Distinguish bail under Schedule 5 from bail under Schedule 6 under the CPA. Apply the principles to a charged client facing armed robbery (Schedule 6).
Marking scheme
- s 60(11)(a) Schedule 6 — exceptional circumstances (8 marks)
- s 60(11)(b) Schedule 5 — interests of justice (5 marks)
- Onus reversal (5 marks)
- Application: armed robbery (4 marks)
- Constitutional s 35(1)(f) (3 marks)
Model answer (AI-assisted)
# Model Answer: Bail under Schedule 5 and Schedule 6 of the Criminal Procedure Act
## 1. Issue Identification
The central issue is to distinguish between the bail regimes applicable to Schedule 5 and Schedule 6 offences under the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 ("the CPA"), with particular focus on the onus of proof, the applicable tests, and constitutional considerations. The principles must then be applied to a client charged with armed robbery, which constitutes a Schedule 6 offence.
## 2. Applicable Rules, Statutes and Case Authority
### 2.1 Constitutional Framework
Section 35(1)(f) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that everyone who is arrested for allegedly committing an offence has the right to be released from detention if the interests of justice permit, subject to reasonable conditions. This constitutional right underpins all bail proceedings, though it may be limited by the onus reversals contained in the CPA schedules.
### 2.2 Schedule 5 Offences: Section 60(11)(b)
Schedule 5 offences are serious crimes where the prosecution bears the initial onus, but once the State establishes a *prima facie* case, the evidential burden shifts to the accused. Under section 60(11)(b) of the CPA, the court shall order the accused's release on bail unless the interests of justice do not permit such release.
The "interests of justice" test requires consideration of factors enumerated in section 60(4) to (10), including:
- The likelihood of the accused attending trial;
- Whether the accused will interfere with witnesses or evidence;
- The likelihood of the accused committing further offences;
- Danger to the public or any particular person;
- The nature and gravity of the offence.
In *S v Dlamini; S v Dladla and Others; S v Joubert; S v Schietekat* 1999 (4) SA 623 (CC), the Constitutional Court held that while the onus is on the accused to adduce evidence establishing that the interests of justice permit release, this does not constitute an unjustifiable infringement of the constitutional right to bail.
### 2.3 Schedule 6 Offences: Section 60(11)(a)
Schedule 6 offences represent the most serious crimes, including murder, rape, and armed robbery. Section 60(11)(a) of the CPA creates a significantly higher threshold: bail shall be granted only if the accused, having been given a reasonable opportunity to make representations, adduces evidence which satisfies the court that **exceptional circumstances** exist which in the interests of justice permit release.
The test is cumulative: the accused must establish both:
1. Exceptional circumstances; **and**
2. That the interests of justice permit release.
In *S v Dlamini; S v Dladla and Others; S v Joubert; S v Schietekat* 1999 (4) SA 623 (CC), the Constitutional Court held that section 60(11)(a) does not constitute an absolute bar to bail, nor does it create an irrebuttable presumption against bail. However, the section does place a heavy burden on the accused.
*Stanfield v Minister of Correctional Services and Others* 2004 (2) SACR 190 (C) clarified that "exceptional circumstances" relate to the individual circumstances of the accused and the offence, not general societal concerns. The circumstances must be unusual, uncommon, or out of the ordinary.
### 2.4 Onus Reversal
The critical distinction between Schedule 5 and Schedule 6 lies in the reversed onus of proof. For Schedule 5 offences, the accused must show why the interests of justice permit release. For Schedule 6 offences, the accused bears the substantially heavier burden of establishing exceptional circumstances **in addition to** showing that the interests of justice permit release.
This reversal has been held constitutionally permissible in *S v Dlamini; S v Dladla and Others; S v Joubert; S v Schietekat* 1999 (4) SA 623 (CC) as a justifiable limitation of section 35(1)(f) rights under section 36 of the Constitution, given the gravity of scheduled offences and the legitimate state interest in combating serious crime.
## 3. Application to the Facts
Armed robbery falls within Schedule 6 of the CPA (Part III, item 3: robbery with aggravating circumstances). The client therefore faces the stringent test under section 60(11)(a).
The client must discharge the onus of establishing exceptional circumstances. These may include (depending on facts):
- Personal circumstances: age, health status, primary caregiver responsibilities, or employment requiring presence;
- Evidentiary circumstances: weak State case, strong alibi defence;
- Circumstances of the offence: peripheral involvement, recovery of property, minimal violence used.
Even if exceptional circumstances are established, the client must additionally satisfy the court that the interests of justice permit release by addressing section 60(4)-(10) factors, particularly demonstrating minimal flight risk, no witness interference propensity, and that release poses no public danger.
The severity of armed robbery and its prevalence make the threshold exceptionally high, requiring compelling personal circumstances beyond the offence itself.
## 4. Conclusion
Schedule 5 bail operates under a less onerous test requiring only that the interests of justice permit release, with the accused bearing the evidential burden. Schedule 6 bail imposes the significantly higher threshold of exceptional circumstances **plus** interests of justice, representing the Legislature's response to the most serious crimes. For the client charged with armed robbery, success depends on adducing compelling evidence of exceptional personal or case-specific circumstances while simultaneously negating concerns under the interests of justice test—a formidable burden consistent with constitutional limitations on the right to bail.
Source: S v Dlamini, S v Stanfield + CPA s 60.