Macdonald v. Canada (Attorney General)

Macdonald v. Canada (Attorney General)
Court (s) Database
Federal Court Decisions
Date
2005-09-29
Neutral citation
2005 FC 1326
File numbers
T-330-05
Notes
Digest
Decision Content
Date: 20050929
Docket: T-330-05
Citation: 2005 FC 1326
OTTAWA, Ontario, September 29th, 2005
PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE KELEN
BETWEEN:
PHILLIP MACDONALD
Applicant
and
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA
Respondent
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] This is an application for judicial review of a decision of the Commissioner of the Correctional Service of Canada (CSC) dated January 26, 2005 in which the applicant's grievance of his placement in administrative segregation at Fenbrook Medium Institution (FMI) in Gravenhurst, Ontario was denied.
[2] This application raises two issues: whether the CSC's decision to segregate the applicant was made in a manner that violates procedural fairness; and whether the Commissioner of the CSC's (Commissioner) decision to deny the applicant's grievance challenging his segregation warrants the Court's intervention, applying the appropriate standard of review.
FACTS
(a) The Segregation
[3] On August 5, 2004 the applicant, at that time an inmate at FMI, was placed in administrative segregation by the institutional head on grounds that the applicant's actual or intended acts jeopardized the security of the institution or persons and that his continued presence in the general inmate population would prolong that risk. In particular, prison authorities received information alleging that the applicant:
1. had been involved in the drug subculture at FMI;
2. had directly and indirectly intimidated other inmates; and
3. had carried a weapon on his person from time to time.
[4] The applicant's administrative segregation began on August 5, 2004 and ended on September 22, 2004, at which time he was involuntarily transferred from FMI to the Joyceville Institution near Kingston, Ontario. The applicant has also grieved his involuntary transfer pursuant to the CSC's multi-level procedure set out in sections 90-91 the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20 (the Act) and sections 74-82 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, SOR/92-620 (the Regulations), but that challenge does not fall within the review at bar.
[5] On August 5, 2004 the applicant was provided written reasons for his placement in a copy of the Involuntary Segregation Placement report (Placement Report). In that document the CSC provided the grounds for confining the applicant in segregation and the rationale for that decision:
You are being placed in administrative segregation according to subsection 31(3)(a) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act because there are reasonable grounds to believe: "that (i) the inmate has acted, has attempted to act or intends to act in a manner that jeopardizes the security of the penitentiary or the safety of any person, and (ii) the continued presence of the inmate in the general inmate population would jeopardize the security of the penitentiary or the safety of any person".
Rationale:
Full description of the incident or circumstances leading to the consideration of placement in segregation; Security Intelligence information believes that you are involved in the drug sub culture at FMI. It is also believed that you are and have used direct and indirect "muscling" tactics on other Offenders. This behaviour is against the behavioural modification agreement that you are currently under not to mention the rules and laws governing this Institution. Security intelligence Information also reveals from time to time you carry a weapon. At this point your continued presence in the open population of FMI may jeopardize the security and safety of this Institution.
(b) Segregation Review Board
[6] In accordance with paragraph 21(2)(a) of the Regulations, the Segregation Review Board ("SRB") conducted a review on August 12, 2004 of the applicant's placement in segregation. The applicant attended the hearing and submitted a written rebuttal denying the allegations against him. On the SRB's recommendation, the institutional head maintained the applicant in administrative segregation pending completion of the Security Intelligence Officer's ("SIO") investigation. Pursuant to paragraph 21(3)(c) of the Regulations, the applicant was provided written reasons for the SRB's recommendation:
Inmate Macdonald was placed in segregation after reliable information indicated he is muscling, intimidating other inmates and involved in the institutional drug subculture. Inmate submitted a hand-written rebuttal during his 5-day review, denying the above allegations. It was noted in Inmate Macdonald's information sharing paperwork that is on a BMA. This information is incorrect as inmate was removed from the BMA on July 29, 2004. SIO continues to investigate Inmate Macdonald's involvement in the above activities. SRB believes that based on the above information inmate can no longer be maintained in FMI population at this time. SRB recommends he remain in segregation pending completion of SIO investigation and exploration of desegregation strategies.
[7] On August 18, 2004 the applicant was personally told in detail by CSC officer Lisa Blasko, the substance of the allegations against him which were detailed before the Court in the Affidavit of Ms. Blasko. The detailed Security Intelligence Reports and Record of Intercepted Telephone Communications involving the applicant using a false PIN number to avoid detection are before the Court, but were not provided to the applicant at the time to protect the security of the Institution and sources of information.
(c) The Grievance
[8] The applicant grieved the decision to place him in segregation through the CSC's internal resolution process, set out in sections 74-82 of the Regulations, to the third and final level, exhausting all internal remedies before seeking redress before the Court.
[9] The grievance was denied at the second level in a decision of the Ontario Regional Deputy Commissioner (the Deputy Commissioner) dated August 31, 2004. The reasons provided the applicant with further information obtained in the course of the SIO's investigation, excerpts of which include:
This report clearly documents the security intelligence information gathered leading to your placement in segregation and subsequent involuntary transfer. In summary, this information includes:
a. Information received through telephone interception ... suggests you were involved in the running of a "store" with other offenders making deposits to an outside bank accounts. The ... SIO believes you were also involved in extorting money from other inmates.
b. You used another offender's PIN number to contact ... an ex-offender. ... The ex-offender maintained an outside bank account for you and it is noted you were expecting a "deposit". This suggests some type of "dealing within the institution.
c. Your girlfriend received $500 from him that was not sent from your institutional funds[...]
d. [...] one of your visitor's was found in possession of marijuana and arrested and charged by OPP. [...] the drug detector dog did show interest.
e. The SIO believes you also tried to introduce contraband through another offender. Although the contraband was paid for, it was not delivered. There is information indicating you have threatened others involved in this deal that did not take place even after being placed in segregation.
Given this security intelligence information ... [your] placement in administrative segregation was justified [...] Your grievance is denied.
[10] The CSC's third level decision on January 26, 2005 affirmed the Deputy Commissioner's rejection of the applicant's grievance that he was wrongfully placed in administrative segregation:
Your third-level grievance regarding your admission to Administrative Segregation on 2004-08-05 has been reviewed.
[...]
With regard to your concerns related to your admission to Administrative Segregation, we have reviewed your second-level grievance presentation, the response provided by you, as well as relevant file information and policy. It is our opinion that your admission to segregation was warranted and in accordance with Section 31(3)(a) of the CCRA as quoted in the second-level grievance response [...]
Your grievance is therefore denied.
This decision is now the subject of the present application for judicial review.
RELEVANT LEGISLATION
[11] The relevant legislation is the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20, and the Corrections and Conditional Release Regulations, SOR/92-620. The relevant excerpts follow these Reasons at Appendix A.
ISSUES
[12] The following issues are raised in this application for judicial review:
1. Did the CSC breach its duty of procedural fairness in arriving at its decision?
a) Did the CSC ground its decision in an irrelevant consideration, namely the violation of an expired behavioural modification agreement (BMA)?
b) Did the CSC engage in the unauthorized interception of the applicant's private telephone communications?
c) Did the CSC fail to disclose sufficient particulars of the allegations to enable the applicant to know of the case to be met and to make meaningful reply?
2. What is the appropriate standard of review against which to assess the CSC's third level decision to uphold the applicant's administrative segregation?
ANALYSIS
Issue No. 1: Procedural Fairness and Natural Justice
Did the CSC breach its duty of procedural fairness in arriving at its decision to administratively segregate the applicant?
[13] Prison authorities have a duty of procedural fairness when exercising their authority to place inmates in involuntary administrative segregation. Authority for this proposition lies in Cardinal v. Warden of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 644, a case before the Supreme Court of Canada in which Le Dain J. at page 648 described administrative segregation as "a form of confinement involving severe restrictions on mobility, activity, and association."
[14] To determine whether the CSC discharged its duty in this case, it falls for me to examine three independent submissions by the applicant which, if borne out on the facts, may amount to the respondent having breached the fairness principle. The parties and the Court agree that the standard of review is correctness with respect to the duty of fairness.
(a) Did the CSC ground its decision on an irrelevant consideration, namely the violation of an expired behavioural modification agreement (BMA)?
[15] The legal grounds for confining an inmate in administrative segregation are set out in subsection 31(3) of the Act:
31.
...
(3) The institutional head may order that an inmate be confined in administrative segregation if the institutional head believes on reasonable grounds
(a) that
(i) the inmate has acted, has attempted to act or intends to act in a manner that jeopardizes the security of the penitentiary or the safety of any person, and
(ii) the continued presence of the inmate in the general inmate population would jeopardize the security of the penitentiary or the safety of any person,
(b) that the continued presence of the inmate in the general inmate population would interfere with an investigation that could lead to a criminal charge or a charge under subsection 41(2) of a serious disciplinary offence, or
(c) that the continued presence of the inmate in the general inmate population would jeopardize the inmate's own safety, and the institutional head is satisfied that there is no reasonable alternative to administrative segregation.
31.
...
(3) Le directeur du pénitencier peut, s'il est convaincu qu'il n'existe aucune autre solution valable, ordonner l'isolement préventif d'un détenu lorsqu'il a des motifs raisonnables de croire, selon le cas :
a) que celui-ci a agi, tenté d'agir ou a l'intention d'agir d'une manière compromettant la sécurité d'une personne ou du pénitencier et que son maintien parmi les autres détenus mettrait en danger cette sécurité;
b) que son maintien parmi les autres détenus peut nuire au déroulement d'une enquête pouvant mener à une accusation soit d'infraction criminelle soit d'infraction disciplinaire grave visée au paragraphe 41(2);
c) que le maintien du détenu au sein de l'ensemble des détenus mettrait en danger sa sécurité.
[16] The applicant submits that the CSC's grounds for segregating him included violation of a behavioural modification agreement ("BMA"). I do not agree. Prison authorities repeatedly cited that the grounds for segregation were that the applicant's actual or intended acts jeopardized the security of the institution or persons and that such risk would continue if he were to remain in the general inmate population. The written Placement Report excerpted at paragraph 5 of my reasons refers to these as the grounds for confinement and makes specific mention of subparagraphs 31(3)(a)(i) and (ii) of the Act as authority. The same statutory provisions are also listed in the written reasons of the SRB's report provided to the applicant.
[17] Comment was made with reference to a pre-existing BMA only to the extent that the allegations made against the applicant would independently violate the terms of that agreement, as well as ground the CSC's decision to administratively segregate him. The BMA was not cited as a ground itself for confining the applicant, nor was it cited as forming part of the allegations underlying the reasonableness of those grounds.
[18] The respondent concedes that the BMA referred to had expired before the applicant's segregation. CSC's reference to the BMA in the mistaken belief of its continued existence was mentioned and corrected in the SRB's written recommendation reproduced in paragraph 6 of my reasons.
[19] In my view, the BMA was not held out as a ground for segregating the applicant, and the CSC did not use the BMA as a basis for its decision.
(b) Did the CSC engage in the unauthorized interception of the applicant's private telephone communications?
[20] The applicant submits that prison authorities intercepted and monitored his private telephone communications without lawful authority. Paragraph 94(1)(a) of the Regulations provides legal authority for interception of telephone calls:
94.
(1) Subject to subsection (2), the institutional head or a staff member designated by the institutional head may authorize, in writing, that communications between an inmate and a member of the public, including letters, telephone conversations and communications in the course of a visit, be opened, read, listened to or otherwise intercepted by a staff member or a mechanical device, where the institutional head or staff member believes on reasonable grounds
(a) that the communications contain or will contain evidence of
(i) an act that would jeopardize the security of the penitentiary or the safety of any person, or
(ii) a criminal offence or a plan to commit a criminal offence [...]
94.
(1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), le directeur du pénitencier ou l'agent désigné par lui peut autoriser par écrit que des communications entre le détenu et un membre du public soient interceptées de quelque manière que se soit par un agent ou avec un moyen technique, notamment que des lettres soient ouvertes et lues et que des conversations faites par téléphone ou pendant les visites soient écoutées, lorsqu'il a des motifs raisonnables de croire :
a) d'une part, que la communication contient ou contiendra des éléments de preuve relatifs :
(i) soit à un acte qui compromettrait la sécurité du pénitencier ou de quiconque,
(ii) soit à une infraction criminelle ou à un plan en vue de commettre une infraction criminelle; [...]
[21] There is clear evidence before this Court that the intercepted inmate communications falling between June 28, 2005 and July 30, 2005 were authorized. The record before the tribunal contains documents signed on three separate dates by the institutional head, authorizing the interception of communications of both the applicant and another inmate. The authorizations claimed reasonable grounds falling within the meaning of subparagraph 94(1)(a)(i) of the Regulations. These documents are in the form set out in Annex A to CSC's Commissioner's Direct 575: Interception of Communications Related to the Maintenance of Institutional Security. There is no evidence before the Court to suggest that the authorizations are unlawful.
(c) Did the CSC fail to disclose sufficient particulars of the allegations to enable the applicant to know of the case to be met and to make meaningful reply?
[22] The fairness principle requires that the individual be afforded the opportunity to meaningfully answer allegations it faces. To effectively exercise its right to answer, the subject must be apprised of the case to be met. The fairness principle does not mandate the same inflexible standard in all cases, however. In Knight v. Indian Head SchoolDivision No. 19, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 653, L'Heureux-Dubé J., writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, held at page 682 that, "the concept of procedural fairness is eminently variable and its content is to be decided in the specific context of each case".
[23] In Baker v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, L'Heureux-Dubé J. further articulated the content of fairness at paragraph 22, holding that fairness "depends on an appreciation of the context of the particular statute and the rights affected [...]"
[24] In the present case, the applicant submits that he was provided with an inadequate summary of the allegations against him. In particular, the applicant submits that he was not informed that information surrounding the allegations against him had been obtained by intercepted telephone communications. In the applicant's view, this deprived him of the ability to address the nature of the allegations.
[25] The applicant's position relies on Demaria v. Regional Classification Board, [1986] F.C.J. No. 493 (F.C.A.), Jamieson v. Commissioner of Corrections (1986), 51 C.R. (3d) 155 (F.C.T.D.), and McInroy v. The Queen (1985), 13 Admin. L.R. 8 (F.C.T.D.) to advance his case. The nature of the question decided in those cases was decisions to transfer inmates between penitentiaries. That question is very different than the question of involuntarily segregating inmates, as explained by the Federal Court of Appeal in Blass v. Canada(Attorney General), [2002] F.C.J. No. 810 per Pelletier J.A. at paragraph 20:
¶ 20 [...] Certain decisions made for the sake of the proper administration of the institution do not require the same degree of disclosure as decisions of a disciplinary nature. The decision to place the respondent in administrative segregation to ensure that he would not interfere with an ongoing investigation is clearly a decision made for the proper administration of the institution.
[26] The Federal Court of Appeal in Blass, supra, has specifically defined the content of the fairness principle in the context of the CSC deciding to administratively segregate an inmate. The rule articulated in Blass defining the content of fairness requires that the inmate placed in segregation must be told the grounds for the decision and the facts underlying those grounds. As concerns the grounds cited, fairness requires that the relevant justification under subsection 31(3) of the Regulations be disclosed. In addition, the factual underpinning of the grounds cited must be identified. These requirements are set out by Pelletier J.A. at paragraphs 16 and 23 of Blass:
¶ 16 [...] To comply with the requirements of procedural fairness, the institutional head could not simply cite the provisions of the Act. He had to disclose to the inmate the facts that justified those grounds [...] In communicating this information to him, the institutional head was not accusing the respondent of being an instigator of the disturbance. He was merely telling him the facts on which he based his belief that the respondent's presence in the general inmate population would interfere with the ongoing investigation.
[...]
¶ 23 With respect to the issue of procedural fairness, the penitentiary authorities informed the respondent that they believed his presence would interfere with the ongoing investigation and also told him the facts on which they based that conclusion. It was not necessary to give him more details about this information because, at that stage, the relevant issue was not whether he was an instigator or not, but whether he might interfere with the investigation. Once the respondent knew that there was information implicating him, and the reason that he was being confined was the fear that he might interfere with the investigation, he knew everything that there was to know [...] There was no breach of procedural fairness.
Blass defines the duty to be fair narrowly: once the inmate in that case had been apprised of both the grounds of confinement and the existence of information establishing that ground, the fairness principle was satisfied. An inmate so informed would be in a position to meaningfully respond to the allegations against him.
[27] In my view, this is a low burden to discharge in the context of administrative segregation. Cases in which the decision made is disciplinary in nature engage different rights or interests than questions relating to the administration of the institution, as in the case before me. The disclosure requirement mandated by the fairness principle in disciplinary cases is greater than in institutional administrative cases. Blass stands for the proposition that once the inmate is informed that information exists in relation to the specific ground cited for segregation, fairness is satisfied.
[28] In the present case, the specific identities of information sources were withheld by prison authorities. The applicant further submits that he was not told of the existence of intercepted telephone communications. In the applicant's view, this denial of disclosure constitutes a breach of procedural fairness. I do not agree. For the reasons that follow, I find there was sufficient disclosure of both the grounds of confinement and the information underlying those grounds.
[29] The applicant was repeatedly informed, initially in the Placement Report, that the ground for his segregation was that contained in subparagraphs 31(3)(i) and (ii) of the Act, being that the applicant's actual or intended acts jeopardized the security of the institution or persons and that such risk would continue if he were to remain in the general inmate population. This satisfies the requirement to disclose the ground of segregation to the applicant.
[30] The applicant was further given a synopsis detailing the existence of information relating to the issue of security of the institution. Particulars of that existing information were described under Part A of the Placement Report at paragraph 5 of these reasons. These disclosed that the information obtained by the prison authorities alleged that the applicant: (1) had been involved in the drug subculture at FMI; (2) had directly and indirectly intimidated other inmates; and (3) had carried a weapon on his person. Each of these allegations related directly to the security of the institution and of other inmates. I am satisfied this disclosure properly informed the applicant of the case to be met.
[31] The CSC Security Officer met with the applicant on August 18, 2004 to apprise him of the details of the allegations including his use of a fake PIN number to place telephone calls, the use of a bank account to do suspicious transactions probably involving drugs, and the threats by the applicant against other inmates.
[32] The prison authorities were not required to disclose to the applicant that some of their information had been obtained by interception of telephone communications. Once they identified the nature of the allegations relating to the ground of segregation, they had discharged their burden to disclose. They had no further obligation to disclose the specific sources of their information, be that source a telephone call, a confidential informant, or otherwise.
[33] The applicant was given several opportunities to respond to the allegations against him. The applicant submitted a written rebuttal to the SRB on its review of his placement and the applicant attended that hearing. The applicant's denial of the allegations against him was taken into account in the decision to maintain his segregation, and found not credible.
[34] I am satisfied the applicant was aware of the allegations against him with sufficient precision as to enable him to properly respond with meaningful submissions
Issue No. 2: Standard of Review
What is the appropriate standard of review against which to assess the CSC's third level decision to uphold the applicant's administrative segregation?
[35] In this application, there is only one question to be reviewed: the CSC decision to administratively segregate the applicant.
[36] It now falls for me to consider the applicable standard of review upon which to assess this decision. The respondent submits that the decision under review is one of a finding of fact and that the standard of review is patent unreasonableness. As authority for this view, the respondent cites Tehrankari v. Canada(Correctional Service), [2000] F.C.J. No. 495 (F.C.T.D.), where the decision of the Commissioner at issue concerned the correction of inmate file information. The Commissioner's decision to deny a grievance in respect of administrative segregation is a different question, warranting this Court's own assessment of the applicable standard of review.
Pragmatic and Functional Approach
[37] In determining which standard of review is applicable on judicial review, the Supreme Court of Canada in Dr. Q. v. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 226 held at paragraph 26 that the Court must undertake a pragmatic and functional approach:
[...] In the pragmatic and functional approach, the standard of review is determined by considering four contextual factors - the presence of a privative clause or statutory right of appeal; the expertise of the tribunal relative to that of the reviewing court on the issue in question; the purposes of the legislation and the provision in particular; and, the nature of the question - law, fact, or mixed law and fact [...]
[38] The first factor the Court must consider is the presence or absence of a privative clause or statutory right of appeal. The Act does not contain a privative clause insulating the Commissioner's decisions made pursuant to the grievance process, nor does the Act provide a route of appeal for the Commissioner's decision. Accordingly, this factor is neutral.
[39] The second factor to consider is the relative expertise of the decision-maker. The Commissioner or his or her delegate has obvious expertise relating to the CSC and its institutional administration, including administrative segregation. I am mindful that the Federal Court of Appeal in Blass, supra, held at paragraph 20: "[...] The decision to place the respondent in administrative segregation ... is clearly a decision made for the proper administration of the institution." This factor favours curial deference to the Commissioner's decisions relating to internal prison management, including inmate segregation grievances.
[40] The third factor to consider is the purpose of the legislative provision in question and of the Act as a whole. The overall objective of the Act is set out in section 3:
3. The purpose of the federal correction system is to contribute to the maintenance of the just, peaceful and safe society
a) carrying out sentences imposed by the Courts through the safe and humane custody and the supervision of offenders and
(b) assisting the rehabilitation of offenders and their reintegration into the community as law-abiding citizens through the provision of programs in penitentiaries and in the community.
The Act recognizes the necessity of the CSC to oversee its own internal administrative matters, as evidenced by the three-level grievance procedure set out in sections 90-91 of the Act and sections 72-84 of the Regulations pursuant to which inmates may seek redress.
[41] The statutory provision permitting administrative segregation is section 31 of the Act. This section provides, inter alia:
Purpose
31. (1) The purpose of administrative segregation is to keep an inmate from associating with the general inmate population.
[...]
The purpose of administrative segregation is to separate an inmate from the general institutional population on the basis of one of the grounds enumerated in subsection 31(3), each of which relates to the security of the inmate, other persons, or the institution itself. Parliament has recognized that the Commissioner and his or her delegates must, in practice, make judgments regarding institutional administration to the end of ensuring its protection and that of its inmates. The legislation mandates the weighing of competing interests, balancing those of the inmate posing the apprehended threat against those of other inmates, the institution's staff, and the community. The provision does not involve the state bringing disciplinary action against the inmate, which arises in the context of institutional charges and criminal proceedings. The purpose of the legislation favours affording the Commissioner's decision greater deference.
[42] The fourth factor to be addressed is the nature of the question, whether it is one of law, fact, or mixed law and fact. The decision to segregate an inmate involves an appreciation of facts to the extent that the Commissioner's delegate must review the information before it and weigh its credibility and reliability. The decision also involves, however, knowing the legal grounds that must be met under subsection 31(3) of the Act to justify an inmate's involuntary confinement. Questions of fact relating to internal administrative matters are within the Commissioner's expertise, and accordingly the standard of review on these matters is patent unreasonableness. On questions of law, the Commissioner will be given no deference, since relative expertise favours the Court. On questions of mixed law and fact, the Court will grant limited deference to the Commissioner and review such decisions on the standard of reasonableness simpliciter.
[43] The Commissioner's decision challenged by the applicant turns on determination of fact. Accordingly, the Court will assess the CSC's third level decision against the standard of patently unreasonable, that is, whether the decision is clearly wrong.
The Decision
[44] I now turn to the Commissioner's third level decision dated January 26, 2004 denying the applicant's grievance. The relevant portions of that decision, excerpted at paragraph 9 of these reasons, indicate that the decision-maker directed its attention to the applicant's second level presentation and to the Deputy Commissioner's reasons denying his grievance. The decision-maker also referred to the applicant's third level submissions, file information and policy. I am satisfied that the decision-maker arrived at its conclusion having regard to the grounds justifying involuntary segregation, the information held by the CSC in relation to that ground, the applicant's denials of the allegations against him, and the written reasons of the second level disposition.
[45] In the present case, the facts justifying the applicant's segregation were that the applicant's actual or intended acts jeopardized the security of the institution or persons and that his continued presence in the general inmate population would prolong that risk. Based on the allegations specified in the Placement Report and the further particulars from the SIO's investigation cited in the Deputy Commissioner's reasons for decision, I am of the opinion that the institutional head had reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant had jeopardized the security of the institution and would continue to do so if allowed to remain in the general inmate population.
[46] Alternatives to segregation were contemplated by the institutional head from the outset and were rejected. Confinement of the applicant to his cell was not possible given the institutional structure of FMI. In my view, the rejection of alternatives to administrative segregation was reasonable.
[47] Subjecting the CSC's third level decision to the standard of patently unreasonableness, I am satisfied the decision to uphold the Deputy Commissioner's denial of the applicant's grievance was not patently unreasonable. For that reason, the decision of the Commissioner to deny the applicant's grievance will be upheld.
ORDER
THIS COURT ORDERS THAT:
This application for judicial review of the decision of the Commissioner of the Correctional Service of Canada dated January 26, 2005 is dismissed with costs.
"Michael A. Kelen"
JUDGE
APPENDIX A
1. Correctional and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20
Administrative Segregation
Purpose
31. (1) The purpose of administrative segregation is to keep an inmate from associating with the general inmate population.
Duration
(2) Where an inmate is in administrative segregation in a penitentiary, the Service shall endeavour to return the inmate to the general inmate population, either of that penitentiary or of another penitentiary, at the earliest appropriate time.
Grounds for confining inmate in administrative segregation
(3) The institutional head may order that an inmate be confined in administrative segregation if the institutional head believes on reasonable grounds
(a) that
(i) the inmate has acted, has attempted to act or intends to act in a manner that jeopardizes the security of the penitentiary or the safety of any person, and
(ii) the continued presence of the inmate in the general inmate population would jeopardize the security of the penitentiary or the safety of any person,
(b) that the continued presence of the inmate in the general inmate population would interfere with an investigation that could lead to a criminal charge or a charge under subsection 41(2) of a serious disciplinary offence, or
(c) that the continued presence of the inmate in the general inmate population would jeopardize the inmate's own safety,
and the institutional head is satisfied that there is no reasonable alternative to administrative segregation.
Considerations governing release
32. All recommendations to the institutional head referred to in paragraph 33(1)(c) and all decisions by the institutional head to release or not to release an inmate from administrative segregation shall be based on the considerations set out in section 31.
Case to be reviewed
33. (1) Where an inmate is involuntarily confined in administrative segregation, a person or persons designated by the institutional head shall
(a) conduct, at the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, a hearing to review the inmate's case;
(b) conduct, at prescribed times and in the prescribed manner, further regular hearings to review the inmate's case; and
(c) recommend to the institutional head, after the hearing mentioned in paragraph (a) and after each hearing mentioned in paragraph (b), whether or not the inmate should be released from administrative segregation.
Presence of inmate
(2) A hearing mentioned in paragraph (1)(a) shall be conducted with the inmate present unless
(a) the inmate is voluntarily absent;
(b) the person or persons conducting the hearing believe on reasonable grounds that the inmate's presence would jeopardize the safety of any person present at the hearing; or
(c) the inmate seriously disrupts the hearing.
1992, c. 20, s. 33; 1995, c. 42, s. 12.
Where institutional head must meet with inmate
34. Where the institutional head does not intend to accept a recommendation made under section 33 to release an inmate from administrative segregation, the institutional head shall, as soon as is practicable, meet with the inmate
(a) to explain the reasons for not intending to accept the recommendation; and
(b) to give the inmate an opportunity to make oral or written representations.
Idem
35. Where an inmate requests to be placed in, or continue in, administrative segregation and the institutional head does not intend to grant the request, the institutional head shall, as soon as is practicable, meet with the inmate
(a) to explain the reasons for not intending to grant the request; and
(b) to give the inmate an opportunity to make oral or written representations.
Visits to inmate
36. (1) An inmate in administrative segregation shall be visited at least once every day by a registered health care professional.
Idem
(2) The institutional head shall visit the administrative segregation area at least once every day and meet with individual inmates on request.
Rights, etc., of inmate
37. An inmate in administrative segregation shall be given the same rights, privileges and conditions of confinement as the general inmate population, except for those rights, privileges and conditions that
(a) can only be enjoyed in association with other inmates; or
(b) cannot reasonably be given owing to
(i) limitations specific to the administrative segregation area, or
(ii) security requirements.
Grievance Procedure
90. There shall be a procedure for fairly and expeditiously resolving offenders' grievances on matters within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner, and the procedure shall operate in accordance with the regulations made under paragraph 96(u).
Access to grievance procedure
91. Every offender shall have complete access to the offender grievance procedure without negative consequences.
Isolement préventif
Objet
31. (1) L'isolement préventif a pour but d'empêcher un détenu d'entretenir des rapports avec l'ensemble des autres détenus.
Retour parmi les autres détenus
(2) Le détenu en isolement préventif doit être replacé le plus tôt possible parmi les autres détenus du pénitencier où il est incarcéré ou d'un autre pénitencier.
Motifs d'isolement préventif
(3) Le directeur du pénitencier peut, s'il est convaincu qu'il n'existe aucune autre solution valable, ordonner l'isolement préventif d'un détenu lorsqu'il a des motifs raisonnables de croire, selon le cas :
a) que celui-ci a agi, tenté d'agir ou a l'intention d'agir d'une manière compromettant la sécurité d'une personne ou du pénitencier et que son maintien parmi les autres détenus mettrait en danger cette sécurité;
b) que son maintien parmi les autres détenus peut nuire au déroulement d'une enquête pouvant mener à une accusation soit d'infraction criminelle soit d'infraction disciplinaire grave visée au paragraphe 41(2);
c) que le maintien du détenu au sein de l'ensemble des détenus mettrait en danger sa sécurité.
Considérations
32. Les recommandations faites aux termes du paragraphe 33(1) et les décisions que prend le directeur en matière d'isolement préventif sont fondées sur les principes ou critères énoncés à l'article 31.
Réexamen
33. (1) Lorsque l'isolement préventif est imposé au détenu, le directeur charge une ou plusieurs personnes de réexaminer périodiquement chaque cas, par une audition, selon les modalités réglementaires de temps et autres, et de lui faire après chaque réexamen des recommandations quant au maintien ou non du détenu en isolement préventif.
Présence du détenu
(2) L'audition a lieu en présence du détenu, sauf dans les cas suivants :
a) celui-ci décide de ne pas y assister;
b) les personnes chargées de l'audition croient, pour des motifs raisonnables, que sa présence mettrait en danger la sécurité de quiconque y assiste;
c) celui-ci en perturbe gravement le déroulement.
1992, ch. 20, art. 33; 1995, ch. 42, art. 12.
Obligation du directeur
34. Quand le directeur, contrairement à une recommandation faite aux termes du paragraphe 33(1), a l'