Dominion Investments (Nassau) Ltd. v. Canada

Dominion Investments (Nassau) Ltd. v. Canada
Court (s) Database
Federal Court Decisions
Date
2005-10-13
Neutral citation
2005 FC 1397
File numbers
T-1591-04
Notes
Reported Decision
Decision Content
Date: 20051013
Docket: T-1591-04
Citation: 2005 FC 1397
Ottawa, Ontario, October 13, 2005
PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE JOHANNE GAUTHIER
BETWEEN:
DOMINION INVESTMENTS (NASSAU) LTD.
-and-
MARTIN TREMBLAY
(President of Dominion Investments (Nassau) Ltd.
Plaintiffs
AND
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF CANADA
Defendant
REASONS FOR ORDER AND ORDER
[1] Dominion Investments Nassau Ltd. (Dominion) has appealed from the decision by the Prothonotary to stay their action for a permanent injunction against the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), and for damages including punitive and exemplary damages ($6,350,000 US) against Her Majesty, for a period of 12 months to allow the defendant to pursue and complete a police investigation that is currently ongoing. The stay is accompanied by a requirement that the defendant report to the Court within six months regarding any significant change that might make it possible to resume the proceedings and lift the stay.
[2] In that order, the Prothonotary also ordered that the affidavit of Serge Therriault, filed in support of the defendant's motion for the stay, be delivered to her by hand and that all copies held by the Court be destroyed within a reasonable time.
[3] This appeal raises two novel issues:
(i) Can the defendant use the procedure set out in section 37 of the Canada Evidence Act, R.S. 1985, c. C-5 (Evidence Act) to prevent the disclosure of information (in this case, the affidavit of Mr. Therriault prepared specifically to support her motion to stay the action under paragraph 50(1)(b) of the Federal Courts Act, R.S. 1985, c. F-7) (the Act) that she herself chose to file to obtain an order other than the order relating to the disclosure of that information;
(ii) If so, is a stay of proceedings the appropriate remedy to allow the RCMP to complete an ongoing investigation when the conduct of the investigation is itself the central issue in the action in damages, and if so, must the three tests set out in R.J.R. - Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, which are generally applicable in analyzing motions for a stay of proceedings under section 50, be applied in analyzing the merits of the motion?
BACKGROUND
[4] It is not appropriate to review in detail the facts alleged in the action. For the purposes of this appeal, it is sufficient to note that in their action, the plaintiffs allege that in 2002 and 2003, in the course of an investigation, the RCMP disclosed information that was false, misleading and highly prejudicial to their reputations and their business to certain financial institutions with which they did business and to the police in the United States.
[5] That information was allegedly disclosed in relation to a request made by the American authorities for the extradition of Daniel Pelchat, in a document filed in September 2002 in the public record of the Quebec Superior Court, stating:
As part of our financial investigation, we have, together with the RCMP, learned that Pelchat's moneys are deposited into an investment account named Dominion Investments at the Royal Bank of Canada. While that investigation remains ongoing, the RCMP reports that Dominion Investments is a Bahamian money laundering operation affiliated with the Hell's Angels.
[Emphasis added.]
[6] As I said, the plaintiffs are seeking, in addition to the damages they are claiming, an order enjoining the RCMP to cease disclosing any information to anyone regarding the applicants, including any information relating to the facts out of which this action arose. With regard to the allegations in the amended statement of claim, I also understand that they are thereby attempting to put an end to, or prevent, any future investigation in which they might be directly or indirectly implicated.
[7] In her motion record, the defendant included a certificate under section 37 of the Canada Evidence Act referring to, without disclosing, the information found in the redacted affidavit filed in support of the stay motion. Mr. Covey, the Superintendent of the RCMP, stated in that certificate that disclosure of the information in all of the redacted paragraphs of the affidavit would seriously encroach upon a public interest, and more specifically the functioning of the RCMP and of Canadian police services, as well as on the conduct of ongoing criminal investigations. He also certified that it would endanger the lives of individuals who have cooperated with the police services in those investigations, that it would identify or tend to identify informers and individuals who are the subject of investigations and investigative techniques used by the RCMP and, more generally, police intelligence.
[8] The plaintiffs are therefore generally aware of the principles relied on by the defendant to protect the substance of Mr. Therriault's affidavit under section 37, in accordance with the procedure set out in that section. However, they are not aware of the evidence filed by the defendant to establish that she has met the tests set out in R.J.R. - Macdonald Inc., supra, and that she is entitled to a stay of proceedings.
[9] At the hearing before the Prothonotary, the defendant also had an opportunity to make additional submissions ex parte (that is, in the absence of the plaintiffs and their counsel) and to provide an explanation of the evidence filed in support of her stay motion.
[10] In his decision, the Prothonotary first considered the application of section 37 of the Evidence Act, and stated, based on the information in the certificate and the redacted affidavit, that the defendant was justified in objecting to disclosure of the information in the affidavit because there were reasons of public interest not to disclose it. He found that Mr. Covey's certificate complied with the requirements in section 37 and that there was no public interest in disclosure that outweighed the interest identified in the certificate. On that point, he noted, in paragraph 22 of his decision, that "the main reason why disclosure might be in the public interest" is that it is in the interests of justice that parties' rights be recognized as soon as possible when they apply to the courts for a remedy.
[11] On that point, he then said, at paragraph 23:
The right to a speedy disposition is indeed in play here as well, but it cannot outweigh a valid public interest identified in the Certificate. The fact that the plaintiffs are seeking an injunction cannot, in my opinion, make this case more important, because it is uncertain whether that remedy may be granted in this instance.
[12] In the second step, the Prothonotary considered the primary remedy sought by the defendant: a stay of proceedings. After identifying how, in his opinion, the case must be distinguished from Mulroney v. Canada (Attorney General), [1996] Q.J. No. 3868, he concluded that, having regard to the allegations in the statement of claim, the defendant could not present a defence that would protect her right to make full answer and defence, and protect the other public interests referred to in the affidavit, without disclosing the information in the affidavit of Serge Therriault.
[13] In his opinion, this clearly indicated that a stay would be in the public interest within the meaning of paragraph 50(1)(b), but "For greater certainty, and as is the practice of this Court", he then applied the test set out in R.J.R. - Macdonald Inc., supra, and concluded that having regard to the particular facts of the case, a stay of proceedings was the only remedy that could guarantee both the defendant's right to protect the information in the affidavit of Serge Therriault in the public interest and her right to make full answer and defence.
ISSUES
[14] The plaintiffs submit that the Prothonotary made a number of errors of law in his analysis and his application of section 37 of the Evidence Act, as follows:
(i) He refused to apply the principles of law set out in ample criminal jurisprudence, stating simply that those principles relate solely to criminal law, and he did not consider all of the material evidence in the assessment mandated by section 37;
(ii) He did not consider the fact that the defendant was unable to rely on section 37 because the information she wished to protect had already been made public;
(iii) He erred in fact and in law when he refused, notwithstanding subsection 37(5) of the Evidence Act, to establish conditions for disclosure of the information in the affidavit filed by the defendant, such as disclosure to the plaintiffs' counsel only;
[15] The Prothonotary allegedly erred when he agreed to apply the process described in section 37 for protecting information prepared and filed by the defendant of her own accord in order to obtain a procedural advantage, a stay of proceedings (proactive context) rather than in the course of an objection to production of that information (reactive context) when she was or could have been required to do so by a court or other body with the authority to compel her to do so in response to an application for such an order. In the plaintiffs' submission, the Prothonotary also erred, in this context, by hearing submissions ex parte.
[16] The plaintiffs further argue that the Prothonotary erred when he found that a stay of proceedings was an appropriate remedy in this instance and applied the tests in R.J.R. - Macdonald Inc., supra, which in their submission are not an applicable analytical framework, as has been decided by André Rochon J., in Mulroney, supra.
[17] Their final argument is that if the Prothonotary was right to use those tests, he erred in the specific manner in which he applied them, by suggesting that the plaintiffs might not be entitled to obtain an injunction and by failing to consider, inter alia, that there would be irreparable harm to their reputation if the proceedings were stayed.
ANALYSIS
[18] The standard of review that applies to the Prothonotary's decision is settled law (Canada v. Aqua-Gem Investments Ltd., [1993] 2 F.C. 425, Z.I. Pompey Industrie v. ECU-Line N.V., [2003] 1 S.C.R. 450 at paragraph 18). It was recently restated by the Federal Court of Appeal in Merck & Co., Inc. v. Apotex Inc., [2003] F.C.J. No. 1925, where Robert Décary J.A. described it as follows:
Discretionary orders of prothonotaries ought not be disturbed on appeal to a judge unless: (a) the questions raised in the motion are vital to the final issue of the case, or (b) the orders are clearly wrong, in the sense that the exercise of discretion by the prothonotary was based upon a wrong principle or upon a misapprehension of the facts.
[19] The plaintiffs submit that the Prothonotary's decision is vital to the final outcome of the case. However, they have not explained how a stay of proceedings, a measure that is neutral and essentially temporary, would have such an influence that way.
[20] The Prothonotary's decision to apply the process set out in section 37 to the information in the redacted affidavit is indeed vital to the final outcome of the motion, but certainly not to the outcome of the action. As I will explain later, that decision does not relate to the future disclosure of information or documents during the proceeding once the stay is lifted.
[21] In any event, for the reasons that I will explain below, I am satisfied that the Prothonotary erred in law when he agreed to apply section 37 of the Evidence Act to the stay motion. In addition, if I am not mistaken on this point, in my opinion the Prothonotary was clearly wrong in his assessment of the interests at stake in relation to the application of section 37 and paragraph 50(1)(b) of the Act. That error justifies that I consider the motion de novo. I will return to this point.
A. Application of section 37 of the Evidence Act
[22] First, we should note that at the hearing before the Prothonotary the plaintiffs did not suggest that section 37 did not apply. In response to questions by the Court, the plaintiffs submitted that the defendant could not rely on section 37 to prevent the disclosure of the evidence she had herself filed in support of her request for a stay because the result would be grossly unfair and could not be sanctioned by the Court given the wording of this section.
[23] Because there is no indication that relevant evidence needed for this question of law to be disposed of is missing, the Court must consider it in the appeal (Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458, at paragraph 51 and 671905 Alberta Inc. v. Q'Max Solutions Inc. (C.A.), [2003] F.C.J. No. 873, at paragraph 35).
[24] I will therefore examine that argument. For the purposes of this analysis, I will adopt the principles of interpretation summarized by Iacobucci J. in Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, at pages 580 and 581:
26 In Elmer Driedger's definitive formulation, found at p. 87 of his Construction of Statutes (2nd ed. 1983):
Today there is only one principle or approach, namely, the words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.
Driedger's modern approach has been repeatedly cited by this Court as the preferred approach to statutory interpretation across a wide range of interpretive settings: see, for example, ... . I note as well that, in the federal legislative context, this Court's preferred approach is buttressed by s. 12 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-21, which provides that every enactment "is deemed remedial, and shall be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects".
27 The preferred approach recognizes the important role that context must inevitably play when a court construes the written words of a statute: as Professor John Willis incisively noted in his seminal article "Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell" (1938), 16 Can. Bar Rev. 1, at p. 6, "words, like people, take their colour from their surroundings". This being the case, where the provision under consideration is found in an Act that is itself a component of a larger statutory scheme, the surroundings that colour the words and the scheme of the Act are more expansive. In such an instance, the application of Driedger's principle gives rise to what was described in ... as "the principle of interpretation that presumes a harmony, coherence, and consistency between statutes dealing with the same subject matter".
[25] It will be useful to reproduce here the most relevant provisions of section 37 and of sections 38 and 39 of the Evidence Act, since those provisions comprise a code or set of rules designed to govern the exercise of public interest immunity, including sensitive information and Privy Council confidences.
Canada Evidence Act, R.S. 1985, c. C-5, as amended:
Loi sur la preuve au Canada, L.R. 1985, ch. C-5, tel qu'amendée:
37. (1) Subject to sections 38 to 38.16, a Minister of the Crown in right of Canada or other official may object to the disclosure of information before a court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the production of information by certifying orally or in writing to the court, person or body that the information should not be disclosed on the grounds of a specified public interest.
37. (1) Sous réserve des articles 38 à 38.16, tout ministre fédéral ou tout fonctionnaire peut s'opposer à la divulgation de renseignements auprès d'un tribunal, d'un organisme ou d'une personne ayant le pouvoir de contraindre à la production de renseignements, en attestant verbalement ou par écrit devant eux que, pour des raisons d'intérêt public déterminées, ces renseignements ne devraient pas être divulgués.
(1.1) If an objection is made under subsection (1), the court, person or body shall ensure that the information is not disclosed other than in accordance with this Act.
(1.1) En cas d'opposition, le tribunal, l'organisme ou la personne veille à ce que les renseignements ne soient pas divulgués, sauf en conformité avec la présente loi.
(2) If an objection to the disclosure of information is made before a superior court, that court may determine the objection.
(2) Si l'opposition est portée devant une cour supérieure, celle-ci peut décider la question.
(3) If an objection to the disclosure of information is made before a court, person or body other than a superior court, the objection may be determined, on application, by
(3) Si l'opposition est portée devant un tribunal, un organisme ou une personne qui ne constituent pas une cour supérieure, la question peut être décidée, sur demande, par :
(a) the Federal Court, in the case of a person or body vested with power to compel production by or under an Act of Parliament if the person or body is not a court established under a law of a province; or
a) la Cour fédérale, dans les cas où l'organisme ou la personne investis du pouvoir de contraindre à la production de renseignements sous le régime d'une loi fédérale ne constituent pas un tribunal régi par le droit d'une province;
(b) the trial division or trial court of the superior court of the province within which the court, person or body exercises its jurisdiction, in any other case.
b) la division ou le tribunal de première instance de la cour supérieure de la province dans le ressort de laquelle le tribunal, l'organisme ou la personne ont compétence, dans les autres cas.
(4) An application under subsection (3) shall be made within 10 days after the objection is made or within any further or lesser time that the court having jurisdiction to hear the application considers appropriate in the circumstances.
(4) Le délai dans lequel la demande visée au paragraphe (3) peut être faite est de dix jours suivant l'opposition, mais le tribunal saisi peut modifier ce délai s'il l'estime indiqué dans les circonstances.
(4.1) Unless the court having jurisdiction to hear the application concludes that the disclosure of the information to which the objection was made under subsection (1) would encroach upon a specified public interest, the court may authorize by order the disclosure of the information.
(4.1) Le tribunal saisi peut rendre une ordonnance autorisant la divulgation des renseignements qui ont fait l'objet d'une opposition au titre du paragraphe (1), sauf s'il conclut que leur divulgation est préjudiciable au regard des raisons d'intérêt public déterminées.
(5) If the court having jurisdiction to hear the application concludes that the disclosure of the information to which the objection was made under subsection (1) would encroach upon a specified public interest, but that the public interest in disclosure outweighs in importance the specified public interest, the court may, by order, after considering both the public interest in disclosure and the form of and conditions to disclosure that are most likely to limit any encroachment upon the specified public interest resulting from disclosure, authorize the disclosure, subject to any conditions that the court considers appropriate, of all of the information, a part or summary of the information, or a written admission of facts relating to the information.
(5) Si le tribunal saisi conclut que la divulgation des renseignements qui ont fait l'objet d'une opposition au titre du paragraphe (1) est préjudiciable au regard des raisons d'intérêt public déterminées, mais que les raisons d'intérêt public qui justifient la divulgation l'emportent sur les raisons d'intérêt public déterminées, il peut par ordonnance, compte tenu des raisons d'intérêt public qui justifient la divulgation ainsi que de la forme et des conditions de divulgation les plus susceptibles de limiter le préjudice au regard des raisons d'intérêt public déterminées, autoriser, sous réserve des conditions qu'il estime indiquées, la divulgation de tout ou partie des renseignements, d'un résumé de ceux-ci ou d'un aveu écrit des faits qui y sont liés.
(6) If the court does not authorize disclosure under subsection (4.1) or (5), the court shall, by order, prohibit disclosure of the information.
(6) Dans les cas où le tribunal n'autorise pas la divulgation au titre des paragraphes (4.1) ou (5), il rend une ordonnance interdisant la divulgation.
(6.1) The court may receive into evidence anything that, in the opinion of the court, is reliable and appropriate, even if it would not otherwise be admissible under Canadian law, and may base its decision on that evidence.
(6.1) Le tribunal peut recevoir et admettre en preuve tout élément qu'il estime digne de foi et approprié -- même si le droit canadien ne prévoit pas par ailleurs son admissibilité -- et peut fonder sa décision sur cet élément.
37.3 (1) A judge presiding at a criminal trial or other criminal proceeding may make any order that he or she considers appropriate in the circumstances to protect the right of the accused to a fair trial, as long as that order complies with the terms of any order made under any of subsections 37(4.1) to (6) in relation to that trial or proceeding or any judgment made on appeal of an order made under any of those subsections.
37.3 (1) Le juge qui préside un procès criminel ou une autre instance criminelle peut rendre l'ordonnance qu'elle estime indiquée dans les circonstances en vue de protéger le droit de l'accusé à un procès équitable, pourvu que telle ordonnance soit conforme à une ordonnance rendue au titre de l'un des paragraphes 37(4.1) à (6) relativement à ce procès ou à cette instance ou à la décision en appel portant sur une ordonnance rendue au titre de l'un ou l'autre de ces paragraphes.
(2) The orders that may be made under subsection (1) include, but are not limited to, the following orders:
(2) L'ordonnance rendue au titre du paragraphe (1) peut notamment :
(a) an order dismissing specified counts of the indictment or information, or permitting the indictment or information to proceed only in respect of a lesser or included offence;
a) annuler un chef d'accusation d'un acte d'accusation ou d'une dénonciation, ou autoriser l'instruction d'un chef d'accusation ou d'une dénonciation pour une infraction moins grave ou une infraction incluse;
(b) an order effecting a stay of the proceedings; and
b) ordonner l'arrêt des procédures;
(c) an order finding against any party on any issue relating to information the disclosure of which is prohibited.
c) être rendue à l'encontre de toute partie sur toute question liée aux renseignements dont la divulgation est interdite.
38.01 (1) Every participant who, in connection with a proceeding, is required to disclose, or expects to disclose or cause the disclosure of, information that the participant believes is sensitive information or potentially injurious information shall, as soon as possible, notify the Attorney General of Canada in writing of the possibility of the disclosure, and of the nature, date and place of the proceeding.
38.01 (1) Tout participant qui, dans le cadre d'une instance, est tenu de divulguer ou prévoit de divulguer ou de faire divulguer des renseignements dont il croit qu'il s'agit de renseignements sensibles ou de renseignements potentiellement préjudiciables est tenu d'aviser par écrit, dès que possible, le procureur général du Canada de la possibilité de divulgation et de préciser dans l'avis la nature, la date et le lieu de l'instance.
(2) Every participant who believes that sensitive information or potentially injurious information is about to be disclosed, whether by the participant or another person, in the course of a proceeding shall raise the matter with the person presiding at the proceeding and notify the Attorney General of Canada in writing of the matter as soon as possible, whether or not notice has been given under subsection (1). In such circumstances, the person presiding at the proceeding shall ensure that the information is not disclosed other than in accordance with this Act.
(2) Tout participant qui croit que des renseignements sensibles ou des renseignements potentiellement préjudiciables sont sur le point d'être divulgués par lui ou par une autre personne au cours d'une instance est tenu de soulever la question devant la personne qui préside l'instance et d'aviser par écrit le procureur général du Canada de la question dès que possible, que ces renseignements aient fait ou non l'objet de l'avis prévu au paragraphe (1). Le cas échéant, la personne qui préside l'instance veille à ce que les renseignements ne soient pas divulgués, sauf en conformité avec la présente loi.
38.02 (1.1) When an entity listed in the schedule, for any purpose listed there in relation to that entity, makes a decision or order that would result in the disclosure of sensitive information or potentially injurious information, the entity shall not disclose the information or cause it to be disclosed until notice of intention to disclose the information has been given to the Attorney General of Canada and a period of 10 days has elapsed after notice was given.
38.02 (1.1) Dans le cas où une entité mentionnée à l'annexe rend, dans le cadre d'une application qui y est mentionnée en regard de celle-ci, une décision ou une ordonnance qui entraînerait la divulgation de renseignements sensibles ou de renseignements potentiellement préjudiciables, elle ne peut les divulguer ou les faire divulguer avant que le procureur général du Canada ait été avisé de ce fait et qu'il se soit écoulé un délai de dix jours postérieur à l'avis.
38.04 (1) The Attorney General of Canada may, at any time and in any circumstances, apply to the Federal Court for an order with respect to the disclosure of information about which notice was given under any of subsections 38.01(1) to (4).
38.04 (1) Le procureur général du Canada peut, à tout moment et en toutes circonstances, demander à la Cour fédérale de rendre une ordonnance portant sur la divulgation de renseignements à l'égard desquels il a reçu un avis au titre de l'un des paragraphes 38.01(1) à (4).
38.06 (1) Unless the judge concludes that the disclosure of the information would be injurious to international relations or national defence or national security, the judge may, by order, authorize the disclosure of the information.
38.06 (1) Le juge peut rendre une ordonnance autorisant la divulgation des renseignements, sauf s'il conclut qu'elle porterait préjudice aux relations internationales ou à la défense ou à la sécurité nationales.
(2) If the judge concludes that the disclosure of the information would be injurious to international relations or national defence or national security but that the public interest in disclosure outweighs in importance the public interest in non-disclosure, the judge may by order, after considering both the public interest in disclosure and the form of and conditions to disclosure that are most likely to limit any injury to international relations or national defence or national security resulting from disclosure, authorize the disclosure, subject to any conditions that the judge considers appropriate, of all of the information, a part or summary of the information, or a written admission of facts relating to the information.
(2) Si le juge conclut que la divulgation des renseignements porterait préjudice aux relations internationales ou à la défense ou à la sécurité nationales, mais que les raisons d'intérêt public qui justifient la divulgation l'emportent sur les raisons d'intérêt public qui justifient la non-divulgation, il peut par ordonnance, compte tenu des raisons d'intérêt public qui justifient la divulgation ainsi que de la forme et des conditions de divulgation les plus susceptibles de limiter le préjudice porté aux relations internationales ou à la défense ou à la sécurité nationales, autoriser, sous réserve des conditions qu'il estime indiquées, la divulgation de tout ou partie des renseignements, d'un résumé de ceux-ci ou d'un aveu écrit des faits qui y sont liés.
38.08 If the judge determines that a party to the proceeding whose interests are adversely affected by an order made under any of subsections 38.06(1) to (3) was not given the opportunity to make representations under paragraph 38.04(5)(d), the judge shall refer the order to the Federal Court of Appeal for review.
38.08 Si le juge conclut qu'une partie à l'instance dont les intérêts sont lésés par une ordonnance rendue en application de l'un des paragraphes 38.06(1) à (3) n'a pas eu la possibilité de présenter ses observations au titre de l'alinéa 38.04(5)d), il renvoie l'ordonnance à la Cour d'appel fédérale pour examen.
38.11 (1) A hearing under subsection 38.04(5) or an appeal or review of an order made under any of subsections 38.06(1) to (3) shall be heard in private and, at the request of either the Attorney General of Canada or, in the case of a proceeding under Part III of the National Defence Act, the Minister of National Defence, shall be heard in the National Capital Region, as described in the schedule to the National Capital Act.
38.11 (1) Les audiences prévues au paragraphe 38.04(5) et l'audition de l'appel ou de l'examen d'une ordonnance rendue en application de l'un des paragraphes 38.06(1) à (3) sont tenues à huis clos et, à la demande soit du procureur général du Canada, soit du ministre de la Défense nationale dans le cas des instances engagées sous le régime de la partie III de la Loi sur la défense nationale, elles ont lieu dans la région de la capitale nationale définie à l'annexe de la Loi sur la capitale nationale.
(2) The judge conducting a hearing under subsection 38.04(5) or the court hearing an appeal or review of an order made under any of subsections 38.06(1) to (3) may give any person who makes representations under paragraph 38.04(5)(d), and shall give the Attorney General of Canada and, in the case of a proceeding under Part III of the National Defence Act, the Minister of National Defence, the opportunity to make representations ex parte.
(2) Le juge saisi d'une affaire au titre du paragraphe 38.04(5) ou le tribunal saisi de l'appel ou de l'examen d'une ordonnance rendue en application de l'un des paragraphes 38.06(1) à (3) donne au procureur général du Canada -- et au ministre de la Défense nationale dans le cas d'une instance engagée sous le régime de la partie III de la Loi sur la défense nationale -- la possibilité de présenter ses observations en l'absence d'autres parties. Il peut en faire de même pour les personnes qu'il entend en application de l'alinéa 38.04(5)d).
38.14 (1) The person presiding at a criminal proceeding may make any order that he or she considers appropriate in the circumstances to protect the right of the accused to a fair trial, as long as that order complies with the terms of any order made under any of subsections 38.06(1) to (3) in relation to that proceeding, any judgment made on appeal from, or review of, the order, or any certificate issued under section 38.13.
38.14 (1) La personne qui préside une instance criminelle peut rendre l'ordonnance qu'elle estime indiquée en l'espèce en vue de protéger le droit de l'accusé à un procès équitable, pourvu que telle ordonnance soit conforme à une ordonnance rendue en application de l'un des paragraphes 38.06(1) à (3) relativement à cette instance, a une décision en appel ou découlant de l'examen ou au certificat délivré au titre de l'article 38.13.
(2) The orders that may be made under subsection (1) include, but are not limited to, the following orders:
(2) L'ordonnance rendue au titre du paragraphe (1) peut notamment :
(a) an order dismissing specified counts of the indictment or information, or permitting the indictment or information to proceed only in respect of a lesser or included offence;
a) annuler un chef d'accusation d'un acte d'accusation ou d'une dénonciation, ou autoriser l'instruction d'un chef d'accusation ou d'une dénonciation pour une infraction moins grave ou une infraction incluse;
(b) an order effecting a stay of the proceedings; and
b) ordonner l'arrêt des procédures;
(c) an order finding against any party on any issue relating to information the disclosure of which is prohibited.
c) être rendue à l'encontre de toute partie sur toute question liée aux renseignements dont la divulgation est interdite.
39. (1) Where a minister of the Crown or the Clerk of the Privy Council objects to the disclosure of information before a court, person or body with jurisdiction to compel the production of information by certifying in writing that the information constitutes a confidence of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada, disclosure of the information shall be refused without examination or hearing of the information by the court, person or body.
39. (1) Le tribunal, l'organisme ou la personne qui ont le pouvoir de contraindre à la production de renseignements sont, dans les cas où un ministre ou le greffier du Conseil privé s'opposent à la divulgation d'un renseignement, tenus d'en refuser la divulgation, sans l'examiner ni tenir d'audition à son sujet, si le ministre ou le greffier attestent par écrit que le renseignement constitue un renseignement confidentiel du Conseil privé de la Reine pour le Canada.
(2) For the purpose of subsection (1), "a confidence of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada" includes, without restricting the generality thereof, information contained in
(2) Pour l'application du paragraphe (1), un " renseignement confidentiel du Conseil privé de la Reine pour le Canada » s'entend notamment d'un renseignement contenu dans :
(a) a memorandum the purpose of which is to present proposals or recommendations to Council;
a) une note destinée à soumettre des propositions ou recommandations au Conseil;
(b) a discussion paper the purpose of which is to present background explanations, analyses of problems or policy options to Council for consideration by Council in making decisions;
b) un document de travail destiné à présenter des problèmes, des analyses ou des options politiques à l'examen du Conseil;
(c) an agendum of Council or a record recording deliberations or decisions of Council;
c) un ordre du jour du Conseil ou un procès-verbal de ses délibérations ou décisions;
(d) a record used for or reflecting communications or discussions between ministers of the Crown on matters relating to the making of government decisions or the formulation of government policy;
d) un document employé en vue ou faisant état de communications ou de discussions entre ministres sur des questions liées à la prise des décisions du gouvernement ou à la formulation de sa politique;
(e) a record the purpose of which is to brief Ministers of the Crown in relation to matters that are brought before, or are proposed to be brought before, Council or that are the subject of communications or discussions referred to in paragraph (d); and
e) un document d'information à l'usage des ministres sur des questions portées ou qu'il est prévu de porter devant le Conseil, ou sur des questions qui font l'objet des communications ou discussions visées à l'alinéa d);
(f) draft legislation.
f) un avant-projet de loi ou projet de règlement.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), "Council" means the Queen's Privy Council for Canada, committees of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada, Cabinet and committees of Cabinet.
(3) Pour l'application du paragraphe (2), " Conseil » s'entend du Conseil privé de la Reine pour le Canada, du Cabinet et de leurs comités respectifs.
(4) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of
(4) Le paragraphe (1) ne s'applique pas
(a) a confidence of the Queen's Privy Council for Canada that has been in existence for more than twenty years; or
a) à un renseignement confidentiel du Conseil privé de la Reine pour le Canada dont l'existence remonte à plus de vingt ans;
1. (b) a discussion paper described in paragraph (2)(b)
b) à un document de travail visé à l'alinéa (2)b), dans les cas où les décisions auxquelles il se rapporte ont été rendues publiques ou, à défaut de publicité, ont été rendues quatre ans auparavant.
(i) if the decisions to which the discussion paper relates have been made public, or
(ii) where the decisions have not been made public, if four years have passed since the decisions were made.
[26] Originally, Parliament had included the rules on this subject in the Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, section 41 (see Appendix A), even though it was clear that its intention was that they would apply not only in this Court but also in all courts with the authority to compel the production of information protected by a public interest immunity.
[27] It was then clear that Parliament had simply codified the common law principles, and not repealed them.[1] It confirmed that the Court may examine information that relates to international or federal-provincial relations or national defence or security, or to Privy Council confidences. After considering whether the proper administration of justice outweighs the specified public interest, the Court may order disclosure. It specifies, however, that the power to examine and order disclosure does not apply to information relating to the interests specified in subsection 41(2).
[28] On July 7, 1982, section 41 of the Federal Court Act was repealed (S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 111, s. 3). New provisions were incorporated into the Evidence Act (see Appendix "A").[2] The new section 37 now specifies that not only may a minister of the Crown object to disclosure of information, and that the objection may be made not only to a court, but to any person with jurisdiction to compel the production of such information. In that sense, the amendments do not seem to depart from the common law principles that applied at the time.
[29] Section 38 introduces the new concept of designated judge and now permits the documents to be examined by the Chief Justice of the Federal Court or another judge designated by the Chief Justice, even where the objection is based on reasons of international relations or national defence and security.
[30] In Gold v. R. (F.C.A.), [1986] 2 F.C. 129, the first decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in which these provisions arose in a civil case, the Court said:
17 The circumstances which led Parliament, at the instance of the government, to change radically the laws governing access to information in government files, Canada's security service and, specifically, to repeal subsection 41(2) of the Federal Court Act [R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10 (as am. by S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 111, s. 3)], ought to be fresh in judicial minds. As to the latter, Parliament has manifestly found it expedient to substitute a judicial discretion for what was heretofore an absolute right on the part of the executive to refuse disclosure. It is not to be assumed that any of this transpired because the government of the day was spontaneously taken by a selfless desire to share its secrets. The executive had been unable to sustain the credibility of the system of absolute privilege codified in subsection 41(2). The new system was a politically necessary response to serious public concerns. Effective judicial supervision is an essential element of the new system. Among other aspects of the new system, its credibility is dependent on a public appreciation that the competing public interests are, in fact, being judicially balanced. It will not be well served if it appears that the exercise of judicial discretion is automatically abdicated because national security is accepted as so vital that the fair administration of justice is assumed incapable of outweighing it. Each application under section 36.2 must be dealt with on its own merits.
[31] Following the events of September 11 and the enactment of the Anti-terrorism Act, 2