. At trial, uncontroverted evidence shows the plaintiff's medical bills were $40,000, but the plaintiff's health insurer paid all of them, leaving the plaintiff with no out-of-pocket expenses. The defendant moves to reduce the damages award by $40,000, arguing the plaintiff suffered no economic loss. How should the court rule under the collateral source rule?
- 10.
A defendant, who is a skilled architect, is sued for negligently designing a building that collapsed. At trial, the court instructs the jury to evaluate the defendant's conduct against that of a 'reasonable person of ordinary prudence.' The defendant argues the instruction is wrong and that professionals should be held to the standard of a reasonable member of their profession. Which instruction is correct?
Questions & answers
1. A passenger standing on a train platform is injured when a railroad employee, while helping a distant passenger board, negligently dislodges a package of fireworks. The fireworks explode, causing scales at the far end of the platform to fall and strike the plaintiff. The plaintiff sues the railroad for negligence. Under the rule of Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., which outcome is most likely?
Answer: The railroad is not liable because the duty owed by the railroad ran to the passenger being helped, not to a plaintiff whose injury was unforeseeable from the defendant's vantage point.
Palsgraf holds that negligence liability requires that the defendant owe a duty to the particular plaintiff; the scope of duty is limited to foreseeable plaintiffs, and injury to a bystander far away from the negligent act falls outside that scope. Option A incorrectly treats but-for causation as sufficient without addressing duty to this plaintiff. Option B reflects Justice Andrews's dissent, not the majority rule. Option D introduces assumption of risk, which was not at issue and is unsupported on these facts. Option E overstates the common carrier duty, which does not eliminate the foreseeability/duty limitation.
2. During surgery, a patient is under general anesthesia and has no ability to observe what is happening. After surgery, the patient's right arm—which was not the site of the operation—is found to be paralyzed. The surgeon offers no explanation. The patient sues. Which doctrine best supports the patient's ability to reach the jury on breach without direct evidence of a specific negligent act?
Answer: Res ipsa loquitur, allowing an inference of negligence when the injury is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur absent negligence, the instrumentality was in the defendant's exclusive control, and the plaintiff did not contribute.
Res ipsa loquitur permits a jury to infer breach from the circumstantial evidence that paralysis of an unoperated limb ordinarily does not occur without negligence, and the patient-plaintiff could not have observed or caused it. Option A misstates contributory negligence, which is a defense, not a burden-shifting device for plaintiffs. Option C is incorrect because surgery is not classified as an abnormally dangerous activity. Option D misapplies transferred intent, a doctrine applicable to intentional torts. Option E fabricates a statutory basis not present in the facts.