Rodier v. Lapierre

Rodier v. Lapierre
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
1892-06-15
Report
(1892) 21 SCR 69
Judges
Ritchie, William Johnstone; Strong, Samuel Henry; Taschereau, Henri-Elzéar; Patterson, Christopher Salmon; Gwynne, John Wellington
On appeal from
Quebec
Subjects
Appeal
Decision Content
Supreme Court of Canada
Rodier v. Lapierre, (1892) 21 SCR 69
Date: 1892-06-15
Dame M. J. Blanche Rodier et vir (Plaintiffs)
Appellants
And
Dame Angélique Lapierre, ès qual., (Defendant.)
Respondent.
1892: May 31; 1892: June 15.
Present:—Sir W.J. Ritchie C.J., and Strong, Taschereau, Gwynne and Patterson JJ.
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH FOR LOWER CANADA (APPEAL SIDE).
Appeal—Monthly allowance of $200—Amount in controversy—Annual rent—R.S.C. ch. 139 sec. 29 (b)—Jurisdiction.
B. R. claimed, under the will of Hon. C. S. Rodier and an act of the legislature of the province of Quebec (54 Vic. ch. 96), from A. L. testamentary executrix of the estate the sum of $200, being for an instalment of the monthly allowance which A.L. was authorized to pay to each of the testator's daughters out of the revenues of his estate. The action was dismissed by the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada, and on an appeal to the Supreme Court it was
Held, that the amount in controversy being only $200, and there being no "future rights" of B.R. which might be bound within the meaning of those words in section 29 (b) of the Supreme and Exchequer Courts Acts, the case was not appealable.
Annual rents in subset. (b) of sec. 29 of R.S.C. ch. 135 mean "ground rents " (rentes foncières) and not an annuity or any other like charges or obligations.
APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (appeal side) reversing the judgment of the Superior Court for Lower Canada.
The appellant by her action alleged that she was entitled to receive $100 monthly out of the revenues of the estate of her father the late Honourable C.S. Rodier under his will, which monthly allowance had been increased to $300 by an act of the legislature of the province of Quebec (54 Vic. ch. 16) and claimed from the respondent as testamentary executrix the additional $200 for the month of February, 1891.
The respondent pleaded that the act of the legislature, 54 Victoria chap. 96, imposed no obligation on her, but simply an authorization to pay whenever she might deem proper to do so.
The Superior Court for the province of Quebec, district of Montreal (Davidson J.) held that the respondent was bound to pay, but this decision was reversed by the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada (appeal side) (Wurtele J., dissenting.)
On an appeal to the Supreme Court the respondent objected to the jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the case was not appealable under sec. 29 of the Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act.
Geofrion Q.C., and Beaudin Q.C., for respondent, cited and relied on Gilbert v. Gilman[1]; Dominion Salvage Co. v. Brown[2], and art. 1241 C.C.
Lash Q.C. and DeMartigny for appellants contended that the claim was for rent within the meaning of that word in subset. (b) sec. 29 of the Supreme and Exchequer Courts Act, and that this case was distinguishable from that of Gilbert v. Gilman and other cases since decided.
The judgment of the court was delivered by:—
TASCHEREAU J.—This appellant claims from the re­spondent by her action, a sum of $200 for an instalment of a monthly allowance due to her as she alleges in virtue of her late father's will, and of the act 54 Vic. ch. 96 of the province of Quebec passed in relation to that will. Her action has been dismissed and she now appeals. The respondent moves to quash the appeal for want 1892 of jurisdiction. This motion must be allowed. This is clearly not an appealable case. The appellant argued that her appeal could be entertained on the ground that as the judgment dismissing her action, if allowed to stand would be resjudicata between her and the respondent, and a bar for ever of her claim, her appeal came within the words “where the rights in future might be bound” of section 29 of the Supreme Court Act. But that contention cannot prevail. We have in numerous cases determined that these words of the statute are governed by the preceding words of the clause “fee of office, duty, rent, revenue or any sum of money payable to Her Majesty or any title to lands or tenements, annual rents, or such like matters or things.” The words “annual rents” cannot support the appeal. They mean ground rents (rentes foncières), and not an annuity or any other like charges or obligations.
Neither can the appeal be entertained on the ground that the appellant's claim, being for a monthly allowance of $200, should be considered as being for an amount exceeding $2,000. The only amount actually in controversy in the present case is $200. The consequences of the judgment and its effect on the appellant's future rights in the matter cannot render the case appealable as being a case of $2,000. This monthly allowance is liable to be extinguished at any time by the death or re-marriage of the respondent for instance, according to the terms of the will in question.
Appeal quashed with costs.
Solicitors for appellants: Beïque, Lafontaine & Turgeon.
Solicitors for respondents: Beaudin & Cardinal.
[1] 16 Can. S.C.R. 189.
[2] 20 Can. S.C.R. 203.