Chevrier v. The Queen

Chevrier v. The Queen
Collection
Supreme Court Judgments
Date
1880-03-01
Report
(1880) 4 SCR 1
Judges
Ritchie, William Johnstone; Fournier, Télesphore; Henry, William Alexander; Taschereau, Henri-Elzéar; Gwynne, John Wellington
On appeal from
Federal Court of Appeal
Subjects
Civil procedure
Decision Content
Supreme Court of Canada
Chevrier v. The Queen (1880) 4 SCR 1
Date: 1880-03-01
Noe Chevrier
Appellant
And
Her Majesty The Queen
Respondent
1879: Feb. 8, 22; 1880: March 1.
Present—Ritchie, C. J., and Fournier, Henry, Taschereau and Gwynne, J. J.
ON APPEAL FROM THE EXCHEQUER COURT OF CANADA.
Petition of Right—Demurrer—9 Vic., c. 37—Right of the Crown to plead prescription—10 years prescription—Good faith—Translatory title—Judgment of confirmation—Inscription en faux—Improvements, claim for by incidental demand—Arts. 2211, 2251, 2206, C. C. (L. O.); Art. 473, C. P. C. (L. C)
N. C., the suppliant, by his petition of right, claimed, as representing the heirs of P. W. Jr., certain parcels of land originally granted by Letters Patent from the Crown, dated 5th January, 1806, to P. W. Senr., together with a sum of $200,000 for the rents, issues and profits derived therefrom by the Government since the illegal detention thereof.
The Crown pleaded to this petition of right—1st, by demurrer, defense au fonds en droit, alleging that the description of the limits and position of the property claimed was insufficient in law; 2nd, that the conclusions of the petition were insufficient and vague; 3rd, that in so far as respects the rents, issues, and profits, there had been no signification to the Government of the gifts or transfers made by the heirs to the suppliants.
These demurrers were dismissed by Strong, J., and it was Held, That the objection taken should have been pleaded by exception à la forme, pursuant to art. 116 C. C. P., and as the demurrer was to all the rents, issues and profits as well those before as those since the transfer, it was too large and should be dismissed, even supposing notification of the transfer necessary with respect to rents, issues and profits accrued previous to the sale to him by the heirs of P. W. Jr.
This judgment was not appealed against. As to the merits the defendant pleaded—1st. By pre-emptory exception, setting up title and possession in Her Majesty under divers deeds of sale and documents; 2nd. Prescription by 30, 20 and 10 years. An exception was also fyled, setting up that these transfers to petitioner by the heirs of P. W. Jr. were made without valid consideration, and that the rights alleged to have been acquired were disputable, droits litigieux. The general issue and a supplementary plea claiming value of improvements were also fyled.
To first of these exceptions the petitioner answered that the parties to the deeds of sale relied upon had no right of property in the land sold, and denied the legality and validity of the other documents relied upon, and inscribed en faux against a judgment of ratification of title to a part of the property rendered by the Superior Court for the district of Aylmer, P. Q. To the exception of prescription the petitioner answered, denying the allegations thereof, and more particularly the good faith of the defendant. To the supplementary plea, the petitioner alleged bad faith on the part of defendant. There were also general answers to all the pleas.
On the issues thus raised, the parties went to proof by an enquêle had before a Commissioner under authority of the Court, granted on motion, in accordance with the law of the Province of Quebec.
The case was argued in the Exchequer Court before J. T. Taschereau, J., and he dismissed the suppliant's petition of right with costs. Whereupon the suppliant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Held, (Fournier and Henry, J. J., dissenting.) 1. That before the Code, and also under the Code (art. 2211), the Crown had, under the laws in force in the Province of Quebec, the right to invoke prescription against a subject, which the latter could have interrupted by petition of right.
2. That in this case the Crown had purchased in good faith with translatory titles, and had, by ten years peaceable, open and uninterrupted possession, acquired an unimpeachable title.
3. That in relation to the Inscription en faux, the Art. 473 of the Code of Procedure is not so imperative as to render the judgment attacked an absolute nullity, it being registered in the Register of the Court.
4. That the petitioner was bound to have produced the minute, or draft of judgment attacked, but having only produced a certified copy of the judgment, the inscription against the judgment falls to the ground.
5. That even if S. O's title was un titre précaire, the heirs by their own acts ceded and abandoned to L. all their rights and pretensions to the land in dispute, and that the petitioner C. was bound by their acts.
Held, also, That the impenses claimed by the incidental demande of the Crown were payable by the petitioner, even if he had succeeded in his action.
Per H. E. Taschereau and Gwynne, J.J., That a deed, taken under 9 Vic., c. 37, sec. 17, before a notary (though not under the seal of the Commissioners) from a person in possession, which was subsequently confirmed by a judgment of ratification of a Superior Court, was a valid deed, that all rights of property were purged, and that if any of the auteurs of the petitioner failed to urge their rights on the monies deposited by reason of the customary dower, the ratification of the title was none the less valid.
Appeal from a judgment rendered by Mr. Justice J. T. Taschereau in the Exchequer Court of Canada, dismissing appellant's petition of right with costs.
The suppliant, as representing the heirs of one Philemon Wright Jr., by his petition of right, claimed from Her Majesty certain parcels of lands forming part of lots Nos. 2 and 3 in the 5th range of Hull, held by the Government of the Dominion of Canada, and including portion of the works, booms and canals, known as the Gatineau works, and demanded $200,000 for rents, issues and profits derived therefrom by the Government since their illegal detention thereof. The petition set up Letters Patent from the Crown to Philemon Wright Senr., a transfer from Philemon Wright Senr. to Philemon Wright Jr.; the marriage of Philemon Wright Jr. to Sally Olmstead without marriage contract; the death of Philemon Wright Jr., in Dec, 1821, leaving 8 children, issue of his marriage with Sally Olmstead; the right of dower in the widow, called customary dower, consisting in the usufruct for the wife and ownership for the children, after death of the husband, of the real estate held by Philemon Wright Jr., at the time of his marriage with Sally Olmstead; and the donations and transfers by the children of Philemon Wright Jr. to the suppliant, executed in favor of the suppliant after the death in 1871 of their mother, who, subsequent to the death of Philemon Wright Jr., had married one Nicholas Sparks.
The crown pleaded to this petition of right: 1st, by demurrer, defense en droit, because the petition failed to describe by a clear and intelligible description the limits and position of the lots in question, as in the possession of Her Majesty; and, also, because the petition was insufficient in law in so far as the petitioner had failed to allege any signification to Her Majesty of the deeds of gift or transfer in virtue of which he chimed the said property and said rents, issues and profits, which he estimated to amount to $200,000.
These demurrers were argued before Strong, J., and the following judgment was rendered, and was not appealed from:—
"The Court having heard the parties on the demurrers by the said defendant firstly, secondly and thirdly pleaded. Considering that as to the said demurrer in the cause firstly pleaded the objection thereby taken to the petition, should, pursuant to article 116 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Province of Quebec, have been taken and set forth by way of exception to the form of the petition, and not by way of demurrer. And considering further, that the position, boundaries and extent of the land of which the petitioner prays to be declared proprietor are set forth with sufficient certainty and particularity in the petition, doth dismiss the said demurrer first pleaded with costs, distraits to the Attorney for the said petitioner.
"And considering, with respect to the demurrer in this case by the said defendant secondly pleaded, that the said second demurrer is addressed to the whole of the petitioner's claim to the rents, issues and profits of the lands in the petition mentioned, and that by virtue of article 1,498 of the Civil Code of the Province of Quebec, the petitioner is entitled to recover so much of the said rents, issues and profits as have accrued since the sale and transfer to him the petitioner as alleged, without shewing any notice or signification to have been made of the said deeds of sale, and transfer to the Crown or its officers, whereby it appears that, assuming the pretention of the defendant to be right as regards the rents, issues and profits, accrued prior to the date of the said deeds of sale and transfer, the conclusion of the said second demurrer is too large, and covers a portion of the petitioner's conclusions in respect of which he is entitled to recover, doth dismiss the said demurrer secondly pleaded with costs, distraits to the Attorney for the petitioner.
"And as to the demurrer in this cause thirdly pleaded, considering that the grounds of the said demurrer are the same as those severally comprised in the first and second demurrers, for the reasons already given as to the first and second demurrers doth dismiss the said demurrer so thirdly pleaded with costs, distraits to the Attorney for the said petitioner."
As to the merits the defendant pleaded—1st. Prescription by 30 and 20 years; 2nd. Prescription by 10 years; 3rd. By exception, setting up title and possession in Her Majesty under divers deeds of sale and documents to the Crown, the deeds relied upon being a notarial deed from Sally Olmstead, 12th Sept., 1849, to Her Majesty, of 21 acres, 1 rood and 25 perches of the property claimed by suppliant; two notarial deeds by one Andrew Leamy et ux., dated respectively 27th March, 1854, and 7th May, 1855, of 65 acres and 2 perches of the property, and a deed of sale and quit claim, dated 3rd Feb., 1853, and registered after the fiat was granted, alleged to have been executed by some of the heirs in favor of Leamy; 4th. By exception, alleging that by 9 Vic., c. 37, the Commissioners of Public Works were authorized to take possession of the lands and water-courses necessary, in their judgment, for the construction of Public Works, and to contract and agree with all persons, guardians, tutors, &c., and all such contracts and agreements, and all conveyances and other instruments made in pursuance thereof, were declared to be valid and effectual to all intents and purposes whatever, and provision was thereby made for the payment of the compensation to be paid for such land and waters, to the owner and owners, occupier or occupiers thereof; that in conformity with said statute, and the law in force in that behalf, the said Commissioners of Public Works caused the said titles or conveyances to Her Majesty the Queen to be deposited with the Prothonotary of the Superior Court, in the District of Ottawa, said Court representing the Court of Queen's Bench, and fully complied with all and every the requirements of said statute and of law, in order to obtain the confirmation of said several deeds or conveyances; and that by judgments in due form of law, rendered in said Court, and now in full force and effect, the said titles and conveyance were confirmed and the claims of the persons under whom petitioner set up title were thereby barred.
An exception was also fyled, setting up that the donations to petitioner were made without legal and valid consideration, and by concert and collusion with the donors and with knowledge of the titles and possessions of the Crown, and that the rights alleged to have been acquired by the donations were uncertain, disputed, and disputable, droits litigieux. A defense en fait, or general issue, was also fyled.
The answers to the pleas of prescription denied that Her Majesty the Queen and her auteurs had been in possession, use and occupation of the land in said petition mentioned, peaceably, openly, uninterruptedly, and in good faith, and with good and sufficient title, and alleged specially that Sally Olmstead had no right to convey the property referred to, having only a usufruct; that the judgments of ratification could not affect the rights of the real owners; that the judgment of confirmation had been entered in the Register from a pretended draft of judgment illegally made, and signed by the Prothonotary, and was null and void; and that Leamy had only an usufructuary possession derived from Sally Olmstead.
A motion for an Inscription en faux was made by petitioner against the judgment of ratification of title and against the draft of the judgment, and also against the register in which the judgment was registered.
An incidental demande was put in on behalf of the Crown, setting up that improvements had been made on the property since the occupation by defendants, and that the value of these improvements should be set off pro tanto against any rents or revenues.
Issue was joined on this incidental demande, and an admission given as to certain improvements having been made. And the incidental demande came up for hearing with the merits of the case.
The other allegations of fact in the pleadings and the oral and documentary evidence given at the trial, sufficiently appear in the judgments hereinafter given.
The case was argued on the merits in the Exchequer Court before J. T. Taschereau, J., who delivered the following judgment:
"Le pétitionnaire réclame en cette cause contre Sa Majesté la Reine: "1o. La propriété d'une étendue de terre que Sa Majesté possède comme formant partie des Lots. 2 et 3, du 5e rang du township de Hull, en la Province de Québec;
"2o. Une somme de $200,000 comme fruits et revenus de cette étendue de terre qu'il allègue être illégalement détenue par le gouvernement de Sa Majesté.
"Le pétitionnaire fonde sa réclamation sur un grand nombre de titres, et notamment sur plusieurs actes de donation produits en cette cause comme émanant des héritiers de feu Philémon Wright, concessionnaire originaire de ces lots de terre en vertu de lettres patentes en date du 3 janvier 1806.
"Sa Majesté en réponse à cette pétition a plaidé:
"1o. Insuffisance dans la description de l'étendue et du site actuel des parties de lots de terre en question et comme possédés par Sa Majesté.
"2o. Insuffisance dans la pétition, en autant qu'elle n'allègue pas que le pétitionnaire ait signifié au gouvernement de Sa Majesté les divers actes de donation, cessions ou transports en vertu desquels il (le pétitionnaire) réclame la propriété des lots et les fruits et revenus qu'il estime à la somme de $200,000 et la propriété des dits lots de terre.
"3o. Par exception péremptoire en droit, Sa Majesté a plaidé prescription de 10 et 20 ans, et de plus celle de trente ans (30 ans).
"4o. Sa Majesté a invoqué au soutien de sa défense divers documents, entre autres:
"1o. Un acte de vente fait et passé pardevant Mtre. R. A. Young et confrère, notaires, le 7 mai, 1855, consenti par Andrew Leamy et Erexina Wright, son épouse, au gouvernement du Canada, contractant par la ministère de W. F. Coffin et Thomas McCord, Ecr., pour et au nom du Commissaire des Travaux Publics.
"2o, Un acte de ratification (dudit acte de vente), passé à Québec, devant Mtre. Petitclerc et confrère, notaires publics, le 19 mai, 1855, des deux lots de terre vendus à Sa Majesté par l'acte ci-dessus mentionné comme portant date 7 mai, 1855.
"3o. Que cet acte de vente du 7 mai, 1855, fut déposé au bureau du Protonotaire de la Cour Supérieure pour le District d'Ottawa, conformément à un statut de la Législature du Canada, 9 Vic. ch. 37, établissant les Travaux Publics et que cet acte a été confirmé par jugement de cette dite cour, prononcé le 3 juillet, 1856, et qu'en conséquence, en vertu des diverses sections du dit statut et du dit jugement, tout droit de propriété, hypothèque, droit de mineurs, et même douaire non ouvert, si aucuns existèrent, ont été purgés et entièrement éteints, quant aux immeubles acquis par le gouvernement de Sa Majesté.
"4o. Sa Majesté a également invoqué un titre de donation fait et passé à Hull, le 6 février, 1865, devant Larue et confrère, notaires, par lequel acte, Andrew Leamy et la dite Erexina Wright, vendirent au gouvernement de Sa Majesté, représenté par l'Honorable Charles Chapais, en sa qualité de Commissaire des Travaux Publics, un certain lot de terre y désigné et en a obtenu un jugement de confirmation aux mômes effets que celui ci dessus énoncé.
"5o. Sa Majesté a également invoqué en sa plaidoirie divers autres actes pour appuyer sa défense et elle en allègue l'enregistrement, conformément à la loi.
"La pétitionnaire Chevrier a répliqué, spécialement, que le jugement de confirmation du 3 juillet, 1856, par la Cour Supérieure du District d'Ottawa, était faux, et il s'est inscrit en faux contre cet acte et a plaidé mauvaise foi à l'encontre des différentes prescriptions invoquées par Sa Majesté, et a prétendu que les divers titres d'acquisition ci-dessus énumérés, n'étaient pas dans la forme prescrite par le 9 Vic. ch. 37, et qu'en conséquence Sa Majesté n'en pouvait tenir aucun avantage.
"Comme Ton voit, cette cause est très compliquée et soulève nombre de questions importantes. Et j'avoue que la plaidoirie orale des habiles avocats des parties m'a beaucoup aidé dans le délibéré. Je suivrai dans le cours de mes observations, autant que possible, l'ordre dans lequel les différents points de la demande et de la défense, m'ont été présentés.
"Insuffisance des allégations de la déclaration ou pétition.
"Le pétitionnaire dit que le gouvernement de Sa Majesté est actuellement en possession de 159 acres de terre, situés dans les Nos. 2 et 3, du 5e rang du Township de Hull, y compris un étang (a pond); il ne donne pas les tenants et aboutissants de ces 159 acres, ni l'étendue ou superficie de l'étang; cette irrégularité, si elle eût été plaidée par exception à la forme serait fatale et aurait indubitablement entraîné le renvoi de la pétition quant à présent et sauf à se pourvoir; mais Sa Majesté n'a pas plaidé par exception à la forme, mais bien par une défense ordinaire en droit. Tout l'effet de cette dernière défense a été de mettre le Requérant sur ses gardes, et s'il eût demandé à amender cette partie de sa petition ab initio, ou même pendant l'instance, je lui aurais accordé ce droit d'après la règle 57, Cour d'Echiquier, page 231 du Manuel de Mr. Cassels, mais le pétitionnaire n'en a rien fait, pas même lors de la plaidoirie devant moi. Aujourd'hui, si j'avais à prononcer en faveur du pétitionnaire, je ne pourrais savoir ni indiquer où se trouvent les 159 acres de terre en question, y compris le pond (étang), dans le 2 ete 3e rang, je ne sais où arrêter au nord comme au sud, à l'est comme à l'ouest. Je serais dans l'impossibilité de prononcer d'une manière certaine avec une base si incertaine. Pourrais-je même aujourd'hui renvoyer les parties à rectifier cette irrégularité? C'est possible, mais cet amendement n'obligerait-il pas le pétitionnaire à recommencer l'enquête ab initio après une plaidoirie nouvelle de la part de Sa Majesté, car je ne puis d'avance prévoiries conséquences d'un tel amendement sur la plaidoirie. Mais je crois qu'à cet étage de la cause le pétitionnaire n'a pas droit de demander à faire cet amendement: je considère que le droit d'amendement qu'accorde la règle 57, (page 281, Manuel Cassels), ne s'applique qu'au temps de l'instruction de la cause et non au temps de la plaidoirie (argument) de la cause, après que les parties l'ont terminé. D'ailleurs le requérant n'a fait aucune demande de permission, ce qui met fin à la question.
"Ainsi, en supposant pour un instant que sur tous les autres points, je serais convaincu de la légalité des pétitions du pétitionnaire, je suis d'opinion qu'il devait faillir relativement à cette irrégularité à laquelle il n'a pas voulu y remédier et qui a pour effet de rendre impossible un jugement en sa faveur.
"Sa Majesté a plaidé que le pétitionnaire n'est pas saisi d'un droit d'action contre elle, tant pour la propriété réclamée que pour les fruits et revenus au montant de $200,000, parce qu'il n'a pas signifié à Sa Majesté avant de produire sa pétition de droit, ni en aucun temps depuis, les actes de donation sur lesquels il fonde cette pétition. C'est un principe incontestable d'après le Code Civil, que le cessionnaire de droits de créances et de droits d'actions n'a pas de possession utile à rencontre des tiers tant que l'acte de vente n'a pas été signifié et qu'il n'en a pas été délivré copie au débiteur. De fait il n'est pas saisi du droit d'action, il ne peut poursuivre sans avoir au préalable effectué cette signification, son droit n'est pas né et n'existera que lors de cette signification des transports, ou donations, qu'il tient des prétendus héritiers, ou représentants, de feu Philémon Wright. "Les décisions de nos plus hauts tribunaux sont en ce sens, surtout depuis les articles 1570, 1571 du Code Civil Canadien.
"Les articles 1689 et 1690 du Code Napoléon dont la rédaction est en termes équivalents à ceux de notre Code Civil Canadien, et M. Troplong en son traité de la vente, No. 909, démontre que les actions, même de droits immobiliers, ne peuvent être cédées qu'à la charge d'une signification du titre de cession.
"Mr. Toullier, Vol. 17, continuation de Duvergier, page 215, No. 18, énonce cette même doctrine, même quant aux cessions de droits d'actions immobiliers. Telle est la loi, surtout en la Province de Québec, depuis le Code Civil Canadien.
"Il n'y a aucun doute que les actes de donation, ou cession, que lui ont faits les représentants Wright ne contiennent;—
1o. Qu'un transport de fruits et revenus;
2o. Qu'une cession de droits d'action pour recouvrer ces fruits et de droit d'action contre Sa Majesté pour recouvrer certains immeubles. Or, tout cela est transport de droits d'action, exigeant signification au débiteur pour que le cessionnaire en soit légalement saisi et puisse les exercer en justice.
"Le pétitionnaire prétend que le titre principal que Sa Majesté invoque, et cité en sa défense comme vente par Andrew Leamy et Erexina Wright, son épouse, exécuté le 7 mai, 1855, par-devant Young et collègue, est nul et ne peut produire les effets que Sa Majesté prétend en résulter.
"Cet acte d'acquisition est évidemment basé sur la 9 Vic. ch. 37, et le pétitionnaire invoque la section 17 de cet acte comme contraire à la validité de ce contrat, sur le principe que cet acte n'a pas été exécuté sous le seing du commissaire. Cet acte n'est pas un écrit sous seing privé; il a été exécuté en première instance par-devant notaires, entre Messieurs W. F. Coffin et T. McCord, comme se portant fort du commissaire-en-chef, et promettant de le faire ratifier par acte de mai, 1855, passé à Québec par-devant Mtre. Jos. Petitclerc et collègue, notaires, et aussi contresigné par Thomas Begley, Secrétaire du Bureau des Travaux Publics. Le pétitionnaire prétend que cet acte est nul parce qu'il n'a pas été scellé du sceau du Commissaire, mais il me semble que le seul objet de cette section 17 de la 9 Vic. ch 37, exigeant le sceau du Commissaire, était pour éviter toute erreur sur l'interprétation à donner à aucun écrit sous seing privé du Commissaire, comme une lettre que l'on pouvait, ou voudrait, interpréter comme un contrat liant le gouvernement.
"Indubitablement la législature ne pouvait avoir en vue de prohiber comme contrat l'acte le plus solennel en la Province de Québec, savoir celui reçu et exécuté par des officiers publics aussi bien connus que les notaires publics. Il me semble que le fait seul d'exécuter de tels actes par-devant des notaires publics, leur donne un caractère d'authenticité beaucoup plus prononcé que s'ils étaient passés sous seing privé, quoique revêtus du sceau du commissaire. Je considère cette section 17 comme suggestion d'un mode de contrat, mais non exclusive de toute autre manière de contracter suivant les lois de la Province de Québec. De plus, on voit à la section 8 de cet acte 9 Vic., ch. 37, que l'emploi des actes passés par-devant des notaires est admis comme valable. Cette section 8 dèclare que ces contrats notariés seront exemptés de la formalité de l'enregistrement, admettant évidemment, la forme du contrat notarié. Cet acte de vente et ceux de même nature que Sa Majesté a invoqué dans sa défense ont du être soumis au procureur général et être approuvés par lui, puisque les applications pour leur confirmation ont été faites en son nom pour Sa Majesté la Reine, et j'avoue que je trouve en ces circonstances une haute autorité à l'appui de la légalité des titres en question en cette cause, et notamment de celui du 7 mai, 1855.
"De plus, ces titres ont été approuvés par le tribunal de la Cour Supérieure, qui les a confirmés, et personne ne s'en est plaint, que plus de vingt ans après, et cette plainte vient de la part d'un acquéreur de droits litigieux. Ces actes me paraissent parfaitement légaux, et il ne me reste sur cette branche de la cause qu'à considérer l'effet qu'ils pourraient légalement produire vis-à-vis des auteurs du pétitionnaire.
La Législature par son statut, 9 Vic., ch. 37, a décrété emphatiquement que de tels actes suivis d'un jugement de confirmation par la Cour Supérieure écarterait à toujours en faveur de Sa Majesté toute réclamation hypothécaire, tout droit de propriété quelconque, même le douaire non-ouvert, laissant aux créanciers, ou propriétaires du fonds, à faire valoir et exercer leurs droits sur le prix de vente déposé entre les mains du Protonotaire de la Cour Supérieure. Tout ceci a eu lieu. Cette législation peut paraître exorbitante de prime abord, mais elle est sage et conforme aux exigences du service public qui ne doit pas souffrir des délais. Si les auteurs du pétitionnaire n'ont pas jugé à propos de se présenter pour recevoir leur créances comme représentant le douaire coutumier, ils n'ont qu'eux-mêmes à blâmer. Mais à ce propos je vois que Mr. Andrew Leamy et son épouse, Erexina Wright, les vendeurs, ont reçu sur la distribution des deniers du prix de vente une somme de £933 2s. 4d., et je remarque dans le dossier de la cause qu'il se trouve nombre de documents sous forme de transports, ou cessions, (quitclaims) par les héritiers Philémon Wright, à Mr. A. Leamy, constatant que Leamy et son épouse étaient aux droits de ces héritiers, ou représentants, Philémon Wright, ce qui expliquerait probablement l'esprit de libéralité avec lequel ils ont fait donation sans garantie au pétitionnaire de ces prétendus droits ou réclamations qui, pour une cause ou une autre étaient sortis de leurs mains. Je remarque aussi qu'un autre créancier, John O'Meara, a reçu £430 14s. 2d. et que plusieurs des héritiers, ou représentants légaux de feu Philémon Wright, qui étaient parties opposantes à la confirmation du titre de Sa Majesté, du 7 mai, 1855, ont retiré leur opposition. Si les autres intéressés ne se sont pas présentés pour recevoir leur part du douaire, ils n'ont qu'eux seuls à blâmer et leurs droits sont à jamais perdus, si le jugement de confirmation du titre de Sa Majesté et de la distribution des deniers n'est pas déclaré faux, tel que le pétitionnaire le demande en cette cause.
"En abordant cette branche de la cause qui se rapporte à l'inscription de faux que le pétitionnaire a formulée contre le jugement du 3 juillet, 1856, disons de suite, que le moyen principal du pétitionnaire, et en réalité le seul qu'il puisse invoquer est celui tiré du fait que le projet (draft) ou minute de ce jugement n'est pas paraphé par le ou les deux juges qui l'ont prononcé, car du reste le dossier de la cause est complet, le jugement incriminé est entré au dossier, il a été réguliérement enregistré au bureau d'enregistrement du comté d'Ottawa 14 jours après sa reddition, et ce dans le livre B, Vol. 6, p. 554, sous No. 416, sous le certificat du régistrateur, lequel certificat n'est pas attaqué, et ce n'est que vingt ans après tout cela, que l'on se réveille pour contester l'authenticité de ce jugement. J'ai dit que le régistre de la Cour Supérieure constate toute la procédure de la cause et même l'entrée du jugement, mais il semblerait que cette entrée n'aurait été faite que longtemps après. Je dirai même que le régistre a été tenu avec une négligence bien regrettable, quoique toute la procédure y soit complétement entrée depuis le dépôt de l'acte de vente jusqu'au jugement final. Il ne manque donc que la paraphe du juge sur la minute, et ici s'élève la question de savoir si l'article 473 du Code de Procédure du Bas-Canada est tellement impératif que la cour y doive trouver une cause de nullité insurmontable, s'il n'est pas observe à la lettre? Je ne le crois pas, à moins que l'article le prononce en termes formels. Cet article est, suivant moi, suggestif plutôt qu'impératif. Le juge ou le greffier par suite de cette négligence peuvent être blâmés, et même condamnés à des dommages sérieux, à défaut par l'un d'avoir paraphé la minute, et par l'autre d'avoir entré au régistre un jugement dont le juge n'a pas paraphé la minute. Dire que le plaideur souffrira de la négligence d'un officier public au point d'en être ruiné, et ce soit par l'oubli ou négligence, c'est ce que je ne puis admettre, surtout dans un cas comme celui-ci, où il ne manque que cette paraphe et que le dossier est régulier et constaté par son enregistrement au bureau du régistrateur du district d'Ottawa. M. Poncet, 1er vol. Traité des Jugements, pages 228, 229, 230 et suivantes, traite cette question en maître, et je suis heureux de le trouver de mon opinion. Sans doute la loi est stricte et elle doit l'être, mais son caractère principal est celui de l'équité et de la justice, et je le demanderai à tout esprit impartial, dans un cas comme celui qui nous occupe, pourrait-on légalement ruiner un simple individu par suite d'une telle omission. Je dis non avec toute confiance.
"Le pétitionnaire Chevrier a beaucoup insisté sur le fait que la minute du jugement (draft of judgment) n'a pas été signée ou paraphée par le ou les juges qui l'ont prononcé le 3 juillet, 1856, mais la preuve de cette omission me paraît insuffisante.
"En effet ce document (la minute), produit sous le No. 26 des exhibits de Sa Majesté, n'est pas paraphé par le juge, mais le pétitionnaire aurait dû noter que ce document No. 26 n'est qu'une copie du projet (draft of judgment) puisqu'elle est ainsi produite et certifiée comme telle copie. Le pétitionnaire aurait dû faire produire la minute elle-même; ce n'est que contre une copie qu'ils s'est inscrit en faux; et pour réussir dans la preuve de son faux il aurait dû demander à la cour d'ordonner aux avocats de Sa Majesté de produire la minute même. C'est une mesure de toute nécessité qu'il aurait dû prendre, et à défaut son inscription de faux dirigée contre la minute doit être renvoyée. Il aurait pu à cet égard examiner le greffier de la Cour Supérieure du District d'Ottawa, lequel vit encore, et qui aurait pu produire la minute ou jetter sur la matière quelques nouvelles lumières. Sa Majesté, ni ceux qui la défendent aujourd'hui, se trouvant sur la défensive, n'avaient rien à produire, leur position était celle de la défensive. Je considére cette objection comme insurmontable et comme mettant fin à l'inscription de faux, quant à ce qui concerne la minute, car cette minute n'a pas vu le jour sous cette inscription. La minute n'étant pas produite, l'inscription contre elle tombe, et par contre-coup celle contre la copie du jugement entrée au registre doit éprouver le même sort, puisqu'en réalité la seule chose que l'on pût reprocher au jugement consistait en l'absence de la paraphe du juge sur la minute et qui n'est pas nécessaire sur la copie du jugement tirée du régistre. Cette objection peut paraître futile; je la considère pour le moins aussi importante que celle de l'omission de la paraphe du juge sur la minute d'un jugement entré au régistre, accompagné de toutes les autres formalités de la reddition d'un jugement, suivi de l'enregistrement de ce jugement et de plus de vingt ans de possession sans trouble, si ce n'est celui que lui cause le pétitionaire qui ne se présente ici que comme acquéreur de droits litigieux, qualité que les tribunaux ont mission de ne pas accueillir aveuglément. "Suivant les prétentions du pétitionnaire, le jugement qu'il attaque n'aurait jamais été prononcé, il serait un faux, mais il ne peut nier que la cause dans laquelle ce jugement est allégué avoir été prononcé a existé et il existe encore; le greffier actuel le dit, et l'a prouvé clairement, or je me demande, quelle serait la conséquence d'un jugement que je rendrais aujourd'hui, ou que tout tribunal, en appel par exemple, et que maintiendrait l'inscription de faux contre le jugement de confirmation? Serait-ce de donner gain de cause au pétitionnaire sur tous les points et de faire condamner Sa Majesté à l'indemniser? Non, indubitablement, si ce n'est quant aux frais de l'inscription et à la déclaration du faux du jugement. Je ne pourrais condamner Sa Majesté à remettre les terres réclamées au pétitionnaire. La seule conséquence serait que la cause serait reportée à l'état où elle était avant le jugement du 3 juillet, 1856. Le dossier de cette cause, dans la quelle la demande de ratification a eu lieu au nom de Sa Majesté, est encore en existence, et son instance n'a pas été affectée par la péremption, et si aujourd'hui le jugement était déclaré faux la cause pourrait être continuée jusqu'à jugement final sur nouvelle demande, ou application, que Sa Majesté ferait d'un plaidoyer depuis darien-continuance, et alors Sa Majesté pourrait faire suivre ce plaidoyer d'un jugement dont on aurait soin de ne plus oublier la paraphe sur la minute.
"Je crois que je pourrais me dispenser de tout commentaire ultérieur, vu que les divers titres de propriété en cette cause suivis de leur ratification en justice, comme je l'ai déjà fait remarquer, assurent à Sa Majesté un droit incontestable à la propriété de ses divers terrains, mais comme les parties en cette cause ont traité la question de prescription, je dois en dire quelques mots.
"Je dirai d'abord que la couronne comme tout individu peut prescrire. L'article 2211 du Code Civil Canadien le déclare en termes formels, et de plus consacre ce droit comme ancien, en ces termes:
"Le Souverain peut user de la prescription. Le moyen qu'à le sujet pour l'interrompre est la pétition de droit outre les cas où la loi donne un autre remède.
"La Législature, en adoptant cet article comme droit ancien, a tranché une question qui a pu être douteuse, mais qui se trouve définitivement réglée aujourd'hui.
"D'abord, quant à la prescription de dix ans, il est incontestable que Sa Majesté ayant été de bonne foi dès le moment de ses diverses acquisitions dont elle ignorait les vices, si toutefois ces vices existèrent, a par l'espace de dix ans à compter des diverses dates de ses titres d'acquisition, à l'encontre du prétendu douaire coutumier de Sally Olmstead, dont le mari est mort le 28 novembre, 1812, époque à laquelle le douaire s'est ouvert quant à la mère et aux enfants, avec cette différence que la prescription contre la mère a couru à compter du décès de son mari, et contre les enfants à compter de leur majorité, même du vivant de leur mère, suivant l'article 1449 du Code Civil Canadien. Or tous ces enfants étaient majeurs depuis plus de dix ans à l'époque des acquisitions de Sa Majesté des terrains en question en cette cause.
"S'il existait un vice dans la possession de Sa Majesté il ne lui a pas été dénoncé par interpellation judiciaire (ou pétition de droits) conformément à l'article 412 du Code Civil Canadien qui règle cette question comme ancien droit: 'Le possesseur est de bonne foi lorsqu'il possède en vertu d'un tître dont il ignore les vices ou l'avènement de la cause résolutoire qui y met fin. Cette bonne foi ne cesse néanmoins que du moment où ces vices ou cette cause lui sont dénoncés par interpellation judiciaire.' L'Honorable Juge Loranger a admis ce principe dans la cause de Lepage vs. Chartier[1], savoir, que pour prescrire par dix ans contre un douaire et faire les fruits siens il suffit que le tiers acquéreur ait été de bonne foi au moment de son acquisition, et que la connaissance subséquente du vice de son titre ou de celui de son prédécesseur ne peut lui préjudicier. Je ne vois rien au dossier de cette cause pour me faire croire un instant à la mauvaise foi du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté, au moins à l'époque de la passation des divers actes d'acquisition que Sa Majesté invoque en cette cause. Inutile de remarquer ici que la plaidorie en cette cause de la part de Sa Majesté n'énonce pas que cette possession de dix ans avec titres ait été entre présents et non-absents, car c'était matière d'exception chez le pétitionnaire, le principe étant que dans ces cas la preuve de l'absence incombe à l'excipient. Je crois également que Sa Majesté a prouvé son plaidoyer de prescription de trente ans. En effet elle possède les terrains en litige en vertu d'acquisition à titres singuliers, elle peut invoquer sa possession en vertu de ses titres, ce qui lui donne vingt-six ans de possession, et elle peut y joindre celle d'Andrew Leamy et Erexina Wright, qui a été d'environ trois ans, et celle de Madame Sparks elle-même. On a prétendu que le tître de Madame Sparks était précaire et sa possession infectée de ce vice et ne pouvait servir à Sa Majesté pour compléter, environ deux ans manquant pour accomplir les 30 ans de prescription.
"Je suis porté à croire que le titre de Madame Sparks en est un non-attaché de précarité, je l'interprète comme un arrangement de famile entre elle et ses enfants, par lequel cette femme, Sally Olmstead, a renoncé à son droit à un douaire sur une étendue de plus de 591 acres sur lesquels elle pourrait réclamer 295 acres en usufruit pour s'en tenir à la propriété pleine et entière de 159 acres, plus l'étang (pond) dont il est ci-devant question, et qu'elle vend le 29 septembre, 1853, comme à elle appartenant, suivant l'acte exécuté par-devant R. A. Young et confrère, notaires, à Aylmer. Le fait que cette vente ait été faite sans autre garantie que celle de ses faits et promesses, ne milite pas contre les droits de la couronne: elle a usé de ces 159 acres de terre comme à elle appartenant, et elle pourrait les vendre ainsi après les avoir possédés depuis le partage ou arrangement de famille du 5 mars, 1838, ce qui donnerait à Sa Majesté le bénéfice d'une prescription trentenaire plus six ans.
"En supposant pour un instant que le titre de Madame Sparks fût précaire, ce que je ne crois pas, les héritiers de Philémon Wright et de Madame Sparks ont effectué en faveur de M. Leamy dès 1836 et 1838, des cessions et abandons de tous leurs droits et prétentions aux terrains réclamés en cette cause, et en ce moment leur cessionnaire en ayant cause, M. Chevrier, est lié par les actes de ses auteurs et prédécesseurs et surtout par les déclarations et désistements (quit-claims) des prétendus douariers représentés par M. Chevrier; ces actes de désistement (quit-claims) constituent une rénonciation au douaire de leur mère.
"La rédaction de ces actes de désistement, rénonciations et quit-claims, peut laisser quelque chose à désirer, mais ce qu'il y a de bien certain en ces actes c'est l'intention d'abandonner à M. Leamy et à ses successeurs tous les droits et prétentions qu'ils pouvaient avoir à aucun titre sur les terrains en question en cette cause,
"Maintenant, le grand nombre de ces enfants, petits-enfants, ou représentants de Philémon Wright ont-ils prouvé leur généalogie, ou même droits successifs? C'est une question tres-problématique et dans la discussion de laquelle il vaut mieux ne pas entrer, et ce dans l'intérêt de ces enfants. "Je passe par-dessus nombre de questions d'assez faible intérêt, croyant en avoir déjà dit assez pour motiver le renvoi de la pétition; cependant je signalerai une autre seule difficulté que le pétitionnaire aurait à surmonter: elle n'a pas été signalée par la défense, mais que je me considère tenu d'indiquer ici, vu qu'elle est très-sérieuse et que si le jugement que je vais prononcer était porté en appel, comme j'ai tout lieu de croire qu'il le sera, l'objection pourrait y être soulevée et le requérant pris par suprise. Cette difficulté vient de ce que le pétitionnaire n'a pas prouvé ou même essayé de prouver l'enregistrement des droits de succession des descendants dans les immeubles en question. Cette formalité est essentielle et formellement requise par l'article 2098 du Code Civil Canadien qui énonce: 'Que la transmission par succession doit être enregistrée au moyen d'une déclaration énoncant le nom de l'héritier, son degré de parenté avec le défunt, le nom de ce dernier et la date de son décès, et enfin la désignation de l'immeuble, et que jusqu'à ce que l'enregistrement du droit de l'acquéreur ait lieu, l'enregistrement de toute cession, transport, hypothèque en droit par lui consenti affectant l'immeuble est sans effet.'
"Ainsi les cédants ou donateurs de M. Chevrier, n'ayant jamais fait enregistrer leurs droits successifs tel que requis par cette article, ils n'en étaient pas légalement saisis de maniére à céder à M. Chevrier ces mêmes droits; M. Chevrier n'a donc qu'un vain titre à ces propriétés, il ne pouvait les réclamer sans montrer que les donateurs s'étaient soumis à cette forme de transmission par succession impérativement exigée par cet article 2098 du Code Civil Canadien. M. Chevrier n'a donc qu'un titre sans effet, il ne peut donc pas espérer un jugement favorable.
"Disons de suite à propos des fruits et revenus de ces terrains au montant de $200,000 que M. Chevrier réclame, que supposant pour un instant que Sa Majesté dût être condamnée à remettre à M. Chevrier ces terrains, Sa Majesté ne pouvait être condamnée à les payer, vu que Sa Majesté a possédé en vertu de bons titres, justes titres et de bonne foi depuis le moment de ses acquisitions de ces terrains, car suivant l'article 412, ayant un titre valable, en ignorant les vices, surtout au moment de ses acquisitions, elle a fait les fruits siens et ne peut être condamnée à les remettre.
"Et quant aux impenses que Sa Majesté a réclamées à un montant trés-élevé, elle devrait dans tous les cas lui être payées par le pétitionnaire, dans le cas ou il aurait réussi à établir ses droits aux terrains en question. Le renvoi pur et simple de la pétition me semble être une conséquence inévitable des objections que j'ai indiquées dans les pages précédentes, et en conséquence je renvoie la pétition de droit de M. Chevrier et je le condamne à payer les dépenses encourues par Sa Majesté sur la défense en cette cause."
From this judgment the suppliant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Mr. Fleming for appellants:
The defendant demurred to the petition on the ground of insufficiency of the description of the property, and want of notification to the Government of the transfer of the rights of the heirs to the suppliant. These demurrers were all dismissed by Strong, J. This judgment is sound in law. See arts. 116, 119 and 52 C. P. C. L. C., Pothier Procédure Civile[2], Pigeon Procédure Civile[3]; Cameron v. O'Neill[4]; C. C. L. C. art. 1570 and 1571; Code Nap. art. 1689, 1690; Laurent Code Civil[5].
Moreover, Mr. Justice Strong's judgment has not been appealed against by way of a cross appeal, and it therefore remains in force.
The first plea relied on by respondent is that of thirty years' prescription. To complete the time of this prescription, the defendant has to join the possession of Leamy and Mrs. Sparks. Now, the possession of Mrs. Sparks was that of a dowager, douairiere, only, and she could not prescribe against her title, and Leamy having only acquired the usufruct could not prescribe either, and consequently there was no prescription during their occupation of which the Crown might avail itself, and its own possession was too short.
The quit claims produced show nothing contradictory of the property being held by Sally Olmstead, as dower. With respect to her share the expression is "allotted to her use." Now, this exactly coincides with the rights of a dowager—which is the use or enjoyment of the property subject to dower.
Had the quit claims simply said "allotted to Olmstead," there would be nothing contradictary to the right of dower, it would be merely an omission of the mention of the title by which that portion was to be held, and consequently the character of the title must be held to be in accordance with the rights of the person to whom it was allotted; if an heir, then she would hold as heir; if it had been community property, then as commune; if left to her by will, then as legatee; but as no other title than that of dowager is shewn, then the allottment must be considered to have been made to her; according to her only apparent rights, viz.: that of dowager.
That it was given to her in any other way is moreover contradicted by her own statement in the deed of the 7th December, 1852, by which she sells to Leamy her right of dower on the property.
The next point I will take up has reference to the title which Her Majesty got through the Commissioners of Public Works under 9 Vic., ch. 37.
The defendant, by exception, sets up the sale by Leamy and wife to Her Majesty, represented by the Commissioner of Public Works, before Young & Colleague, notaries public, on the 7th of April, 1855, purporting to convey the land in question in this case, along with other pieces, and also a deed of donation of the 6th February, 1865, by which A. Leamy and wife made a donation to the Crown of a certain piece of land forming part of lots Nos. 2 and 3 in the 5th concession of Hull, and two judgments of confirmation of these deeds, one rendered on the 3rd July, 1856, and duly registered in the registry office for the county of Ottawa, and the other on the 14th February, 1866, and also duly registered, and that these judgments, rendered under the provisions of the 9th Vic., ch. 37, sec. 9, forever barred all rights of property in the land mentioned in the deed thereby confirmed.
First the suppliant submits that the title in itself is not in the form required by the statute 9th Vic., ch. 37, sec. 17; to render it valid the deed must be signed by the Commissioner, countersigned by the Secretary, under the seal of the Commissioners, "and no other deed shall be held to be the act of the Commissioners."
Then also Leamy does not come within the category of persons mentioned in the Act, and thereby authorized to convey property not their own—viz.; tutors, curators, administrators, and others holding a representative character: the Act shows the confirmation could only be applied for with respect to contracts made either with the persons above mentioned, or persons holding as proprietors; whereas Leamy was not one of the class enumerated in the Act, and held only as usufructuary, not as proprietor, and the property was not dealt with as belonging to an unknown proprietor. Moreover, the judgment of confirmation was only authorized by the Act with respect to lands which could have been expropriated, to wit, to such portions of the lands which were included in plans submitted by the Commissioners to the Legislature, and approved of, as the Commissioners might deem necessary for the construction of public works.
Until the Legislature had thus authorized the construction of a public work and designated the site of it, the Commissioners were destitute of authority to expropriate, and consequently could not ask for or obtain a valid judgment of confirmation, and there was no evidence, nor even any allegation, that such plan had ever been submitted to, or approved of by the Legislature.
Upon this point the appellant cited the following authorities:—Abbott on Corporations[6]; Green's Brice ultra vires[7]; Pothier Vente[8]; Guyot, Repertoire de Jur.[9]; Potter's Dwarris on Stats.[10]
Supposing, however, that the deed was not so absolutely null as to be unsusceptible of ratification, still it is not a title of which Her Majesty can be presumed to have any knowledge.
Her Majesty is presumed to be cognizant of all acts legally performed by her agents acting within the scope of their authority, and of no others.
But in this case, as it has been clearly shown, the deed itself was illegal and a contract ultra vires, and consequently Her Majesty cannot be reputed cognizant of it. See Pothier, Prescription[11].
Her Majesty's commissioners must therefore be considered as holding possession by virtue of the law which allowed them to take possession without a title, rather than under a title which is null. This proposition is almost self-evident, and hardly needs authorities to support it. See Dunod, Prescription[12].
The next proposition which the appellant will submit is that until the Civil Code was passed there was no petition of right in the Province of Quebec by which a subject could interrupt prescription.
[TASCHEREAU, J.: The Privy Council have declared that the Code has the effect of a declaratory law as to what was the old law.]
I think I will be able to show that the Court has the right to say what was the law previous to the Code; that is only a matter of opinion. I will admit that theoretically the petition of right has always existed, but there was no machinery in existence; and even up to this day in the Province of Quebec, bills providing for such machinery have always been rejected by the Legislature. Then when you cannot bring an action contra non valentem agere nulla currit prescriptio.
As to the prescription of ten years the appellant contends that the Crown, in order to avail itself of this prescription, should have held the property under a just title, in good faith, openly and publicly as proprietor. The good faith required is a belief that the party from whom the property was acquired was the real proprietor of it; the just title is a title which would be a valid transfer, if the person making it was the legal proprietor. In this case, the title set up from the Crown, not being under seal as was required by the Act 37 Vic., chap. 37, sec. 17, which provides that these deeds shall be so executed, and that no others shall be held to be the act of the Commissioners, was null, and consequently could not be the base of prescription. Moreover, the agents of the Crown were aware of the defect in Leamy's title, as is proved in the first place by the letter of Mr. Merrill, Superintendent of Public Works, Ottawa, to Thomas Begley, Secretary of Board of Works, under date of the 16th April, 1853, in which he states Leamy has only a right of dower on part of the property, and gives the names of the heirs of Philemon Wright as proprietors; 2nd, by the deed of 4th April, 1855, from Leamy to Commissioners, in which it is stated that difficulties may arise respecting his title, and security is exacted from him; Thirdly, by the correspondence between the officers of the Department of Public Works here and at Quebec, in which it is repeatedly stated that with respect to that part part of the property which Leamy obtained from Sally Olmstead, he had only a life interest.
The third plea of prescription, viz., twenty years, is merely that of ten years applied to absentees—it is open to the same objection as those urged against that of ten years, and it is therefore unnecessary to discuss it.
The Crown is not accused of being a trespasser, it is merely contended that the Crown took possession with the consent of Leamy, who had a right to hold or transfer possession during the lifetime of Mrs. Sparks.
The Crown subsequently got from Leamy and wife what its agents supposed to be a valid title, during Mrs. Sparks' lifetime. In reality, the Crown holds without a title.
As the agents of the Crown were aware that Leamy's title would expire at Mrs. Sparks' death, they knew they could not legally hold the property after that date; the Crown is consequently bound to account for the rents, issues and profits from that date.
The fifth exception sets up the deed of 1849 from Nicholas Sparks and wife to the Crown; deeds of 1855 from Leamy and wife to the Crown; alleges that Her Majesty was in possession under these deeds, and that donations to petitioners were made collusively with intent to defraud Her Majesty, of whose titles the parties thereto were well aware. With respect to this plea, I cannot see how the donations could injure Her Majesty, as the petitioner claimed no greater rights than the parties from whom they held, and, consequently, it made no difference to Her Majesty whether these rights were urged by the petitioner or by the heirs.
The petitioner expressly denies the execution of the alleged sale by the four heirs of Philemon Wright Jr., in February, 1853, impugning it as a forgery.
The document in question was never produced, nor registered when Leamy's title was questioned by the agent of the Crown, and if it had been genuine Leamy would surely have then produced it.
One of the subscribing witnesses was dead, and the other, being examined, said he did not know whether he was present at the execution of it or not, or whether it ever was executed by the alleged parties to it. Moreover, two of these parties, Philemon Wright and Sally Wright swore positively that they never signed it; of the other two, one was dead, and the fourth, Mrs. Leamy, could not be affected by it, as she could not contract with Leamy, her husband.
By the seventh exception the defendant alleged that the rights transferred to petitioner were litigious, and prayed that the petition should be dismissed.
The petitioner contends that the rights are not litigious, that, even supposing they were, the defendant could only ask to be subrogated in the right of the petitioner, paying all cost and charges, and, consequently, the conclusion of this exception was wrong, and moreover, this plea should have been urged in limine litis, and could not be pleaded as a subsidiary plea.
I will now take up the inscription en faux:
The petitioner inscribed en faux against the copy of the alleged judgment of confirmation of title of the 3rd July, 1856, and against the register from which the said judgment was copied, and the pretended draft of judgment, all of which he said were false, no such judgment having ever been rendered.
On this issue the parties went to proof, and it was established: that according to the entries in the minute book the case had been inscribed for hearing in law on the 1st July, 1856; that it never was inscribed for hearing on the merits; that no judgment had ever been rendered; that according to the judge's diary, the last proceeding in the Court was the hearing on law, on which the case was taken en delibéré. With respect to the book called a register, it was shown that it was never seen by the prothonotary until four years after his appointment; it was delivered to him by the former prothonotary, who, in the interval, had been entering up judgments.
The only draft of judgment to be found in the record was produced by the present prothonotary; and was not paraphed by the judge by whom it purported to be rendered.
The initials or paraph of the judge on draft is the only legal evidence of the rendering of the judgment.
Now, even supposing other evidence could have been adduced to show that a judgment had been rendered in this case, no evidence has been brought by the other side, for the sham register, being a book, made up out of the office of the Prothonotary, by a person having no authority to keep a register, can have no more probative effect than if they had fyled a copy of Scott's Waverly Novels.
On the necessity of the signature of the Judge, and its necessity to establish the rendering of a judgment, the following authorities were cited:—Code of Civil Procedure, art. 473 and art. 474; Ordinance 1667, Titre 26, art. 5; Code de Procédure Napoléon, art. 138; Denizart Vo. Minute[13]; Bonnier Procédure Civile[14]. The ordinance of 1667, title 26, art. 6, abolished the formality of the pronunciation of judgment, but maintained the dictum which was also called the arrêté.
But in Canada the Courts have not observed the rule with respect to the dictum, and the only record recognized by law and the jurisprudence of the Courts has been for many years the minute or draft paraphed by the Judge and the transcript or copy of that minute entered in the register.
It is the duty of a Judge, when a judgment has been rendered, to sign or paraph the draft. The presumption of the law is that the Judge performs his duty; consequently, if the draft is not paraphed, that no judgment has been rendered. To controvert this presumption the strongest evidence would be required. But so far from this being the case, the other original registers of the Court, namely, the "Rôle de Droit," minute-book and diary, all show that not only was no judgment rendered, but that the case was not even inscribed for final hearing.
Now all these books are recognized registers of the Court (vide Rules of Practice, S. C. No. 50), and, as such, authentic, and entitled to more credit than the register of judgments, as they are originals, whereas the latter is only a transcript. Where, then, is the proof of the rendering of the judgment?
Mr. Laflamme, Q. C., followed on behalf of the appellant:—
As to the want of signification, the various French authors show that the objection could only be urged by a person prejudiced by not having been notified, and that in this case the defendant did not even pretend to have suffered, or to be liable to suffer any prejudice thereby.
Moreover, the formal notice or signification required by the law of the Province of Quebec could not be carried out in this Province; substantially, notice has been given by the submission of the petition, and the documents on which it was based, by Her Majesty's Attorney General, and the sufficiency of that notice has been admitted by the fiat of the Administrator of the Government thereon.
The learned counsel referred on this point to Troplong De la Vente[15]; Marcadé[16]; Duvergier[17].
Then as to prescription:
The title deed relied upon principally by the Crown is that of the 7th May, 1855. We contend that this deed was not at the time of its execution a perfect deed, and therefore cannot be relied on for prescription. By the Act creating this corporation the commissioners are obliged to affix their seals to all documents, writings, &c. We do not say they could not execute a deed before a notary, but that they should comply with the requirements of the 17th sec. of 9th Vic., c. 37, in notarial deeds as well as in other writings. Analogous provisions exist in the law of the Province of Quebec, viz.: Donations, if not executed before notaries, were an absolute nullity and produced no effect whatever. Then, could the Crown prescribe until this petition of right Act was passed. If subjects had the right of interrupting prescription by petition of right, it certainly was an error communis that such a right did not exist in the Colony, and the authorities quoted show that where there is a reasonable obstruction, prescription does not run. Then has the Crown purchased in good faith.
Bona fides, says Pothier, nihil aliud est quam justa opinio quæsili domini. Voet expresses the same idea. Bona fides est illœsa conscientia putantis rem suam esse. We find that there is in these ideas a view comprehending more than the third party whose property is prescribed. The possessor must be conscious of the validity of his title, as to the right and capacity of the one with whom he treats. For without this how could he believe himself proprietor of the thing.
These therefore are the conditions which the possessor must combine to enable him to have that undoubted belief which is called good faith. He must first have no knowledge that any one but the person who transfers the thing is proprietor. Secondly.—Be convinced that the one who conveys had the right and capacity to alienate. Thirdly.—Receive it by a contract free of fraud and of any other vice. See Troplong on Prescription[18].
There can be no doubt that at the time the Government purchased from Leamy, in 1854, they had doubts as to the validity of his title, and before the deed of the 7th May, 1855, they were officially informed of the rights of the heirs of Philemon Wright Jr.
The question therefore is, can the Crown prescribe against a subject on more favourable conditions than a subject can prescribe against a subject? If a subject could not take the property with such knowledge, how can it be said that the officer of the Crown or a Board of Works could do so?
Mr. Robertson, Q. C., for respondent:—
It is undoubted, that a Judge, at the hearing on the merits, may revise the decision of a Judge of the same Court, previously given on a défense en droit, and also that on an appeal from a final judgment, the merits of the judgment on such défenses come up for adjudication. The Supreme Court therefore can legally decide on the three défenses fyled generally to the portion of the petition claiming to have plaintiff declared proprietor of all the land now held by Government, on lots 2 and 3; and as to the necessity of signification upon the Government of the deeds of donation and transfer, so far as respects the rents, issues, and profits.
Reference was then made to Pigeau[19]; Merlin Repertoire[20]; C. C. L. C. art, 1571; Charlebois v. Forsyth[21].
It is submitted that the Crown can invoke prescription under article 2211 of the Civil Code.
Before the Code, it was decided in appeal in Lower Canada that the Crown could invoke the thirty years' prescription against a petitory action brought to recover portion of the lands covered by the fortifications of the city of Quebec: Laporte and The Principal Officers of Her Majesty's Ordnance[22].
As to the ten years' prescription it is clearly made out. What the English form of art. 2251, Civil Code, calls a translatory title and the French "un titre translatif de propriété," and the Contume juste titre, is a title capable and fit on its face to convey title.
See Grande Coutume by Ferriere, on art. 113, p. 359, where he says: One of the conditions is that the possession be founded on a juste titre, i. e., that possessor has a cause légitime, capable of transferring the domaine, such as purchase, donation, will, judgment, &c., not a lease, or loan, or precarious title.
The titles to the Crown in this case are manifestly translatory, they are deeds of sale, deeds in the usual form, and authentic, and perfect.
The possession of the Crown has been for more than ten years, and if its good faith is impugned, the bad faith must be clearly established by the petitioner.
As to the plea of confirmation or ratification of title, the statute 9th Vic., c. 37, was in force when the ratifications in question in this cause were obtained.
In ordinary cases of ratification, hypotheques alone are purged; but in cases where the Crown obtains or expropriates land for public purposes under the statutes referred to, it is submitted, that rights of mortgage and hypotheques, and rights of property also, are equally purged, and the claim of the owners converted into a claim on the monies deposited in Court.
Under this statute the commissioners had the right to deposit the monies in the Court; the compensation-money was to represent the land; and parties claiming rights of property were bound to fyle their oppositions; and it will be seen that oppositions were actually fyled in this cause by some of the parties, donors to the plaintiff, namely, by Pamelia Wright (Mrs. McGoey), Serina Wright (Mrs. Pierce), and Hull Wright.
The judgments of the Court at Aylmer, ratifying the titles, evidently went on the ground that not only were hypotheques purged, but claims of property were also purged. The judgment in No. 136, ex parte Her Majesty, for ratification, recites that the parties above named, also Ruggles Wright, were opposants; that the application of Her Majesty was made under the 9 Vic., c. 37; that all the formalities required had been shewn to have been complied with, and the oppositions of Pamelia Wright and others had been discontinued with costs.
As to the Inscription en faux, it is submitted that it does not lie against the Register, as stated in the demurrer to certain of the moyens de faux; next, that it is very doubtful, under our jurisprudence, whether a judgment can in any case be attacked by an Inscription en faux; that no faux are proved, the evidence of the witnesses being wholly worthless, and insufficient to set aside either the judgment or Register.
The ordinance of 1667, tit. 26, art. 5, in force in Lower Canada, says: The presiding judge shall see that at the close of the sitting, and on the same day, the clerk has written, he shall sign "le plumitif," and paraph each sentence, judgment, or arrêt.
The plumitif is defined as being the original and primitive paper on which a summary of the judgments is written, which are rendered in open Court. Répertoire de Jurisprudence, vo. "Plumitif."
The plumitif is never signed in our practice. The draft of judgment, when drawn by the Prothonotary, and approved, is initialed, or signed by the Judge.
In France, the feuilles d'audience, or original drafts of judgments, are kept till the end of the year.
The learned counsel referred to Healy v. Corporation of Montreal[23]; art. 1207 and 1220 C. C. L. C.
In Carter v. Molson and Mechanics' Bank v. Molson, recently decided in the Superior Court, Montreal, by Dorion, J. (not reported), it was held no inscription en faux lay against a judgment.
The learned counsel then argued on the facts of record that it appeared that the division agreed to on the 5 March, 1838, ought to be held as a family arrangement, under which Sally Olmstead obtained a title to the 159 acres, reserved for her dower, and that the evidence adduced did not establish bad faith on the part of the Crown.
Mr. Lacoste, Q. C., followed on behalf of the respondent.
It is contended that Her Majesty cannot invoke prescription, because it was practically impossible to exercise the right of petition of right, and that there was common error as to the existence of this right. The case of Laporte v. The Principal Officers of Her Majesty Ordnance[24], clearly shows that the right existed. Then also ignorance of the law is no excuse.
The first plea of prescription is that of thirty years. To succeed on that plea I admit Her Majesty is bound to join her possession to that of her auteurs. Now, if the Court hold that Mrs. Sparks had a precarious title, her possession cannot be joined to that of the Crown, but it seems to me that the estate was divided in 1838, among the heirs, not as a partage provisoire, but forever. See art. 2094.
However, the Crown relies also on the plea of 10 years' prescription in good faith with translatory title. As to the deed of 1849, there can be no question of bad faith. The learned counsel then argued that on the evidence adduced the appellant had failed, as the burden was on him to prove that the crown was in bad faith, if bad faith can ever be imputed to the Crown.
Then, as to the plea under the Statute 9 Vic. c. 37; it is said the deed is not valid, because it was not passed in accordance with the provisions of the act, viz.: Signed and sealed. If that construction is to be put upon the act, how can you explain sec. 5 of the act which expressly recognizes transfers made before notaries and declares such deeds to be valid. Then, that the Crown could purchase from other persons than those specially mentioned in sec. 8, sufficiently appears by the following section, which declares that the money will stand in lieu of the land, and one of the effects of the judgment of ratification is to bar all claims.
We find also, that by the deeds of transfer to the petitioner, some of the parties thereto assumed the quality of heirs of Sally Olmstead; if so, as warrantor of her acts, the suppliant could not call in question titles derived from her. More than this, one of these heirs, Mrs. Leamy, was the co-vendor with Leamy to the Government, and she, in any case, had no rights to transfer to the suppliant.
The following additional authorities were then referred to by the learned counsel on the question of the inscription en faux. French Code of Proc., art. 214 to 251; Sirey (1865), Code, vo. Faux. Bioche, Dict. de Proc. 1850, vo. Faux, No. 44—56, No. 197. Palsgrave v. Ross[25]. The omission to sign a judgment in a Register will not authorize a Court to treat it as non-existant when an authentic copy is produced. 9 Dalloz, Juris du Royaume, p. 616, Note 3.
Mr. Laflamme, Q. C. in reply.
RITCHIE, C. J.:—
The property claimed by the petitioner was granted to Philemon Wright, 3rd May, 1806. On the 25th April, 1808, Philemon Wright conveyed this property to his son Philemon Wright Jr. On the 4th May, 1808, Philemon Wright Jr. married Sarah, alias Sally Olmstead, without any marriage contract.
Philemon Wright Jr. died 5th Dec, 1821, intestate, leaving his widow and eight children issue of the said marriage.
The real estate in question, having been acquired previous to the marriage, continued, notwithstanding the marriage, the sole and absolute property of Philemon Wright Jr., subject to the customary dower (douaire coutumier) of the wife, which consisted of the usufruct or life enjoyment of one-half of the real estate owned and possessed by the husband at the date of the marriage, the absolute property of which would revert to the children, issue of the marriage, or their representatives, after the death of the widow.
On 20th November, 1823, the widow married Nicholas Sparks, and died on the 9th October, 1871.
After the death of P. Wright Jr., his heirs made a division or partage of their father's estate between themselves and the said Sally Olmstead, and caused a plan to be made by one Anthony Swalwell, a surveyor, of the several portions, and on the fifth day of March, 1838, by certain agreements entitled quit claims or transfers, seven in number, all bearing date on the day and year last aforesaid, under their hands and seals, duly made before witnesses, and all duly registered in the Registry Office of the said County of Ottawa, the said several heirs, with the exception of Wellington Wright, ratified the said survey and partage or division made; and the possession of the several lots so previously occupied and enjoyed and the rights of Sally Olmstead, their mother, to certain portions of said lots 2 and 3, in said 5th range of Hull aforesaid, hereinafter mentioned, were also thereby ratified and acknowledged.
In and by each and every of said quit claims and transfers, it was declared:
That the said Philemon Wright, junior, Hull Wright, Pamelia Wright, Horatio Wright, Erexina Wright, Sally Wright, as surviving heirs of their late father, having mutually agreed to divide the inheritance of their late father, have caused the same to be surveyed by Anthony Swalwell, Deputy Surveyor, who having ascertained the quantity of land in lots nos. 2, 3 and 4 in the 5th Concession of the Township of Hull to be 591 acres, 1 rood 24 perches, including a certain pond of water, the said portions of said land, having been sub-divided, the following portions have been allotted to each, that is to say:—
To Philemon Wright
43 acres 2 roods.
" Hull Wright
43 " 2 "
" Pamelia Wright
49 "
" Horatio Wright
53 " 1 rood 24 p.
" Wellington Wright
48 "
" Serina Wright
60 "
" Erexina Wright
65 "
" Sally Wright
70 "
" Sally Olmstead, their mother, the pond of water inclusive
159 "
With all of which the said heirs declared themselves satisfied, and that in order the better to secure to each other a legal title to the said portions of land aforesaid, the said heirs did grant remise and release, and forever quit claim by each of said deeds to each heir severally the lot hereinabove referred too, and shown on said plan of said Swalwell, and describing each portion by metes and bounds, to have and to hold to each heir the said portion so allotted to his or her use and behoof forever, so that the said heirs so conveying said several lots should not, nor should any person claiming from them, have claim or demand any right or title to the said several premises whatever.
The plaintiff now claims a certain undivided interest in the 159 acres so set apart for the use of the said Sarah Olmstead, under deeds from the heirs of Philemon Wright Jr., on the ground that the same was set apart to the said Sally Olmstead as and for her dower in her husband's estate, and that the same on her death reverted to the heirs of the said Philemon Wright Jr.
Of the nine deeds set up in the petition, the first and eighth are set up as being from Philemon Wright as one of the children of Philemon Wright Jr. The third and fourth from Sally or Sarah Wright (Mrs. Boucher). The second and sixth from Erexina Wright, otherwise called Elizabeth Wright, (Mrs. Leamy). The seventh from Pamelia Wright, (Mrs. McGoey). The ninth and last from Philemon Wright, Mary Jane Wright, (Mrs. Allan), Serina Wright, (widow Olmstead), Ellen Wright, (widow Whitney), as the children of Hull Wright. The consideration of some of these deeds is as follows:
The present gift inter vivos and conveyance is thus made for and in consideration, firstly, of the friendship which the said donors entertain towards and for the said donee; secondly, of the gratitude they, the said donors, feel for him, said donee, for services rendered and being rendered by the latter to the former.
It is claimed on behalf of the Crown, in the first place, that this partage was a family arrangement, that the quantity of land set off to the widow was much less in quantity than half her husband's land, and that it was the intention of the parties that the widow, in taking so much less than she was entitled to, was to have the absolute right and title to the part so allotted to her, and that the same was given to and accepted by her in lieu of her dower, or life interest in the half of the estate; and that the Crown, by deeds from the widow and her husband, and from Leamy and wife, who likewise claim a portion under deeds from the widow and late husband, became vested with the absolute ownership of the land. Failing in this contention, it is claimed that the property was acquired and taken possession of by the Crown, for the use, maintenance and construction of certain public works, under powers conferred by the 9 Vic., c. 37 of the statutes of Canada, and that the same was conveyed to the Crown, and that the title of the crown (as to part if not the whole) was afterwards duly confirmed by a judgment of confirmation, whereby all claims to the lands, to which such confirmation extended, were forever barred; and lastly, that if the conveyances and confirmation were not of themselves sufficient to vest the legal title in the Crown, then that the Crown had acquired a legal title to the property by prescription.
If the first proposition could be established there would be an end of the case, but I can find no sufficient evidence to sustain this contention. On the contrary, I think the evidence leads to a conclusion the reverse, though certainly the conduct of the parties would tend to a strong suspicion that such may have been the case. No necessary inference can, I think, be drawn from the quantity of the land set apart to the widow, as being less than half the property which the law gives her, because it would, I think, be unreasonable to suppose that in a block of 590 acres, on rivers such as the Gatineau or Ottawa, every acre would be exactly of the same value, or that it would be possible to divide the lot into nine portions of relatively equal value by giving an exact half in quantity to the widow and eight other portions, each containing exactly the same quantity, to the eight heirs. Thus, we see, in the partage among the heirs of the balance, after deducting the portion set apart to the widow, there is quite as great a discrepancy in the quantities awarded to them respectively. Two get only 43 acres each, while all the rest get many more, ranging in excess from 6 up to 17 acres; therefore, I think the inference may fairly be, that the partage was based on and governed by the value of the respective lots, and not on the quantity of land each share contained, and so, though the widow may not have had allotted to her the use of half her husband's property in extent, she may have had it in value. Then again, we find that while, as among and for the security of the heirs, quitclaims and transfers were made, securing to each heir, by legal documentary title, the absolute interest in the lot appropriated to him or her respectively, no such quit claim or transfer is made to the widow, nor do we find her a party to any such quit claim. If it was deemed necessary that the title of the heirs should be so secured to them, a fortiori the right of the widow, who, as widow, had only an usufructuary interest, still more required, if it was intended that she should be the absolute owner, a solemn relinquishment and conveyance of the rights of the heirs to her in the portion allotted to her.
It is true the deed made by the widow and her husband on the 12th September, 1849, whereby they sold, as their sole and absolute property, a portion of this land so allotted to Her Majesty the Queen, which deed I shall have occasion more particularly to refer to on another branch of this case, certainly shows that she, at that time, claimed to be absolute owner of the property and dealt with it as such, but this can in no way be used directly or indirectly to establish the fact that she was such owner, and if it could, it must, on the other hand, be observed that on the 7th December, 1852, dealing with another part of the 159 acres and her interest in it, she deals with it as if she had a right of dower only. It is a somewhat singular circumstance, that in this deed is expressly excepted the portion sold and conveyed to Her Majesty, which portion was most certainly sold and conveyed as the absolute property of the vendors, and this would rather lead to the supposition that, as they had sold to the Crown, so they were selling to Leamy as the absolute proprietors; the language of the deed to Leamy can only be reconciled with this idea, on the supposition that in transferring what had been allotted to her, if absolutely, for and in lieu of dower, she in common parlance continued to call it her dower, and whoever drew the deed did the same, possibly considering that the words of the deed "the said dower and all other rights whatsoever belonging to the said Sarah Olmstead, and which the latter claims as her right of dower" would cover all her rights, whether as dower or absolute owner. However this may be, I cannot bring my mind to the conclusion that there is sufficient legal evidence to justify me in saying that there was a binding agreement between the heirs and the widow, whereby the portion allotted to the latter was not simply as and for her dower, but was set apart as her absolute property in lieu of her dower, however much I may suspect such to have been the intention, in view of what has been said and of the fact that the parties have so long slumbered on their